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In the United States, professional actor training programs that specialize in
variations of Stanislavski’s System are the realm of “legitimate” actors. Scholarly fields
like performance studies draw students with goals of intellectual analysis and social
engagement. Experimental approaches to training, autobiographical performance, and
community-based processes are studied in these academic areas. To overcome this bias, I
historicize American actor training programs and contextualize Stanislavski and his
followers as participants in an ongoing intellectual conversation about identity, desire,
action and the body.
In the global capitalist environment, it is crucial to replace the Cold War
conceptual framework of containment, which characterizes artists with commercial goals
as “insiders” and those resisting dominant culture as “outsiders,” with a metaphor that
prioritizes commonality and positive action and values history and difference. Drawing
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on Jill Dolan’s theory of “utopian performatives,” which “represent … an imaginative
construction of both thought and action … everyday life and theatrical performance,” I
argue that the lens through which we envision bodies, identity formation, and social
engagement can be changed through a deliberate collaboration between performance
studies and professional actor training curricula. I propose adopting an intertextual
process of building characters for plays through “monopolylogues” that combine Anna
Deavere Smith’s ethnographic interviewing techniques with Method and Brecht-inspired
tools, Viewpoints, and solo performance composition. By physicalizing questions about
identity and community, experience and imagination, subjectivity and objectivity and the
body and technology, this technique re-theorizes individual identity as an ongoing and
changing process that relies on embodied interactions with other people and with history.
The dramaturgy of Charles L. Mee’s The Trojan Women: A Love Story, which I
directed at The University of Texas in 2003, suggests a dialectical relationship between
reality and imagination that this process reflects. Preparing to act in Phyllis Nagy’s The
Strip by piecing together an identity via interviews with drag performers and travelers
mirrored the character’s journey, and highlights how this technique transforms dominant
ideologies of gender and sexuality through naturalizing queerness and theatricalizing “the
real.” My hope is that introducing this method through similar projects can restore actors’
power as intellectuals and agents of transformation.
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Introduction: The American Actor and the Public Intellectual—A Love Story
I will set the stage with a caveat, if only to confess right away what may be the
most obvious criticism of the work I am presenting: I am writing this dissertation because
I am what you might call a frustrated actor. Beginning with a caveat seems appropriate,
since my frustrations (and consequently this entire project) stem from warnings and
admonitions. This work is the product of a romance with acting, and is infused with all of
the attendant elation and complication, desire and excitement, disappointment and hope
and anxiety and confusion—all of the inevitable drama that sometimes arises in an
ongoing intimate relationship. Like many, many actors, at a young age I fell in love with
(and fell in love in) theatre classes and rehearsals. I was exhilarated by the possibility of
getting inside the skin of another person; I was turned on by the emotionally and
physically charged exchanges between me, my fellow artists and audiences, and was
comforted and encouraged by the support and dedication of those collaborators; I was
engaged and frustrated and often transformed by the challenge of interpreting the words
and ideas of Shakespeare or Tennessee Williams or Paula Vogel or Samuel Beckett
through my physical and intellectual labor; and I was both thrilled and frightened by the
risks and possibilities of putting my live body on stage in front of an audience. When I
was in rehearsal or performing, time was suspended and life and the world seemed
fascinating and full and productive, so I always dreamed (and still sometimes do, for that
matter) of having a career on the stage or in films. But also as for many lovers of theatre,
acting was the irresistibly attractive but troubled, dangerous, and unpredictable lover
from whom experienced, knowledgeable and responsible adults who cared about my
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stability and respectability tried to steer me away. I was warned, diverted, and sometimes
encouraged, but always with concern or qualifications.
Usually, teachers, directors, fellow artists and friends kindly made the attempt to
reassure me that their concerns had little to do with my abilities onstage. I was always
dedicated and focused, and there were many who expressed the opinion that I had some
“talent” and “presence.” But their concerns about my choosing a career as an actor were
always, inevitably, twofold: that my intelligence would be wasted if I chose to be an
actor, and that I needed a more stable profession to “fall back on.” In other words, I
shouldn’t choose a partner who wouldn’t be able to provide for me or be my intellectual
equal. I remember that when I graduated from college with a degree in English and
Dramatic Arts, a professor pointed out that I was good at research and writing, and
should think about getting a PhD instead of trying to act. I was insulted. I wasn’t
offended by his suggestion that I get an academic degree, but was frustrated by the
continued assumption that if I chose to be an actor, I wouldn’t be using my skills as an
intelligent critical thinker. How could he not recognize that being an actor is, essentially,
an immensely important and relevant way of doing scholarly research and writing?
Acting stimulates an awareness of history, sociology, anthropology, biology, philosophy,
spirituality, music, dance and visual arts; it often stems from active and rigorous
interpretations of dramatic and other literature; it demands a deep engagement with one’s
environment and one’s body; and it contributes images of how to behave in the world and
models how to be an active, energetic and focused member of a community. So I became
determined to prove that this supposed delinquent from the wrong side of the tracks was,
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in reality, as strong and capable and intelligent as any other choice I might make, just
misunderstood and misrepresented. I wanted to believe that acting would treat me right,
that we were meant to be together even if people had the ridiculous notion that I was
somehow lowering my standards.
I must admit, though, that part of me shared some of the uncertainty voiced by my
advisors and mentors. I secretly had some worry that “professional” acting might not be
for me, not because we weren’t a good match, but because the world seemed to be set up
in a way that continually undermined our attempts at a healthy relationship. I was afraid
the hurdles we would have to leap in defending our right to be together would be too
complicated and exhausting, would outweigh the satisfaction and joy of our pairing, and
eventually would kill the romance. Always having maintained an awareness of how the
work actors do is socially and culturally relevant, for example, I was worried that I would
have to be in the position of being a vehicle for ideas with which I didn’t agree, as it
seemed that the power of creating meaning would be in the hands of those paying me to
be on stage. I also suspected that my physical appearance was not one that would
automatically catch the attention or meet the needs of agents or casting directors, and I
was uninterested in spending valuable time, energy and money on changing the way I
looked. My temperament posed some issues, as well. I was too shy and introspective to
learn how to network properly and meet the kind of people who could help my career
along. And, admittedly, I was easily disheartened by rejection. But acting was without a
doubt the love of my life, and I still wanted more than anything for things to work out for
us.
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It became clear that I had to make a choice: I could either become a “real” actor
(that is, one who makes money at the profession of acting), or I could find a way to adjust
the rules and change the definition of what an actor is so that I would fit into that
category. Although I have the utmost respect and admiration for (and envy of) people
who have the courage, resilience, savvy, and love of acting to pursue it as a professional
career, as of yet I have never truly tried my hand at the “business” of acting. Instead, I
entered a PhD program with the intention of challenging the idea that a person’s status as
an intellectual or activist seemed, to most people, contradictory to a desire to pursue a
career in acting. I didn’t want to jump over to the dangerous side of the tracks to satisfy
my longing for the volatile bad boy, nor did I want to capitulate to the more stable
neighborhood of the more respectable types. I wanted to do away with the railroad and
rip up the tracks once and for all so that you couldn’t tell which was “right” and which
was “wrong”; everybody would be on the same side.
This goal—the questioning and eventual elimination of the boundaries between
disciplines—is a familiar one in the current global cultural and economic environment, in
which the interdisciplinary and international exchange that characterized postmodernism
happens so quickly and easily that differences are becoming increasingly difficult to
recognize. Importantly, though, while globalization relies on the circulation of images
and information through electronic technology, it has also been accompanied by an
increased awareness of how human bodies carry out the knowledge and ideologies
circulated across the globe by various media. This is why it seems to me urgent that live
actors, in particular, recognize their roles as public intellectuals who investigate the way
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human bodies perform identity, philosophy and community. Especially in a political
climate characterized by deception in the service of increasing the power and property of
a small group, which results in the increased suffering of more and more people’s bodies,
actors are in a unique position to both expose the truth and imagine a new possible future.
While capitalism sweeps the globe using rhetoric of sameness, democracy and freedom,
but in actuality promoting the accumulation of more and more personal property and
money, actors in the theatre must negotiate what it means to have a live and local body
that is shaped by living in a world dominated by electronic technology and capitalism.
Actors and audiences together can explore the absolutely crucial possibilities of creating
commonality while also tolerating and encouraging difference, listening closely to each
other, and focusing on pleasure and love, history and community.
Anna Deavere Smith is a contemporary actor who embraces her role as a public
intellectual and devotes herself to questions of civic engagement and the embodiment of
democracy. In May of 2006, I was fortunate to attend a workshop production of her
recent work in progress, Let Me Down Easy, at Zachary Scott Theatre in Austin. The
human body is the topic of this series of interviews: the things it can and cannot do, what
contributes to its health, suffering or pleasure, what it means to inhabit a body in the
current global climate. In Austin, she mostly performed interviews she had conducted
with local people: Mack Brown, the coach of the University of Texas football team,
former Texas Governor Ann Richards discussing her struggle with esophageal cancer,
employees of the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston and a young woman seeking
treatment there, and a local male escort, among others. The theatre is a small space with a
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thrust stage, and so Deavere Smith’s own body was in close proximity to the audience.
Because this was a workshop production, she held a script and addressed the audience
directly between interviews, casually commenting on the work she had been doing.
I had never seen a live performance of Anna Deavere Smith’s in the past,
although I have been studying her work for years. I was struck by how generous she
seemed as a performer and person and was completely impressed, at the same time, by
her focus, commitment, intelligence, energy and virtuosity. Her presence was
extraordinary without being intimidating or threatening, and she seemed genuinely
interested in having an exchange with the audience and creating a community in the room
that also included the people outside the theatre whose bodies she was making present
through her performance (interestingly, I was particularly saddened the moment I heard
of Governor Richards’ recent death: I felt as if I had known her personally and had a
different relationship with her because of having seen this performance). A number of
local theatre and health professionals, spiritual leaders and activists were asked to join
Deavere Smith on stage for a post-show discussion, and audience members were
encouraged to ask questions of the panel. I recognized some members of the audience as
regular theatre-goers, but it was unclear to me to what degree many of the people in the
room were familiar with live theatre and performance. As I listened to people’s questions
and comments, I noticed that they seemed stimulated and engaged in ways participants in
theatre talk-backs often are not. In general, these audience members seemed quite moved
that someone would take the time and energy to listen to “regular people” and give their
voices equal weight in the performance as more prominent local figures. I was
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particularly struck by one woman’s emotional comments: she was an African American
woman, possibly somewhere between 40 and 50 years old, and expressed extreme
gratitude to Anna Deavere Smith for coming to Austin and doing this performance, but
also for dedicating her life to the kind of work she does. She ended by saying, “You’re
doing God’s work.”
The fact that the woman invoked God was jarring, but although I am not a
believer I had to agree. I was encouraged that this woman seemed aware of the potential
spiritual and ethical importance of this work and was unafraid to say it. This is a
pervasive issue among artists and cultural critics of all stripes these days: the recognition
of a need to get over the fear of voicing strong opinions about ideal concepts without
naiveté if the money-and-power-obsessed peddlers of late capitalism are to ever be
questioned. I bring up this story in part because my own work is indebted to Deavere
Smith’s, but also because it illustrates the infectious spiritual and physical possibility live
performers have to make audience members experience love and grace and compassion
and intelligence, to carry them along and transform them. Anna Deavere Smith’s
presence is important and powerful, and she makes every effort to allow people to
participate in, benefit from, and share that power. My argument is that all actors should
be made fully aware that they can possess this power, and in acknowledging it should be
encouraged to use it responsibly.
Actors and Stars
While electronic media can be exciting and important tools of democracy, in
some ways the disempowerment of actors arises out of the predominance of film and
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television as vehicles for culture. Like almost all public figures, actors in general have
become conflated with Hollywood stars, and are frequently thought of as disembodied
images to be looked at, consumed, and sometimes worshipped unreflectively. For
audiences interested in critical thinking, it is difficult to take any artist seriously
(particularly those directly connected with commercial media) after postmodernism, in an
environment where capitalism subsumes all attempts at resistance. Commodification, in
so many different ways, diminishes the ability of artists to encourage social engagement
and change. Examining how stars are constructed as media images reveals how single
identities can become commodities, but at the same time it illuminates the process of
building a character in potentially useful ways.
The construction of stars specifically relies on the consideration of bodies as
images and capital: it is not only the focus on specific qualities and values represented by
a star’s image, but also obscuring the body’s labor and making the identity seamless and
believable that determines star power. Paul McDonald writes,
Star images are collections of meanings read from various star
texts. … Unlike other performers, stars have greater power in the
industry because of their dual capacity as labour and capital. The
star becomes a form of capital inasmuch as his or her image can be
used to create advantage in the market for films and secure profits.
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Because the image is not the person but rather a set of texts and
meanings that signify the person, then the image is something
separable from the star. (14)
The disembodiment that is required to sell stars as capital also makes it possible to
promote the impression that a complex, multiple and changing personality is fixed and
unified. Dyer invokes Lana Turner as a star who embodied the contradictions of 1950s
femininity to illustrate how the illusion of unity is particularly significant with regards to
gender representation:
…if it is true to say that American society has seen sexuality, especially
for women, as wrong, and, in effect “extraordinary,” and yet has required
women to be both sexy and pure and ordinary, then one can see Lana
Turner’s combination of sexuality and ordinariness, or Marilyn Monroe’s
blend of sexiness and innocence, as effecting a magical synthesis of these
opposites. This was possible partly through the specific chains of meaning
in the images of those two stars, and partly through, once again, the fact of
their real existence as individuals in the world, so that the disunity created
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by attaching opposing qualities to their images was none the less rendered
a unity simply by virtue of the fact that each was only one person. (26)
This synthesis is something that makes clear the danger and hegemony of star images and
the infectious allure of presence: resistant and contradictory “outsider” practices are often
obscured or swallowed up and made ineffectual by their inclusion in the “human”
character of a star when he or she is packaged for consumption. But Lana Turner is
particularly fascinating in the respect of the fabrication of image, because, as Dyer
suggests, built into her image is the process of creation, in much the same way that drag
performance exposes the performativity of gender. In “Four Films of Lana Turner,” Dyer
writes,
In Turner’s later films, the processes of manufacture—the production of
the images—are increasingly evident until they become an integral part of
the image. With most stars, the point is to disguise the manufacturing so
that they simply appear to be what their image proclaims them to be; with
Turner, part of the fascination is with the manufacture itself—with her, it
is actually beguiling to see the strings being pulled. (187)
This is particularly evident in Douglas Sirk’s Imitation of Life, which is a film about
passing that contains numerous references to Turner’s character Lora “acting” rather than
actually “being” a proper mother.
11
My interest is in how actors can expose the mechanics of manufacture within their
processes, and still convincingly embody contradictions in such a way that the unification
of opposites is generous and emphasizes possibility rather than colonizing and
eliminating one side or the other. As Anne Bogart writes, “In a time when computers,
television, film and mega malls dominate and mediate our relationship with others,
perhaps the theater is a place to strengthen and heighten our direct connection with each
other” (www.siti.org/#). How does transferring the theories of star studies to live and
community-based theatre, where the presence of an actual body interacting with audience
members affect an actor’s “presence?” How might the interactive relationship between
the actor and the community complicate the idea of the actor/star as individual identity?
What happens if the same kind of intertextuality that goes into the development of star
images is demystified and deliberately used when a live body is actually present? What
might be the advantage of emphasizing the presence of the live body of an individual
actor without an interest only in image or financial gain, but with a focus on the
interaction of an actual person with all of the texts—including real human conversations,
experiences and behaviors—used to create a character? How might grappling with the
differences between “acting,” “doing” and “being” through an actor’s process be an
important contemporary practice?
Training actors to be citizens and scholars
Training plays a pivotal role in encouraging actors to embrace the privilege and
responsibility of their roles as significant public intellectuals, and in changing the way the
public in general imagines actors’ role in the world. The 2005 annual training issue of
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American Theatre includes a panel discussion entitled “How Does Your Garden Grow:
Conversations With 6 Actors Who Teach.” The moderator of the panel, David Byron,
introduces the conversation by pointing out that in the United States, drama departments
at universities are typically granted less financial support and have fewer tenured
professors than other departments, and connects this problem to the way actors are
viewed in this country: “We deify them (endless awards programs) or we dismiss them
(especially when they speak up during an election season), but we haven’t yet seemed to
find a niche for them outside the pages of Entertainment Weekly” (34). Byron points out
that even in England, where actors are thought to be more well respected, Richard Eyre
and Nicholas Wright mention actors very little in their history of contemporary theatre,
Changing Stages, and “in the process they not only marginalize actors’ role in the social
order, but erase them even from theatre history” (34). This marginalization and mistrust
is really nothing new: it has persisted throughout the history of actors and acting. Joseph
Roach reveals that Diderot, in writing Le Paradoxe sur le Comedien, became somewhat
of an apologist for the profession as he “traced the psychology of the actor to its source in
historic persecution and ostracism, the ill-consequence of corrupting nurture if not nature:
like heretics, actors were routinely excommunicated by a church that readily forgave
rapists and fratricides. The heretic may recant, the murderer repent, but actors have
nothing to renounce but their livelihood” (137). Unless they are successful commercial
celebrities, people who choose to make their living as actors must learn to cope with
being dismissed and disrespected.
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While finding the origin of this fear, misunderstanding, and disempowerment is
quite complicated, it is fairly clear how it gets perpetuated. Three quarters of the way
through his panel discussion, Byron poses a question to the group of actor/teachers that I
believe is incredibly important in assessing the state of actor training programs. He asks,
“Is the actor a proactive, creative force, not only on the stage, but in society as a whole?”
(37). The panelists’ responses are telling. Marian Seldes begins the discussion by saying
that she doesn’t “see the actor as a person who can influence and make a change. We are
absolutely the servants of the writer” (37). Floyd King echoes her sentiment: “We’re the
interpreters. It’s not our words, it’s not our thoughts, it’s not our principles that we put up
there on the stage. It’s the playwright’s. If we’re doing our job right, that’s what we’re
serving. If anyone’s going to change the world, it’s going to be a playwright” (38). Seldes
and King’s ideas not only beg the question “How is it possible that interpretation is not
significant, and how can it not reflect an actor’s thoughts or principles?” but also make
me wonder how and why they came to this conclusion and feel the need to downplay the
actor’s creative role to their students. Why does it seem virtuous, even necessary, for
actors to be at someone else’s service?
In response to Gary Sinise’s opinion that “In the scheme of things, you know,
there are more important things than acting,” F. Murray Abraham (who, incidentally, has
identified himself earlier in the conversation as coming from a working class background,
and stated that an acting teacher on the Texas-Mexico border “saved his life”) pipes in
with, “It’s the most important thing in the world!” He continues, “I think acting is
definitely subversive. There’s an anarchic quality to acting that people envy and lash out
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at. Actors represent a danger to society.” Fiona Shaw, who was trained and works in
England, gives the response, “I don’t think that good acting is polemical, but I do think
that the choices the actor makes are, of course, political.” Part of my goal in pursuing this
research is to reveal that actors can and do have a significant societal influence, but that
they are taught to think of themselves as powerless to ease their transition into a
commercial market where they need to find work and survive as professional actors. The
idea that actors are not real artists is not “common sense,” but presenting it as such serves
to support the system of production and consumption as it currently exists in the United
States.
It seems possible that anxiety over what actors are capable of doing is at root of
the systemic tendency to minimize their power and encourages them ignore their role as
philosophers and their ability to effect change. As Byron’s observations point out, despite
confusion in the contemporary United States about what their social function is, actors
are “deified”: they are a source of great fascination, adoration and desire, and hold
enormous power over the public imagination. Richard Bauman, in Verbal Arts as
Performance, describes the strong presence of live performers, the thing that gives them
the “subversive” and “anarchic” quality of which F. Murray Abraham speaks:
The consideration of the power inherent in performance to transform
social structures opens the way to a range of additional considerations
concerning the role of the performer in society. Perhaps there is a key here
to the persistently documented tendency for performers to be both admired
and feared—admired for their artistic skill and power and for the
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enhancement of experience they provide, feared because of the potential
they represent for subverting and transforming the status quo. Here too
may lie a reason for the equally persistent association between performers
and marginality or deviance, for in the special emergent quality of
performance the capacity for change may be highlighted and made
manifest to the community. (qtd. in Dolan Utopia 1)
My work arose out of a desire to focus on and harness that “emergent quality” that actors
possess in rehearsal and performance, the power that is often minimized in training and
might account for some of the mistrust and marginalization of the labor of acting. As I
see it, the work that actors do always combines, to one degree or another, physical reality
with imaginative possibility, and they always embody the kind of praxis that makes
change possible. They work dialectically, in conversation with history, fellow theatre
artists, and audiences; and the product of their labor is embodied and active—they are
engaged in the project of creating worlds and living in them. Actors, while preparing for
a role and performing on stage, actually are what Jill Dolan refers to as “utopian
performatives” – they “represent … an imaginative construction of both thought and
action, of both everyday life and theatrical performance” (Modern Drama 165).
In order encourage actors to make use of their power as creative agents, it is
essential that teachers expose actors who are in training to the opinions of the latter two
actor/teachers cited in the panel above. Students should be encouraged to believe that
their work is indeed “the most important thing in the world,” and that they share the
responsibility of making meaning and the exciting possibility of changing people’s
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understandings of how they live in the world with writers, directors and audiences alike.
One of the main issues this dissertation addresses is how to teach actors to recognize the
power they can possess in this culture, and to imagine how they might responsibly work
together with audiences in their communities to use that power to achieve change.
Resisting the Commodification of Training
The first step toward the empowerment of actors in training involves historicizing
the social and economic processes that led to the current state of theatre education, and
assessing what steps might be taken at this historical juncture to publicly awaken the idea
of actors as well-respected artists and activists. In the introduction to the anthology
Twentieth Century Actor Training, Alison Hodge calls actor training—which has, in
Europe and North America, developed mainly in the twentieth century—“arguably the
most important development in modern Western theatre making,” and points to the fact
that “many of the innovators in this field have been responsible for both unique training
techniques and for some of the landmark theatre productions of the twentieth century” as
evidence that the acting process is central to the understanding of theatre and its
meanings (1). The fact that theories and practices of acting were of central interest to
many innovative theatre artists over the past century—Stanislavski, Meyerhold, Brecht,
Grotowski, Strasberg, Adler, Bogart, etc.—does seem to point to the significance of
actors’ processes in the form and perceived meanings of theatrical production.
Hodge attributes the development of actor training to several factors: a new
awareness of and interest in codified Asian training traditions and intercultural exchange
in general; the Enlightenment focus on science and rationality that led to attempts to
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search for “absolute, objective languages of acting that could offer models, systems and
tested techniques to further the craft;” the creation of the role of theatre “director” at the
turn of the century; and to responses to Diderot’s Le Paradoxe sur le Comedien,
published in 1830 (3). One might add to this list of socio-historical causes many others:
the development of Freudian psychology and responses to it, the industrialization and
mechanization of the European economy, and the spread of capitalism being among the
most significant. As Twentieth Century Actor Training makes evident, the responses to
all of these historical factors among theatre practitioners and acting teachers have been
varied and contradictory; each has had a different theory of how the actor should relate to
the text, the interaction between the individual actor, the theatrical ensemble, and the
audience, the shape and function of the body in performance, and the concept of
character.
Finding these objective languages and defining sets of tools, while it made certain
principles about acting transmissible to students and democratized the craft, also
happened in a climate in which capitalism was beginning its development into the
world’s predominant economic system. Reifying “acting” made it possible to turn the
craft into a commodity, and over the years countless acting teachers have capitalized on
people’s dreams of acting professionally through selling workshops, classes, books and
instructional videos. Scanning the theatre section of the library for books about acting and
actors now, at the beginning of the 21st century, one finds a wealth of material that is
extremely difficult to navigate: there are numerous books about “the craft of acting,”
most of which claim to have found the most direct and accessible route to creating a
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character on stage or on camera. Acting is often presented as one “craft” or “art” to be
mastered despite the obvious existence of so many different approaches; there are also
instructional manuals on how to effectively sell oneself at an audition or deal with “the
business of acting;” there are biographies of actors with long careers in “show business.”
Despite efforts to the contrary, especially in the United States, actor training has not only
changed to feed a system that prioritizes profit, it has itself become a vast industry in
which particular schools or teachers must sell themselves to potential students. As a
result, in many contexts actor training has become a standardized, simplified, and
marketable item—it must be seen as a product rather than a process, a series of
interactions, or an ongoing conversation about certain artistic and philosophic problems.
Far fewer on the library shelves, but in increasing numbers over the last couple of
decades, are books and anthologies devoted to the analysis and criticism of actors’
training and processes by scholars who are attempting to decommodify the art of acting
and restore its intellectual and critical function. In his introduction to Acting
(Re)Considered, Phillip Zarrilli recognizes the problem addressed above, and points out
that “Many discourses about acting assume that they are expressing the truth. Most
narratives foreground neither the process of constructing this ‘truth’ nor the voice or
specific position from which this (version of) ‘truth’ is being constructed” (8). Citing
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Zarrilli calls for a recognition of the fact that “all
languages of acting are highly metaphorical” (10). He suggests “we can celebrate the
freedom of not having to find a ‘universal’ language once and for all. Rather we can
spend our energy on the continuing challenge of searching for languages of acting which
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best allow one to actualize a particular paradigm of performance in a particular context
for a particular purpose” (16). Zarrilli points to a significant problem for acting pedagogy
in the United States, and his criticism is essential to my project and its search for ways to
restore the power of actors as creative and productive artists. However, Zarrilli is himself
also speaking from a particular historical perspective. The book was published in 1995, in
the middle of a postmodern academic, social and economic context that called for a
critical examination of truth claims and an interest in relativism and historicity. Acting
(Re) Considered reflects a desire to resist the logic of dominant ideals that claim an
objective truth that is, in reality, historically determined by those with power and money.
Zarrilli’s work in this particular anthology, and other scholarship that is dedicated
to analysis based on critical theory, often contends that “truth” is relative to one’s
specific, identity-based cultural experience. That experience, in turn, has been determined
by the historic and economic circumstances in which one has been placed. Anything that
claims access to that which is “human” is typically understood as having been
constructed from a white, male, Christian, and heterosexual perspective, making it
necessary to give voice to individual experience that contradicts what are presented as
“universal” ideals. Consequently, traditional actor training has been viewed with
suspicion by scholars interested in resisting dominant ideology, not only because of its
apparent association with capitalist goals, but because of its continued claims to give
actors the ability to represent honest reality. However, for artists and students coming to
consciousness in the environment of a post-September 11 United States, the current war
in Iraq, and the administration of George W. Bush, there is a pervasive interest among
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artists, activists and intellectuals in the strength and power of making claims to truth. It
seems vital that people discover commonality, empathy and identification without giving
in to the idea that everyone is the same, maintain interest in individual civil liberties, and
embrace the deliberate action and change that a certain kind of unity makes possible.
While there is a continued need for critical thinking of the kind that permeated academia
in the 1990s, it seems that the humanist impulses of Stanislavski-based training might
once again prove useful and relevant to actors.
This project proposes an approach to educating actors that interrogates the
prioritization of unified, stable and internally focused identities within traditional actor
training, and at the same time takes up the current need to reexamine the power inherent
in making strong statements about love, empathy, truth, commonality and possibility. I
am inspired by Jill Dolan’s call for activists to embrace what she imagines as a
“reconstructed humanism,” that is “multiple, respecting the complexities and ambiguities
of identity while it works out ways for people to share and feel things in common, like
the need for survival and for love, for compassion and for hope” (22). What changes can
be made in actor training programs that reflect the current cultural and intellectual
climate, in which a longing for ideas like beauty and spirituality is slowly being
acknowledged despite a persistent sense of powerlessness, cynicism and alienation? In
training, how can actors be encouraged to understand that they can and do possess
immense power, and to make connections with people in their own communities to
channel their powerful presences in a way that helps those communities reclaim a sense
of hope and possibility?
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I describe a process for training and rehearsal that consciously incorporates
“traditional” American Stanislavski-based approaches that are the staples of BFA and
MFA programs and other acting schools with oral history and ethnographic interviewing,
solo performance, dramaturgical research and documentary techniques that are currently
the terrain of anthropology, performance studies, theatre history and media studies
programs. I am suggesting a way to continue exploring the powerful possibilities of
feeling, empathy and identification and locate commonalities, connections and truths that
are based in human bodies, but with a full awareness of critical theory that describes how
bodies, feelings, thought and expression are shaped by history and culture. This technique
is an attempt to get beyond what Dolan terms the “cynicism of late global capitalism”
(30) by examining how acting, seen as a physical dialogue between members of a




This process has been influenced and inspired not only by work on the plays
about which I have written directly, but also by my experience as an audience member
and an interest in community-based arts in general. For example, Anne Bogart and the
SITI Company, from whom I learned Viewpoints and Composition techniques, engaged
in a community-based audience project at Actors Theatre of Louisville while preparing
for a production of Noel Coward’s Private Lives that resulted in the creation of their
performance called Cabin Pressure. I saw both productions at ATL in 2000. The process
involved a direct engagement of the context of actor/audience relationships. Bogart writes
in her directors notes for the ensemble performance composition:
What is an audience? What is the creative role of the audience? What is
the responsibility of the audience to the actor? What is an actor? What is
the actor's responsibility to the audience? These are some of the questions
that I posed to the SITI Company actors in rehearsal for Cabin Pressure. I
wanted us to start with no preconceived notions or assumptions about the
answers to these questions, but rather to experiment freely and play with
possible variations on the theme. The result of these explorations is a
production that speaks directly to the people in the room sharing it.”
(www.siti.org)
She also writes that the text for Cabin Pressure pieced together writings from theatre
theorists such as Stanislavski, Meyerhold and Artaud, “as well as selections from my
interviews with fifty seven theater-goers and fragments from existing plays that suggest
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variations on the actor/audience theme” (www.siti.org). I share with Anne Bogart and the
SITI Company an interest in the possibility that bringing larger communities into
rehearsal and preparation might address the problem that theatrical production often
mystifies the processes of creation and erases complexity and contradiction; and that the
choices made outside of performance can be based on conversation, modeling how the
“taste” of an actor, playwright or director is formed through social interaction.
There are a number of other important artists dedicated to questions of community
and identity whose work, while I have not written about it directly in the dissertation, has
inspired and infused my own projects as an actor, director, teacher and scholar. Naomi
Wallace is one, and I discuss my indebtedness to her play The Trestle at Pope Lick Creek
in the conclusion. Another of my many heroes is community-based artist Harrell Fletcher,
whose 1997 collaboration with John Rubin called Some People From Around Here
involved a series of 8’ x 8’ portraits on plywood along Interstate Highway 80 in Fairfield,
California that were billboard-like paintings of people who lived in the local community.
People driving by on their way to other places might not normally consider that this town
is actually made up of human beings: the billboards forced drivers who are used to
rapidly moving from one place to the next to pause and consider who was surrounding
them. At the same time, this project used a medium—the billboard—that is usually
dedicated only to selling things to remind viewers that people are more important than
products. It might have the effect of allowing people to notice and think critically about
the medium itself. It also made “regular” local people take their place aside celebrities or
other images that might typically grace these signs that pervade both urban and rural
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landscapes across the United States. Fletcher said in a recent interview, “If you look at
my work in an overall view, which is the one that I like to see, then you see James Joyce
in relationship to Star Trek, in relationship to rugs, in relationship to plants, or whatever it
happens to be. James Joyce is not being valued more than these other people and
subjects. He’s being valued, because I think he’s interesting, but so are all of these other
things” (http://homepage.mac.com/allanmcnyc/harrellfletcher/mccollum_interview.html).
The process I describe is an attempt to democratize the individual identities of actors and
characters in the way Fletcher’s work promotes equality. The intent is not to devalue
actors and make their presences less charged or powerful, but to elevate all people’s
stature by pointing out that they are equal in importance to actors or stars.
In addition to being inspired by Fletcher’s community-based and media-conscious
strategies, I took the concept of democratizing the individual from Adrienne Kennedy.
Her self-described “autobiographical” collage-like plays such as Funnyhouse of a Negro
and A Movie Star Has to Star in Black and White suggest that individual identity is
comprised of many different books, films, photographs, music, and (most importantly)
experiences and other people, and inspired Elin Diamond’s essay theorizing identity as a
“history of identifications.” Diamond writes that, “Realism as literature and as mode of
production urged and satisfied the pursuit of knowledge, the production of truth” (5); but
that in Kennedy’s plays, “The subject’s identity is no more, or less, than the accumulated
history of her identifications. Indeed ‘identity’ is the illusory stable representation of that
turbulent history and no less powerful (in fact far more powerful) for being imaginary”
(111). Kennedy’s book People Who Led to My Plays is an autobiography, but not of the
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usual sort. It is composed of short snippets of all kinds of memory – descriptions of
people and the thoughts Kennedy had or has about them, photographs, lists of belongings,
loves and hates. The solo “character study” performances I describe, in which actors
build an identity by performing a collection of multiple texts through their individual
bodies, were modeled, both in theory and practice, after this gorgeous and important
autobiographical work.
Chapter Outline
Chapter One is a genealogy of the larger network of historical, economic and
intellectual influences on American actor training. Rather than arguing that an entirely
new method of training should be invented to meet the needs of a new generation of
actors, I try to illuminate how theories and practices of acting are part of an ongoing
dialectic and intellectual process. I begin by questioning why the primary “traditional”
methods of training in the United States have been variations on Stanislavski’s system.
What historical factors led theatre programs to present the theoretical basis of Method
acting and its variations as “common sense?” I argue that Stanislavski himself, as well as
the American originators of the Method, were engaged in an important philosophic
dialogue revolving around issues of history, community and individual identity, the
“real” and imagination, subjective experience and objective fact, and human bodies and
technology. With the expansion of unlimited growth capitalism, however, one side of
each element of this discussion was privileged—the individual over the group, for
example, or “the real” over imagination—and became reified as the “truth” of good
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acting. At this juncture in the cultural history of the United States, it seems that actors are
in a unique position to revive the important dialogue about those questions.
Chapter Two deals more specifically with the current division between
professional actor training and performance studies in the climate of global capitalism. I
point out that this rift reflects the conceptual framework promoting rigid boundaries and
an “insider vs. outsider” mentality, about which Bruce McConachie has written in his
book American Theatre in the Culture of the Cold War: Producing and Contesting
Containment. I suggest that defining performance studies as a separate area of study,
while it produced some valuable theoretical developments, also reinforced the metaphor
of containment and the mentality that makes possible exclusionary practices. I propose
that a deliberate and public collaboration between performance studies and professional
actor training curricula might shift the metaphors by which we understand the acting
process and restore actors’ power as agents of transformation. Drawing on the work of
Anna Deavere Smith, I describe how a process combining her community-based
ethnographic performance techniques with more conventional, method-derived tools and
other approaches to training might productively re-theorize individual identity as an
ongoing and changing process that relies on embodied interactions with other people. In
an effort to overcome the enmity between professional theatre and performance studies, I
envision this process as one that weaves theories of embodied knowledge and critical
pedagogy into actor training, and physicalizes questions about identity and community,
“truth” and imagination, subjectivity and objectivity and the body and technology. In a
sense, I am applying what cognitive theorists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson call an
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“experientialist” approach, which satisfies both the subjectivist and objectivist
viewpoints, to acting.
Chapters Three and Four are more specific still, describing two case studies in
which colleagues and I began experimenting with this approach in the production of
particular plays. The theories of how people live in the world explored by actors often
originate as responses practical issues presented by particular plays and/or production
contexts. Stanislavski’s ideas famously started percolating when he was struggling to find
solutions to difficulties he faced while rehearsing a role in Ibsen’s Enemy of the People.
Many of the forms used in Tadashi Suzuki’s physical method of training began as
exercises to capture the particular qualities of characters in The Trojan Women and other
plays. The theories presented in my dissertation were begun, in part, during my own work
on two projects: directing Charles Mee’s The Trojan Women: A Love Story at the
University of Texas in the fall semester of 2003 and performing the role of Ava Coo in a
Lab Theatre production of Phyllis Nagy’s The Strip at UT in spring 2004.
The chapter on Mee’s play suggests how this approach reflects his playwriting
style, and in doing so replaces the framework around acting that uses the particularly
capitalist metaphors of conflict, conquest, and property with one that emphasizes
dialogue, interaction and transformation. I use as a starting point Fredric Jameson’s
question about the possibility of resistance to capitalism in postmodern art— “We have
seen that there is a way in which postmodernism replicates or reproduces—reinforces—
the logic of consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a
way in which it resists that logic” (1974). I propose that Charles Mee’s The Trojan
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Women: A Love Story, when peopled with human bodies in theatrical production, offers a
Marxian and “reanimated humanist” form that responds to the cynicism of postmodern
American culture: it represents embodied subjects in conversation with pieces of all kinds
of history, moving objects around and being moved (emotionally, consciously, and
physically) by them to shape a new world. Through a close reading of the play combined
with the historical context of the war in Iraq, descriptions of our production choices, and
the performance texts student actors created in rehearsal, I theorize our process as a
reconciliation of performance and theatre curricula.
Chapter Four is specifically about the potential of this process as a means of
gender critique. It combines a close reading of Phyllis Nagy’s The Strip, a description of
the solo performance I conceived based on interviews with people whose experiences
coincided with those of my character, Ava Coo, and Judith Butler’s theories about the
performativity of gender and drag as a subversive act. I argue that, as Nagy’s play and
Ava Coo’s journey make clear, queer performances of gender also have the ability to
emphasize how the body, while its adherence to normative rules is undoubtedly required
in certain ways for work, is often compelled to abandon those rules and “choose” how it
shapes itself according to what is pleasurable, comfortable and sometimes joyful. Using
the interviews I conducted with drag performers, I show how their own processes of
creating “women” characters is a theatricalized version of how identity is truly formed –
they take on their bodies the characteristics of multiple (real and imaginary) women with
whom they have had contact over the years in order to change their own (male) bodies
into representations of femininity. Finally, I argue that “queering” is not really an
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“outsider” practice but a humanizing process, and that the construction of national
identity based on dominant ideology is, in fact, highly theatrical. This inversion of the
association of “the real” with masculinity and productive action and the “theatrical” with
queerness is an attempt to reconcile what Stephen Bottoms calls the homophobic
distinction between efficacious performance and theatrical entertainment.
I conclude with the hopeful possibility that the metaphors through which people
conceive actors’ purpose in local communities across the globe can be transformed
through the gradual introduction of changes in the curricula of theatre and performance
studies departments. These changes should combine the important work that has already
been done in each separate field to create something new and relevant to contemporary
actors and audiences—a process that involves the great pleasure of embodied
conversations and is local and global, factual and imaginative, intellectual and physical,
frustrating and fun. Implementing these changes will, without a doubt, pose a great
challenge. To be honest, some of my students are resistant to this work because the
process of conducting interviews and listening closely enough to people to be able to
imitate their responses requires more focus and energy than some of them expected to
devote to an acting class. Part of their reluctance also comes from the fact that this is a
slippery, imperfect and uncertain process that can never really be mastered. But, like any
worthwhile partnership, choosing to engage with acting requires commitment and
dedication. To enter into this relationship means understanding that the recently re-
cobbled street is bumpy and the ride will be rough—one has to be willing to fail
sometimes, to feel lost, to not understand what is going on or where the path is leading.
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But I am certain that weathering these difficulties is worth it: that the deep understanding
and transformation and sense of community and great joy that can result from this
process will equal and eventually outweigh the pains involved in this labor of love.
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Chapter One
An Intellectual Genealogy of Professional Actor Training in the United States
[The American actor is] dedicated, one: to himself; and then: he’s
dedicated, because of that, to the personality that sells. … his success
depends on that. Then he’s dedicated to what he gets out of the money that
they give him because he sells; he’s dedicated to his family, which is nice;
to his swimming pool … and he becomes more and more … dedicated to
himself and his property. Now, that is impossible in another environment.
This is a transitional stage for us in America. The theatre has been a
victim of many things—mechanization, the success motive—and now it’s
coming of age. We also are going to have to … be nationally understood
as representing America, American ideas. We’re going to have to … state
those ideas, not only in terms (and we excel in those terms) of making the
world laugh. But also making the world think. The American actor is
going to have to make sacrifices for that. … If not, we are going to be
individually successful and not successful as a national cultural symbol.
And I hope … I hope we will.
- Stella Adler, from a 1964 television interview “Stella Adler and
the Actor.”
Acting is a process of labor: it involves the movement of actors’ bodies and the
exertion of energy and effort with some goal in mind. Significantly, while (or, I would
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contend, because) it relies on embodiment, actors’ work is also intellectual labor, and
theorists who have investigated the theories and practices of acting throughout the
centuries have always undertaken important philosophical, social and ethical questions
about the way ideas, feelings, culture and human identity manifest themselves in and
through the body. In a capitalist economy, however, whatever actors’ physical and
intellectual labor generates—a form of embodied human identity, feeling and behavior, a
model for creating community, an interpretation of a play, a philosophy of life, a method
of working—is at risk of becoming a commodified abstraction that is detached from its
connection to movement and bodies so that it can be exchanged in the marketplace.
Particularly in the 21st-century United States, the process of commodifying acting has
resulted in the reification of only certain aspects of Stanislavski-based training as the
accepted craft for actors to master, and also in the legitimation of professionalism and its
marriage to what Stella Adler calls the “profit motive.” This association between
legitimate acting and money has been facilitated by the American tendency to prioritize
the individual over the group and an anti-intellectual bent that values action without
reflection.
In this chapter, I historicize the development of actor training in the United States
in an effort to decommodify it and reveal its intellectual and revolutionary potential. I
begin by interrogating the idea that Stanislavski is the individual most responsible for the
craft of acting. While it is clear that attaching his name to acting has made possible the
transmission and investigation of some important ideas, the association of his work with
commercial media has also obscured his role as a significant intellectual. I place his work
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with The Moscow Art Theatre in the context of intellectual debates about representing
the real through an imagined form in the interest of social change: debates in which
philosophers like Diderot and Marx were among the most important participants. While
Stanislavski-based actor training is often associated with humanism, and humanism has
been criticized in contemporary thought in part because it serves to naturalize dominant
ideology, I remind readers that Stanislavski’s Enlightenment influences made possible
the overthrow of the old aristocratic order, and his early conversants in the United States,
The Group Theatre, had deliberate revolutionary and anti-aristocratic goals: their interest
was in populism and democracy. I also want to show how the increased reliance on
capitalist goals of individual property and privilege has obscured the democratizing
potential of actor training, and that the reification of “The Method” as a solid and unified
“craft” has been furthered by the institutional division between practical or utilitarian
theatre production programs and intellectual academic areas. My goal in representing
actor training as a moving, changing, community-based and historical intellectual process
is to begin to break down the solid walls that maintain this separation.
Actors, Agency and Intellectualism
In the 2005 edition of the annual issue of American Theatre devoted to actor
training, Robert Brustein writes that as soon as “an actor starts thinking of the profession
as ‘the business,’ then it is inevitable that he or she will be more preoccupied with
material rewards than with artistic satisfactions. Most people don’t have that choice. Most
professions are oriented either towards service or towards profit. In acting, the options are
blurred” (124). In the article, the issues Brustein brings up highlight a significant
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dilemma facing actors in the United States who seek training. Many BFA and MFA
programs now call themselves “professional actor training programs,” and actors
intending to immerse themselves in “the business” of acting choose these, while
performance studies programs have developed to encourage the ongoing academic study
of performance in realms mostly other than professional theatre. This is not to suggest
that the investigations actors undertake over the course of their studies in professionally-
oriented programs are not intellectual or scholarly in nature. As I emphasized in the
preface, I contend that exactly the opposite is the case. Among the important elements of
an actor’s process listed on the website for the graduate acting program at Tisch School
of the Arts, for example, is a question central to metaphysics and philosophy: “What’s the
difference between ‘representing’ and ‘being’?”
(http://gradacting.tisch.nyu.edu/object/ga_training.html).
Because their work involves a fully embodied examination of questions about
existence like this one, actors are among the most important and powerful philosophers
and activists a culture might produce. However, because it is taken as common sense in
the contemporary United States that financial profit is the most important mark of success
and source of security and happiness, the power actors might have to effect change is
diminished by the seemingly inevitable commodification of their craft. When motives of
individual profit are placed at the forefront of an actor’s work, grappling with
complicated, in-depth and often contradictory questions of morality and ethics, social
relationships and responsibility, memory and possibility takes a back seat to more
practical and unfortunately reductive questions like “To what kinds of roles am I
35
naturally best suited, and how can the audition material I choose play up those
characteristics?” or “How can I showcase my most sellable features in the most clear and
direct way?”
During my PhD coursework in the Performance as Public Practice program at the
University of Texas at Austin, I took a graduate acting course that was designed for “non-
acting majors.” The professor of the course titled it “I JUST WANT TO ACT (But, thank
God I’m not an actor!)” (Syllabus 1), the implication being that while those of us taking
the course may have an intense interest in acting (we were PhD students, MFA in Drama
and Theatre for Youth students, and MFA playwrights), we were not on the uncertain and
often quite taxing career path to becoming actors in the professional sense. While many
of us had been practicing actors in the past, the title of the course separated our identities
from the activities we were pursuing in this particular course and from any non-
professional acting we might have done: only those who were on the professional track
were actors in the official sense. I don’t mean to suggest, here, that the instructor of this
course was intentionally stating that our work in this class or elsewhere was insignificant,
nor that the MFA acting students were interested only in the business aspects of acting
and theatre. In fact, the course was useful, pleasurable and engaging, and the professor’s
insightful feedback on students’ work revealed her own strong expertise as a performer
and teacher and dedication to larger questions of interpretation; the title of the syllabus
was almost certainly intended in fun and not meant to be scrutinized so closely. But it
illustrates very clearly how we were interpellated into the profit-driven ideological
framework that is pervasive in the United States. Because of the structure of our theatre
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department, if those of us who were not in the MFA program wanted to take an acting
class at all, we could only enroll in this one; we ended up inadvertently reinforcing the
ideology of professionalism vs. scholarship (or practice vs. theory, action vs. thought,
body vs. mind, etc.) by agreeing that we were “non-actors” (and, conversely, that the
MFA actors were not equally scholars, playwrights or teachers).
In general, in the contemporary United States, the course of study actors
undertake in MFA and BFA programs often underscores the idea that the ability to
investigate important questions about the world and how people inhabit it is less
significant to the current definition of an actor than the ability to sell oneself as a
marketable commodity. For example, the website I cited above for the MFA acting
program at New York University’s Tisch School of the Arts states that during the first
two years of study, the actors focus on developing a methodology for approaching
scenes: “In these classes, through the work of a wide range of playwrights, you are
guided to an understanding of process: What does going moment-to-moment mean?
What really is listening? How does an actor play an intention? What’s the difference
between ‘representing’ and ‘being’?” This ongoing intellectual investigation shifts, at
some point, to address necessary business-related issues: “Important classes as you near
graduation prepare you to function confidently in the professional world—taking charge
of business affairs and learning how to audition as well as your many options in the world
of theatre, film and television” (http://gradacting.tisch.nyu.edu/object/ga_training.html).
With the introduction of commercial concerns, the training’s purpose switches from an
investigative process to the creation of a sellable product.
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This emphasis on what Stella Adler called “the success motive” sets certain
parameters for what kinds of questions actors might ask about the process they are
studying. The need for actors to market themselves requires that they settle on a
particular, objective set of tools: “the” art of acting. That art, in this country, most
frequently makes use of language derived from Stanislavski-based techniques—the
concepts of “playing an intention” or achieving “moment-to-moment” behavior, cited
above, are among the basic tenets of American adaptations of his System. According to
the website for the American Academy of Dramatic Arts, “The ability to sustain truthful
behavior in imaginary circumstances is the very heart and soul of Academy study”
(http://www.aada.org/html/curriculum/fulltime.html), and The Actors Studio Drama
School, when it was part of The New School University from 1995-2005, stated that its
goal was “to produce theatre artists who have access to emotional truth and moment-to-
moment reality while maintaining a sense of stage-craft and professionalism”
(http://www.newschool.edu/academic/drama/acting.aspx?s=1:1) . While these programs
do introduce students to a wide range of tools and techniques—clowning, Viewpoints and
Suzuki training, Alexander technique, yoga, etc.—the playing of “truth” on stage using
some derivation of Stanislavski’s work is almost always taught as being foundational and
applicable to any project: it is the one thing student actors are expected to master in order
to have professional careers. Furthermore, the universal applicability of this theory of
acting has taken on the appearance of being inevitable and natural: it seems that
determining objectives, obstacles and actions to achieve believable performances in the
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given circumstances set out by a playwright has always and inevitably been the
cornerstone of the actor’s craft.
The rules derived from Stanislavski-based training are, however, historical and
coincide with the post-Enlightenment interest in applying principles of logic, reason and
analysis to most human activities. In acting, like in other disciplines, the process of
revealing human responsibility for maintaining and living in the world was accompanied
by the question of how to find the truth and the structure once supplied by metaphysical
forces. The conception of acting as a craft with its own set of observable and usable
principles brought the inspiration and basis for actors’ labor “down to earth” and made
the source of their behavior “regular” human beings rather than the spirit of the gods or
the manners and tastes of monarchs. Consequently, it became difficult to determine who
decided how actors would move and shape their bodies. Especially after acting became a
professional endeavor beholden both to artistic standards and the demands of commerce,
it was hard to tell who had agency in determining actors’ habits and actions. Was it a
playwright? A director? And where did they look for ideas of how people should behave?
To their audiences? But who or what shaped the way people in the audience live their
lives and understand theatre?
For example, I currently teach a survey course called “Theatre History from 1642
to the Present,” and early in the class we discuss Aphra Behn’s The Rover and
Restoration comedy in general. The text for the course is an anthology of plays edited by
some of the professors at the University where I teach, The Longman Anthology of
Theatre and Drama. The supporting material for The Rover includes a section on the
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conventions of Restoration theatre, in which the authors are careful to draw correlations
between the permissive morality, posturing, deception and wit characteristic of the court
of Charles II and Restoration plays, and state that “In the late seventeenth century such
things as ‘making a leg’ or talking in ‘the language of the fan’ were not the performance
conventions they are today; rather, they were part of the social world the plays mirrored”
(676). In other words, the manipulative and licentious style of Restoration actors may
seem antiquated, false and contrived to contemporary audiences, but in Restoration
England it reflected, commented on and reinforced the tastes of the aristocrats for whom
the actors (also members of court) were performing. Certainly the relationship of
Restoration audiences to actors is a rich arena for speculation and debate, but it seems
clear that even when they were satirizing the behavior of the cavaliers, actors served as
purveyors of aristocratic taste and habit. Rather than actively choosing how they would
perform a certain kind of personality or a particular action, or delving into the complex
history and psychology of an individual character to make that choice, the source of their
behavior resided in the tastes and fancies of the monarch and the court.
A few centuries later, it would be difficult to argue that Marlon Brando’s famed
understated and deliberately extra-authentic “mumble and scratch” brand of acting had no
effect on the way men enacted their gender, or that many people did not study Marilyn
Monroe’s excessive performances of femininity to learn how an ideal woman was
supposed to act. Brustein writes that actors not only reflect the way people behave in a
particular time,
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Some actors even have the potential to change the style of an entire
period; this was quintessentially true not only of the young Brando, but
also of the young James Dean, and today, to a lesser extent, of Tom
Cruise, Sean Penn and Johnny Depp. When Christopher Walken played
Caligula at Yale in the early 1970s, scores of undergraduates in New
Haven began imitating his loping walk, his eccentric speech, even the
clothes he wore. (46 [emphasis mine])
But unlike in the court of Charles II where the link between actors’ behavior and the
King’s taste was direct, it is hard to say who, exactly, was responsible for coming up with
the standards for actors’ behavior in contemporary films, and even trickier to determine
to what degree Brando and Monroe (both schooled in Method techniques) had a hand in
forming their own personae.
More involved still is the question of how their training, which encouraged them
to be as believable in their characterizations as possible, led them to act in their roles in
specific ways; and why the elements of believability and authenticity were the aspects of
Method training that became priorities, while The Group Theatre and others who studied
Stanislavski also championed revolutionary values such as ensemble playing. While
teaching actors how to control their own bodies in training and rehearsal could ostensibly
give them more power over the knowledge, ideas and tastes being represented, who
ultimately judged how successful they were in using the tools correctly? Again, when
they started to be beholden to paying audiences, the class of people who came to see their
performances assessed actors’ work, as did theatre critics, directors, playwrights and
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other artists. If no single one of these opinions, or the actor’s alone, could result in
changing what elements of training he or she prioritized in creating a character, the
answer might be found in how the actors, critics, directors and playwrights interact and
under the pressure of what kinds of historical circumstances.
Questions about how to best understand the source of how people behave in the
world and who is responsible for that behavior have been at the center of intellectual
debates for centuries. Scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular, began
to grapple with the social conduct of human beings as a science—Comte, for example,
applied positivist scientific principles to the study of human social activity and termed
this field sociology; Freud, of course, looked to psychology for the source of human
behavior; Marx examined history, philosophy, and—most significantly—economics. In
this chapter, I argue that actors and the people who train them have been equally
important participants in this ongoing intellectual conversation about human behavior and
agency, and because it involves specifics of reproducing how bodies behave, their work
has resulted in significant changes in the way people understand desire, identity,
relationships, community and imagination. At the same time, the role of actors as creative
artists who make significant intellectual and social contributions has been obscured both
by mistrust of the necessarily physical nature of their work and by the hegemonic
processes of capitalism. Because of these pressures, only certain elements of one theory
of training have come to be defined as “the” craft of acting, and making money the
primary goal of mastering those elements of the craft. It is not the Stanislavski-based
means of training and its particular approach to “truth” that disempowers actors,
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however, but the commodification of acting programs themselves and the need for them
to feed an increasingly commercial market. The general acceptance of financial profit as
the ultimate goal of professional acting, and the consequent identification of certain
principles of training as key to achieving that goal make it appear that actors are
powerless to make different choices.
I suggest a shift in focus: instead looking at actor training programs primarily as
products promising greater ease of entry into professional careers, the curricula should
actively remind students that their training is part of a historic discussion of important
philosophical and artistic questions about individual identity and responsibility to a
group, truth and imagination, subjectivity and objectivity and technology and the human
body. In this chapter and the next, by situating 21st-century, United States’ actor training
programs within a larger historical conversation and network of influences, I hope to
illuminate how the influence of a capitalist economy has led to the belief that the
elements of an actor’s process which may make her or him more marketable –
faithfulness to the wishes of a director or playwright, physical or cultural resemblance to
particular types of characters, inwardly directed experience of emotion and individual
psychology, etc. – should be prioritized in most situations. The need to privilege certain
ways of solving actors’ problems for commercial reasons limits their ability to look
critically at the work they are doing and recognize the possibility that other approaches to
the intellectual projects they are undertaking might produce more effective social
criticisms and efficacious performances. Through bringing to light historical and
economic factors that have commercialized training programs and forced actors to choose
43
either a professional path or one that is more socially engaged and focused on exploring
intellectual and historical as well as personal and emotional questions, I hope to clarify
what steps might be made in theatre training programs to “decommodify” performers’
processes and their work and restore the transformative power of actors’ labor.
Acting and dialectical materialism
The first step in reminding actors that their processes are significant beyond
preparing them for the necessities of the commercial world is to clarify how their labor
and even the training itself grew to be understood as commodities in the first place. In his
essay “Historicizing the Relations of Theatrical Production,” Bruce McConachie provides
a model for examining how the relations of theatre practice within a particular economic
context influence its means. McConachie cites Raymond Williams, who “enjoins critics
and historians to shift their definition of a ‘work of art’ from an object to a practice.
Rather than attempting to isolate the art object and, in Kantian fashion, separate out its
inherent components, the historian should investigate the nature and conditions of its
historical practice” (173). In an attempt to “decommodify” art, Williams tries to place the
movement back into artistic practice by understanding it as an interaction between social
beings in particular historical and economic circumstances. McConachie, then, calls for a
history of theatre that involves “extensive empirical and theoretical investigations into the
sociohistorical conditions necessary for the emergence of various kinds of theater, the
relations between historical forms of theatrical expression and the dominant ideology of a
historical period, and the functions of theater in reproducing, modifying, or contradicting
hegemonic relations of production” (176). Keeping in mind McConachie’s suggestion to
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illuminate the ideological underpinnings of the conditions surrounding different elements
of theatre, I hope to locate a problem not in specific and objectified practices of actor
training, but in the meanings those practices take on when they are exchanged within a
larger historical framework dominated by a particular system of production and
consumption.
The project of decommodifying acting in Williams’s terms requires a
consideration not only of how theories and practices of actor training are an interactive
part of the system of production and consumption and cultural practices of a particular
time and place, but also how they are part of a dialectical network that reaches across
historical periods and locations. In European and North American history, dialectical
thinking was a significant outgrowth of the democratic, anti-aristocratic and anti-idealist
impulses of modernism, and has been the basis for some of the most significant
philosophical developments over the past century1; the work of several theorists and
practitioners who have analyzed and adapted Marx’s work to critique their own historical
circumstances have provided the inspiration for this dissertation (among them Williams,
Frederic Jamison, Judith Butler, Howard Zinn, Berthold Brecht, Anna Deveare Smith and
Augusto Boal). In this chapter, I begin by examining some of the early impulses behind
Marxism as a philosophy with two intentions in mind. My interpretation of Marx’s own
methods and goals is intended to further clarify the value of uncovering the process
1 I bracket the importance of dialectical thinking to African, Asian and Latin American
philosophical and spiritual systems, here, because while the significantly longer history
of such concepts in other cultural contexts is important in a global context, it is beyond
the scope of this particular project.
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through which the training of actors in the United States came to be understood as a
commercial endeavor focused on individual gain. Its second purpose is to begin to undo
that hegemonic process by highlighting how actors and acting teachers are in fact among
the most significant scholars who have been engaged in ongoing dialectical and critical
investigations of the very sort to which Marx himself was devoted.
Dialectics, as it is defined on the Marxists.org website,
… is the method of reasoning which aims to understand things concretely
in all their movement, change and interconnection, with their opposite and
contradictory sides in unity. … for dialectics, things can be contradictory
not just in appearance, but in essence. For formal thinking, light must be
either a wave or a particle; but the truth turned out to be dialectical – light
is both wave and particle. … We are aware of countless ways of
understanding the world; each of which makes the claim to be the absolute
truth, which leads us to think that, after all, “It’s all relative!” For
dialectics the truth is the whole picture, of which each view makes up
more or less one-sided, partial aspects.
(http://www.marxists.org/glossary/frame.htm)
The materialist understanding of how social relations determine consciousness and
historical progression, on which much of my work on this project is based, was a result of
the fact that Marx saw himself as one part of a dialogue with the intellectual trends that
came before him. He had an early interest in “a ruthless criticism of everything existing,”
and his philosophy was based on a critical analysis of Hegel’s idealism (Tucker xxviii).
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He took his cue from Feuerbach, a 19th-Century German philosopher and member of the
group of thinkers known as the “Young Hegelians,” who argued in The Essence of
Christianity that a “transformational criticism” of the Hegelian idea that human beings
were ideal “spirit (or God) in the process of self-alienation and self-realization” yielded
the truth that God is, in fact, human beings realizing themselves “via the detour of
alienation in the sphere of religion.” In other words, as Hegel saw it, God created humans
as entities separate from himself … Others through whose behavior he could achieve
self-knowledge (so in a sense, humans are the actors God puts in motion to understand
his own identity). Feuerbach, on the other hand sees God as a being humans invented
who shares some of their own qualities and to whom they can look to understand their
lives, but who lives in a separate “spiritual” realm. Marx realized, via Feuerbach, that he
could make use of the structure of Hegel’s work by changing it from a philosophy that
viewed human beings as the personification of spirit into one that viewed spiritual ideals
as alienated thought processes through which people were attempting to order their lives
(xxii-xxiii). His view that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (Tucker 4)
came out of his interpretation and use of Hegel’s own dialectical methodology.
Because he understood history as a moving process of transformation, Marx’s
interest was not in discarding Hegel altogether. He writes,
If Hegel had set out from real subjects as the bases of the state he would
not have found it necessary to transform the state in a mystical fashion
into a subject. “In its truth, however,” says Hegel, “subjectivity exists only
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as subject, personality only as person.” This too is a piece of
mystification. Subjectivity is a characteristic of the subject, personality a
characteristic of the person. Instead of conceiving them as predicates of
their subjects, Hegel gives the predicates an independent existence and
subsequently transforms them in a mystical fashion into their subjects.
(Contribution to the Critique, 18)
Hegel’s views on spirit, rationalism, the state, family, etc., were actually essential to the
formation of Marx’s own thinking, but he argued with the concept that, like subjectivity
or personality, certain ideals such as the state, God, etc., existed outside of or prior to
physical, social interactions.
The inversion of Hegel here is a philosophical concept common to the
Enlightenment: rather than looking upward to an abstract, hierarchical source for the
reason for their existence or the source of their behavior, people could find it in
themselves. Personality was created by the person, not the other way around, and
subjectivity created by subjects. But without the dialectical framework, the source of
these qualities could still be found within each individual person. In fact, the humanism
associated with modernity and capitalism is frequently understood to privilege the power
of separate individual subjects. As Marx understood it, though, the transformation that
resulted in a flip from a vertical plane to a horizontal one was relational: rather than an
individual being in dialogue with God, people could find the source of their identities in
conversation with each other. The key to revolution was removing the power from
objectified ideals by revealing their roots in social interaction. And the dialectic extended
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not only to the people in the same time and location, it also moved across history.
Dialectical materialism, in my reading, implies that Marx and Hegel should be read
together, in dialogue with each other and with a consciousness of the historical conditions
under which each man’s thinking developed, in order to arrive at a full understanding of
Marx’s materialist views and to achieve the transformation he hoped for.
Mirror and Mask: Acting as Being, Representing, and Imagining
Marx was engaged in a study of and debate with Hegelian idealism and began
writing at the incipient stages of industrial capitalism (right around the same time actor
training began to gain significance), and his main criticism reflected the historical
conflict between the ideal and “real” social experience. Marx’s theory was that within
Hegel’s philosophy, ideas became objectified, mystified and static: transformation and
movement, which happen when human bodies interact on a social level, was halted. As
capitalism and commodification became more entrenched, they took on the Hegelian
appearance of being a priori facts and their positive influence was deemed a given, which
resulted in the reification of certain individuated ideas and categories—private property,
for example, “the company” or “the state”—in much the same way aristocratic concepts
of divine truth had been taken as fact. Marx, on the other hand, maintained that while
those categories (and, by extension, individual humans) did indeed take on the
appearance of having an existence of their own, they continued to be socially formed and
historical, created by the people themselves, their daily interactions, and, most
significantly for this project, their moving, changing bodies.
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The fraught relationship between the “ideal” and the “real,” particularly when it
comes to representation, is an intricate and certainly an age-old one, repeatedly argued
throughout the history of philosophy and particularly in dramatic theory and theatre –
Plato promoted “truth” and supposed objectivity, for example, and Aristotle defended the
power of fictional artistic expression. Throughout the history of theatre in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries new developments have most often arisen as a result of
resistance or opposition to the dominant theories and practices of the time, and no matter
what words are used to frame different aspects of the argument—the world as it is versus
the world as it ought to be, social reality versus spiritual idealism, the body versus the
brain, even phenomenology vs. semiotics—the theoretical question at the crux of these
debates always involves, to some degree, the relationship between
truth/reality/experience and imagination/ideal forms.
The argument surrounding abstract ideals and physical reality continues to be
particularly significant to Marxist aesthetics. In my (here simplified) reading of Marx, his
idea was to awaken the consciousness of the working class to two things: first, that their
position as a class of laborers was not a given—it was a result of their placement in
certain historical, social and economic circumstances; and second, that rather than being
separate, abstract entities with a mystical life of their own, the same history and social
structures that defined various categories of people grew out of the people’s own effort,
energy and interaction; and if this was the case, the state, the family, etc. might also be
changed by the people. In other words, it was important to focus on the real lives of the
people, because they were the actual source from which ideal concepts sprang.
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Examining their true experiences together with what they could collectively imagine as
new ideals might gradually change their circumstances. The application of Marx’s
theories to artistic expression has grown more and more complicated (and potentially
confusing to the degree of eluding practical application) as it has grappled with the
nuances of dialectical relationships, power, and change in an increasingly capitalist
world.
What orthodox Marxists understood as the economic base of social relations that
determined all of its superstructural expressions (art, political thought, religion, etc.), is
revealed to be a more intricate web of relationships when one takes into account the
interactive and processual elements of Marx’s dialectical thinking (again, Marx himself
acknowledged his historical indebtedbess to Hegel’s ideals). For example, the
implications of Hegel’s concept that “personality” exists prior to and takes form as
“person” has compelling implications for actors: it is akin to the Romantic idea that the
portrayal of a character, emotion, etc. comes from an outer, mystical realm and enters the
body of the actor in inexplicable ways. That is, in theatrical production, characters and
emotions do rely on the existence of the actor as a conduit: Hegel’s statement was that
personality exists only as person. But although the relationship is dialectical in the sense
that each is only partial on its own and relies on the other for existence, in Hegelian
dialectics the ideal of “personality” always takes the subject position in the sentence,
making the “person” the perpetual object driven by external forces that are obscure and
abstract. In some ways, the superstructure is analogous to Hegel’s “personality.” If one
substitutes “characterization” or “emotion” for the word “personality,” Marx might
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contend that rather than character or emotion always existing prior to being acted, the
relationship is inverted—they are created by actors and audiences through the process of
historical social interaction. But what happens after these emotions or ideas about people
are created? Because they are artistic productions, do they become part of the cultural
superstructure that supposedly lacks the power to change the system of exchange as it
exists? It seems that in one interpretation of Marx, the labor of actors and other artists is
doomed to be ineffectual.
Over the course of the study of culture and lingustics, especially within the
framework of capitalist economy and in the age of electronic technology and
disembodied image, it has become clear that the degree to which characteristics like
“masculinity,” for example, do have ideological power of their own and shape people’s
social interaction, which in turn influences the performances of actors who must be
readable to audiences in order to make money; or alternately, actors who wish to see
themselves as agents in a Marxian sense and resist the existing categories of masculine or
feminine behavior might be understood to merely reinforce the ideal of “masculine” and
give it credence by exerting energy to struggle against it, and the resistant characteristics
they choose must be determined by the dominant ideal they wish to challenge. Their
resistant efforts might also be absorbed by capitalist ideology and lose their power to
destabilize existing ideology because of their perceived marketability. In short, whether
the “personality” or the “person” is subject or object and whether or not one can choose
any position vis a vis ideology becomes a tangled proposition. The power of dialectical
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thinking becomes its ability to consider the ways in which subject and object determine
meaning in constantly shifting exchanges that happen over time.
To determine how artistic representations, generally considered part of the
cultural “personality” of a particular time and place (and therefore its superstructure),
might help to bring about a renewed awareness of the human and embodied aspects of
history and give people the revolutionary possibility of changing their (capitalist) world
and making it more comfortable and equitable requires extra labor. Artists who are
determined to produce efficacious work in the Marxian sense must dedicate themselves to
complex investigations of history, economy, power and language if they are to guess
which forms, content and processes might be the most effective at any given point in
history. Acting, which directly involves human behavior within historic and economic
circumstances, holds a great deal of revolutionary potential in part because it is embodied
and temporal; discovering how to realize that potential is a daunting task, especially
given the material necessities of living in the world. I maintain that it is an important and
potentially rewarding work despite its sometimes discouraging and time consuming
complexity.
The Enlightenment and The Science of Acting: Marx and Stanislavski in
conversation with Diderot
I cite the basic definition of dialectical thinking, here, and am glossing Marx and
Hegel in part as a reminder that history itself is most productively experienced as a
changing process rather a series of isolated objects of analysis: even citing Marx’s work
as “foundational” is misleading to a certain extent, as he was consciously entering a
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conversation that had been going on for centuries. Similarly, any analysis of the history
of actor training in the United States today typically begins with Stanislavski, as he is
hailed by most as the “father of modern acting.” Stanislavski himself, however, was part
of a widespread investigation of the “art of acting” at the end of the 19th century in
Europe, which included the work of a number of important practitioners who had an
interest in transforming previous acting techniques to better suit the technological and
economic climate of the time. Many of these theorists were in dialogue with one of the
most important philosophers of the Enlightenment – Diderot – a fact that lends credence
to the idea that acting and the theories surrounding its practice were an important part of a
significantly larger intellectual debate. As Alison Hodge points out, one of many events
that had an impact on the development of actor training as a formalized practice in
Europe was the publication of Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le Comedien in 1830. Joseph
Roach devotes an entire chapter of The Player’s Passion to Diderot, pointing out that “To
this day, many acting theorists, knowingly or unknowingly, formulate their views in
response to perspectives introduced in the Paradoxe” (117). In other words, like Marx
did with Hegel, acting theorists are often involved in a “transformational criticism” of
Diderot that both makes use of and changes his ideas; and Diderot himself was a critic
who proposed to transform previous understandings of how artistry was achieved.
Significantly, actors’ contributions to the ongoing philosophical discussion about
human behavior and agency are centered in the way identity, feeling and action can be
produced with the human body. For the actor, whose body, as Joseph Roach emphasizes,
always “constitutes his instrument, his medium, his chief means of creative expression”
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(11) the ongoing question comes down to how best to train his or her body to achieve a
particular relationship to truth or to imagined circumstances. In The Player’s Passion,
Roach argues that “conceptions of the human body drawn from physiology and
psychology have dominated theories of acting from antiquity to the present. The nature of
the body, its structure, its inner and outer dynamics, and its relationship to the larger
world that it inhabits have been the subject of diverse speculation and debate” (11).
Discovering how these conceptions of the body, the actor’s use of it, and its relationship
to truth or fiction are understood to resist or support relations of production at different
stages in the history of actor training is one step towards adjusting current practices in a
way that illuminates the power of the actor’s body, encourages a responsible use of that
power, and questions capitalist ideology without risking being eventually subsumed
altogether by that system. The question—one that has been central in contemporary
debates about both acting and power—might be phrased, “Is the body beholden to
abstract ideals that form the basis of its interactions, or can bodies and their needs and
interactions actually determine what those ideals are?” Roach poses the root question of
modern acting in this way: “Is the actor’s bodily instrument to be interpreted as a
spontaneously vital organism whose innate powers of feeling must somehow naturally
predominate? Or is it best understood as a biological machine, structured by and
reducible to so many physical and chemical processes, whose receptivity to reflex
conditioning determines its behavior?” (161). In other words, is spontaneous and inspired
subjective experience more “truthful” for the actor, or can the process of acting be
understood as an objective physical science with the goal of representing emotion? More
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complexities enter the equation for the actor who has social transformation as a goal, and
(as I emphasize in Chapter Two), the question with which activist actors are faced is one
that is primary in contemporary life: what approach to the production and reproduction of
identity and feeling might be the most ethical and potentially transformative?
Diderot was considered a “vitalist” who favored the biological approach to actors’
work. His attempts to make the study of acting into a science are characteristic of an
Enlightenment worldview that emphasized rationalism and objective, scientific
explanations for concepts that had been previously considered spiritual or mystical. The
Enlightenment focus on objectivity has been one theory questioned by contemporary
critical thought, as the very idea that an objective viewpoint is possible has been all but
discarded as hegemonic and supportive of dominant ideology. Enlightenment thinking, in
fact, has occasionally been credited as laying the foundations for the development of
capitalism, as analyzing the mechanics behind the creation of goods was considered
progress—“man must try to understand nature so that he could more effectively control it
and could increase the general wealth of the community” (Souboul 28)— and made
possible mechanization, industrialization, and more efficient production. In this sense,
Diderot’s work made possible the professionalization and commodification of acting.
However, Enlightenment thinking was also the foundation of the French and
American Revolutions, and signaled resistance to traditions based on spirituality that
served to keep the aristocracy in power. D.M.G. Sutherland writes of the Enlightenment
that, “As a cast of mind, it taught its followers to judge institutions by reason and utility,
not by their antiquity or sacredness” (29). Although it is debatable to what degree it was
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intended to do so, the association of truth and reality with objectivity, in this case, had the
result of questioning the basis for the feudal economy, in which power and wealth were
controlled by nobility that was determined by lineage and by the Catholic Church.
Rational thinking resisted a mystical view of spirituality that supported beliefs about the
dominance of the nobility and clergy, and which resulted in the oppression of people who
did not belong to those classes. It was a movement associated with the growing middle
class, rather than the laboring peasant class, but,
The philosophy of the Enlightenment substituted for the traditional
conception of life and society an ideal of social wellbeing based on a
belief in the limitless progress both of the human spirit and of scientific
knowledge. Man was to discover once again the dignity which he had lost.
Liberty in every field, economic and political, was to stimulate his
activity. (Souboul 28)
Because Diderot was writing at a time during which industrialism and capitalism had yet
to take hold, studying the science and mechanics of professions such as acting also served
the purpose of giving agency to oppressed classes: it put the ability and responsibility of
shaping the world in the hands of human beings rather than some outside, unexplainable
force acting upon them.
Diderot’s interest, in many ways, was to uncover the labor behind the creation of
a number of different “products,” and it is no surprise that Marx was one of the
philosopher’s admirers. Roach points out that, in fact, Diderot was highly influential in
post-revolutionary Russia—Lunacharskii, apparently, had studied 18th-century French
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materialism, and made use of some of the revolutionary concepts from Diderot’s long-
suppressed Plan of a University for the Government of Russia. As Roach writes,
“Diderot’s materialism, atheism and revolutionary science seemed smartly in step with
the new world order” (196-97). Roach emphasizes that Diderot’s interest in acting and his
work surrounding it was parallel to his work in the Encyclopedie, ou Dictionnaire
Raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des métiers, in which he revealed the labor behind
hundreds of different crafts and professions and demonstrated “to laymen that such
mastery did not arise mysteriously from a source in the magical occult, bur from
professional skills knowingly applied” (116). His project was to demystify how actors
pursue their craft, and to reveal that their production of emotions and ideas (and hence
something different than clocks or clothing or tangible items) was a physical, almost
mechanical process, centered in the actor’s body. Roach writes, “As the most fully
informed philosopher ever to have addressed the art of acting, he knew that character
emerges directly from the nervous system of the actor; it is not an Apollonian phantom
entering the actor from without” (117).
According to Roach, Diderot’s contributions to modern acting included both the
idea that it is a process of work rather than a mystical expression of sensibility and the
paradox itself, which questioned whether an actor could represent an interior model of a
character or feeling without actually experiencing that character’s emotions. Probing
deeply into questions of consciousness and the interrelationship of mind and body and
subjective experience and objective science in a way that seems to predict current studies
of cognitive science (about which more later), one of Diderot’s significant conclusions
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was that “the bodily process of creating a theatrical illusion requires at the outset the
participation of two interlocking functions: memory and imagination” (143). Unwittingly,
perhaps, in the process of studying actors’ practices, Diderot also may have uncovered
one reason that actors are potentially dangerous to dominant points of view: their work
always involves some dialectical combination of memory (in the Enlightenment view
objective or “real” experience) and imagination (or “possibility”), and their goal is to
combine those things in such a way that results in a particular kind of production:
embodied identities that have thoughts, desires and emotions and interact with each other.
In short, actors are involved with the business of creating an imagined world (that is
based to some degree on their memories and experiences) and living, breathing, working
and feeling in it. In Diderot’s theory actors model the kind of praxis that Marx and many
after him believed could transform the world.
19th Century Theories of Acting Real
Ultimately, while Diderot was concerned with revealing the physical processes
behind acting, he was also an advocate of theatre performances that appeared closer to
“nature.” The goal of mastering the science of acting was to train the body to reproduce
emotional “truth” in a way that appeared to be spontaneous, in contrast to the rigid
structure and false mannerisms of Neoclassicism. The Paradoxe’s placement of acting in
the body rather than a metaphysical source opened up a realm of historical questions
about reality and representation that were raised again and again throughout the late 19th
and 20th centuries, and this debate was particularly active in 19th century Europe, when a
number of schools that examined the theoretical and physical possibilities of acting were
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developed. André Antoine’s Theatre Libre in Paris, for example, was devoted to
naturalism and representing the truth, and the actors “did not ‘recite’ their parts, they
‘lived’ them” (Cairns 62). Emile Zola (whose plays Antoine’s theatre produced) wrote
that artists and intellectuals in 19th century France followed after Enlightenment
developments, and that Naturalism was “the return to nature and to man, direct
observation, exact anatomy, the acceptance and depicting of what is,” and that it
“replaced abstractions by realities, empirical formulas by rigorous analysis. Thus, no
more abstract characters in books, no more lying inventions, no more of the absolute; but
real characters, the true history of each one, the story of daily life” (Dramatic Theory
696). He also writes, “the naturalistic formula will be to our century what the classical
formula has been to past centuries” (Dramatic Theory 704).
In the circumstances under which Antoine and Zola were creating theatre – in
which independent theatres undertook the necessary project of subverting the theatre of
artifice that served to maintain status quo morality and social arrangement – their goal of
total objectivity seemed the most efficacious means of illustrating the problems of
poverty and injustice and exposing the “lies” behind theatre that did otherwise. But
looking back at the naturalistic “formula”—which fell by the wayside while a less gritty
realism took hold—it seems evident that their representations of “true history” through
acting obscured the inevitable presence of one essential element of the Paradoxe: the
actor’s imagination. Naturalism may have represented the details of real experience but
the theory ignored the necessary step of actors engaging their imaginations in the act of
representing the world. In Marxian terms, naturalists might have intended the form of
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their work to reveal that the source of character behavior, experience and emotion was
people of all classes rather than idealized rules determined by an otherworldly source via
a group of elite dramatists. However in practice, their great attention on reproducing
environments might have reified the structures in which people were living; their stated
goal of objectivity might be understood to create an alternate set of ideals and model a
pattern of behavior that, in turn, led their audiences to believe that change was
impossible.
Stanislavski, Realism and the Commodification of “The System”
Stanislavski’s work was inspired by this historical and artistic environment, a
legacy of the Enlightenment, that involved ongoing experimentation in the theory and
practice of acting. In Raymond Williams’ terms, his “System” was not always a product,
but began as a dialectic process that involved inquiry and engagement with other Russian
theatre artists, within his Studios with contemporaries including Meyerhold, Vakhtangov,
and other artists associated with the Moscow Art Theatre, and with philosophers across
cultures and time periods. It is important to note that Stanislavski himself was an actor
and his ongoing intellectual and practical project arose out of a preoccupation with how
different ways of using the actor’s body resulted in different qualities of performance, the
need to find ways to make the body and emotions succumb to the actor’s will, and the
desire to pass that methodology on to other actors. His interest was in making the actor
the agent or subject and his or her character the predicate of the sentence. He studied
Diderot, among other thinkers on acting, with the goal of clarifying the techniques with
which he had been experimenting and systematizing his methods (Roach 195). He was
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also deeply influenced by his life as a spectator—he developed standards for judging his
own work through watching the realist plays produced at the Mali Theatre in Moscow.
As Robert Benedetti points out, Pushkin, Gogol and the actor Mikhail Shchepkin were
debating the question of verisimilitude and the representation of truth in the actor’s art
when the Mali Theatre was founded in 1823, and actors who worked at that theatre, such
as Aleksandr Lenski, continued to work on ways to find “the inner logic of the
character’s psychology” (17).
Diderot and the artists working at the Mali Theatre were only two among
Stanislavski’s many interlocutors. He also admitted to having been influenced by the
Meiningen players’ visit to Moscow and the work of Italian actor Tommaso Salvini,
among others (18). His critical observance and practical adaptation of their ideas suggest
that his ongoing investigation of ways to “live the part” rather than simply represent it
was one extension of a moving historical process. While his goal might have been to
settle upon a concrete set of rules for actors to follow, it is clear that at this stage,
Stanislavski’s working methodology was not a settled “system.” Adrian Cairns asks the
question, “What was being taught that was so new and special? Can it be summarized?
Not really, because Stanislavski was always changing his mind” (92). As Sharon
Carnicke points out, his interest was really in the pedagogy of acting in general, and he
“willingly embraced anything that would illuminate acting and drama” (13), but only
certain aspects of what he studied became reified, especially later in this country, as “the”
craft of acting. What was it that turned this intellectual exploration of various kinds of
plays and philosophies regarding how to embody them into “Stanislavski’s System”?
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What conditions turned the “System” into an object associated with one person instead of
a mode of inquiry shared by a company of actors, writers and artists? And what made
certain elements of that system so appealing to American practitioners?
Individuating and objectifying what is, in actuality, a moving and changing
collective effort is one of the results of a capitalist system of production and
consumption, and also a key premise through which commercial culture grows and
spreads. In Bruce McConachie’s essay cited above, he questions what led people to
associate the aesthetic practices of theatre with the word “production,” which had
previously referred to economic activity, and ultimately associates the beginnings of the
terms “producer” and “production” with the development of capitalism. He states that
under that system, “group creation gave way to individual production, the ‘individual’
being either a capitalist or a corporation, the legal extension and enhancement of
individual power under capitalism” (171). The commercial impulse that began with
industrial capitalism essentially caused a shift in focus—while it was still (and in theatre,
perhaps increasingly so) the interaction and labor of a group that was responsible for a
theatrical event, terming theater a “production” made it into a commercial entity, the
profits from which went into the hands of an individual or corporate “producer.”
As McConachie makes clear, privileging individual power over group process
stimulates the growth of a capitalist economy. Associating something that is actually the
changing, moving labor of a group with one famous name facilitates its existence as a
static and unchanging commodity, more easily exchanged for money. Then, as the system
of commerce becomes more and more entrenched, the ideal of valuing individuality over
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group activity takes on the appearance of being common sense. The process of
commodification has a hegemonic effect similar to Hegel’s idealism, in that it objectifies
and reifies the products of human labor by separating those products from the physical
bodies that created them; the value of commodities to the lives of laborers is unclear, as
the products are taken away to be exchanged in the marketplace to make profit for a
“capitalist” manager or producer (or, in contemporary terms, a corporation—which is
represented as a unified entity). As Marx writes, “That which in the labourer appeared as
movement, now appears in the product as a fixed quality without motion. The blacksmith
forges and the product is a forging” (Capital 347). The abstraction that happens
afterwards, when the blacksmith’s forging is taken from his hands, sold for currency of
which he sees only a small fraction, and is stripped of its direct use value or meaning for
him, is what Marx terms alienation.
Actors are, of course, different than blacksmiths in that the product of their
work—particularly in live theatre—is inseparable from their bodies and always involves
movement, interaction and exchange with other actors and with audiences. Even in
training and rehearsal, the goal of what actors do is not to create some object, but an
experience. Nonetheless, in a capitalist economy, experiencing an evening of theatre
becomes a commodity to be exchanged for money; and that money most often does not
go directly to a group of actors. When a “producer” or even a “director” is involved, a
production generally is attributed to that person’s name. If there is a “star” actor involved,
his or her creation of a personality, character, emotion, an idea, even a particular way of
working, is turned into a reified commodity—the physical movement, interaction with
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history and other people, and potential for transformation that is inherent in actors’ work
is hidden from them. When their collective engagement with important ideas is taken
away and associated with a particular individual, they lose sight of the fact that their work
produces important questions and concepts, and they become less aware of their potential
generative power. It is important to note (as will become more clear in later chapters) that
the process of individuation is characteristic of capitalism because it facilitates the
exchange of ideas and practices as abstract objects (things that do not move around or
change too much will not slip out of one’s hands as they are passed from person to
person), but that individuals with strong and solid ideas are not automatically devoted to
financial profit. A charismatic director or actor might also inspire in people the pursuit of
other artistic goals (or, as Stella Adler suggests in the epigraph, a sovereign nation like
America might be devoted to intellectual concepts). But because these directors,
producers or actors exist within the ideological framework of capitalism, separating their
work from the practices of a group allows them to more easily be subsumed into a
money-based economy and at the same time models and reproduces the kind of
objectification that makes possible the pervasiveness of profit-driven exchange.
While Diderot’s interest in the science of acting was supportive of an intellectual
and economic revolution, the placement of Stanislavski’s work in the environment of
competitive capitalism diluted its potential socially active aims. While his work owed a
great deal to the resistance of mystical views that supported the rule of a landowning
aristocracy, Stanislavski’s family reaped economic benefit from the growing power of the
merchant classes under capitalist development—a power that ultimately resulted in
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equally unjust exploitation of working class labor. He came from a family of wealthy
manufacturers, and he began his life in privilege. As Sharon Carnicke writes, “He
expressed adolescent theatrical impulses in a fully equipped theatre, built by his father in
1877 at the family estate, and, as he grew, he often used his wealth to further his talents
as actor and director” (11). To a certain degree, capitalism and the wealth it produced
underwrote the beginnings of Stanislavski’s intellectual activity. In the planning stages of
the Moscow Art Theatre, Nemirovich Danchenko suggested that Stanislavski use his
family’s money to fund the theatre in order to maintain the integrity of its educational
ideals, but he preferred to launch a public company from the very beginning. Benedetti
writes that Stanislavski never used any of his family’s funds for the MAT, in part because
a private company “would immediately be labeled a money-making exercise. A public
company, on the other hand, would be seen as a philanthropic, educational undertaking”
(61). Stanislavski’s goals were, as he puts it, “philanthropic” and “educational,” not
individual or financial, and his worry was that separate financial control would make his
work into a capitalist venture. The idea behind making the company a public endeavor
was to democratize the work and make it responsible and relevant to a community of
people.
Despite Stanislavski’s familiarity with the merchant class who would be their
supporting audience, his reasoning in this case was flawed. It may have been true that
connecting the theatre financially with Stanislavski’s family fortune would have been a
step that appeared commercial, and making it public was a step toward community
ownership. But in the long run, regardless of its initial funding, because the goal of the
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MAT was professional and the ultimate goal was to exchange productions for money, it
had to be somewhat more clearly defined and solidified than uncommodified laboratory
processes in order to be consumed by the theatre’s middle class audience and appeal to
their tastes. As such, it would have to be focused on producing specific, consistent
“bourgeois” qualities in performance to satisfy its patrons, and the room for pedagogical
and artistic experimentation was limited.
It is interesting to note that the “system” of training that is traditionally used in
North American programs was, when it was introduced in Russia, thought of as strange
and eccentric because it involved experimentation with theatre of all sorts. Sharon
Carnicke suggests that the capitalist goals of the Moscow Art Theatre were the reason for
the continued association of Stanislavski’s work only with realism. She writes that
Stanislavski threatened to resign if the company did not adopt his methods, but
Nemirovich-Danchenko and the company had serious doubts. “Whilst the actors saw his
experimentation as eccentric, Danchenko considered ‘Stanislavskiitis’ dangerous to the
stability of the theatre. … As a sharp businessman, he insisted that the Theatre build
firmly on its initial success with realistic styles” (13). Adrian Cairns points out that, while
Nemirovich-Danchenko was “nervous” about any ongoing experimentation, it was he, as
manager of the theatre, who in the end required the actors to study Stanislavski’s
techniques (47). Regardless, the pressure for the theatre to make money with realist plays
“clipped [Stanislavski’s] wings in other directions” (Carnicke 13). The continued
experimentation to discover new forms of training was eventually conducted with
Meyerhold and other actors outside of the confines of the theatre proper because, as
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Stanislavski wrote, their experimental goals “demanded full realization in laboratory
work. For that there was no place in the Theatre with its daily performances, its complex
duties and its severely economical budget” (My Life in Art 430).
The status of the MAT productions as commodities combined with the reification
of Stanislavski’s set of tools as an objective science of acting to be applied to any
theatrical problem raises issues about ethical representation of identities and classes of
people when the plays must appeal to middle class tastes for financial survival. As a
materialist reaction against spiritual idealism of the same sort with which Diderot and
Marx were both arguing, realism would appear to be potentially successful – it purports
to be a “truthful representation” of people in their actual material lives, and might be used
to reveal the social problems as they exist (as in Ibsen’s plays intended to do, for
example) and explain to a class of people the necessity to change their surroundings.
While Namirovich had to take care to assure the City Council that the theatre was to
appeal to a middle class audience, Stanislavski privately stated, “We are attempting to
bring light into the lives of the poorer classes. … We are trying to create the first rational,
moral public theatre” (Benedetti 68). Generally, however, criticisms of realism as it was
produced at the Moscow Art Theatre suggest that it served to naturalize and solidify
bourgeois values rather than suggesting the possibility of movement and change. Jean
Benedetti suggests the importance of making an impression on the middle class audience
with the Theatre’s initial offering, Tolstoy’s Tsar Fiodor Ioannovich:
Moscow society awaited the opening of the new theatre and Tsar Fiodor
with great excitement and not a little malice. They admired Stanislavski,
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he had been their idol, but they were also quite prepared to see him fall flat
on his face. A failure would prove how stupid it was to transgress the code
of one’s class. On the other side there were those, the young, the
intellectuals, who pinned their hopes on the new company. Stanislavski
and Nemirovich knew there was only one answer: epater les bourgeois.
They needed an unqualified success, a smash (81).
To some degree, Stanislavski’s increased insistence on faithfulness to reality was meant
to shock the middle class, through the sheer virtuosity of the performance, into social
consciousness. His hands were also tied by the bounds of financial success: the
audience’s sensibilities could not be offended so much that they would not return.
His means of tackling this initial play, which marked the beginnings of
Stanislavski’s working methodology, included detailed intellectual investigation and
engagement with the script as well as with the people whose lives it addressed. Benedetti
writes that, “The company were slowly introduced to Stanislavski’s working method,
reading, research and extensive, detailed rehearsals ‘at the table.’ … Stanislavski wrote to
Namirovich that the atmosphere was more like a University than a theatre” (69).
According to Meyerhold and others, this University was devoted to historical accuracy:
It was soon made clear to the cast that the reality of their acting was
expected to match the reality of the sets. There were to be no actors’
tricks, no ‘peasant’ acting of the traditional kind. A truthful presentation of
the people was essential to the meaning of the production. Stanislavski
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took the view that although the play might be called Tsar Fiodor the real
center of the piece was the Russian people themselves. (71)
His experiments with this play, in an attempt “not to present the conventionalized Russia
which could be seen on the Mali stage” included taking the cast on trips to various towns
on the Volga River to witness and understand the character (and characters) of Russia
(68). The process through which the company prepared for this play involved a concern
with ethics in representation of the people’s “inner lives” that was previously not
practiced, and Stanislavski’s interest was in making the subject of the play a varied group
instead of one individual character. Although virtuositic representations were the goal,
the need to turn the research process into a commodity for the sake of consumption by the
middle class limited the degree to which surprising or unexpected results from this
experimentation might have appeared in the final production, and the limited time
reigned in its populist and unconventional goals. In addition, the people who had the
money to purchase tickets or who were theatre-goers already did not, generally, include
the working class or the peasants whom the MAT actors were studying, and so the
success or failure of the production did not require them to live up to the expectations of
the very people whose lives they were putting onstage.
The many contradictions raised by the anti-bourgeois impulses of the company’s
work in combination with the theatre’s need to make money by appealing to the class
whose values it hoped to question become more evident when considering later realist
productions at the MAT, particularly The Cherry Orchard, which was the last play
written by Chekhov for the company. Chekhov, apparently, wanted Stanislavski to play
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the role of Lopakhin, the serf-turned-merchant who buys the cherry orchard and intends
to use it for a capitalist venture, and Stanislavski resisted for various reasons. While he
gave the prospect of playing Lopakhin a great deal of thought, he ended up in the role of
Gaev, Madame Ranevskaya’s impractical, idealistic philosopher of a brother. Benedetti
suggests that this may have to do with economic class: “Stanislavski may not have
wanted to be identified in the public mind with a class which, on the whole, he despised
and from which, with a few exceptions, he had distanced himself’ (128). While Benedetti
denies that this choice of roles is related to Stanislavski’s political views, he points out
that the master knew with which characters he could most believably (especially in the
eyes of the MAT’s audience) identify internally: the solidly middle class intellectuals and
idealists. His concern with “living the part,” in the case of the roles he was willing to play
because of the degree of believability he could produce, prevented him from fully
engaging with a type other than his own, imagining himself into a character’s inner life,
and changing the perception of that particular character type by convincingly taking the
role onto his body. In this case, character identity is determined by social mechanisms,
but the ability of transformation and movement is halted by the application of
Stanislavski’s theories about realistic acting in the context of a professional performance
that requires actors to closely resemble the identities they take on in order to be
successful.
Examining Stanislavski’s work on that production in more depth, however, makes
clear how physical indicators of the characters’ social functions were combined with
detailed instructions about their actions and, importantly, how they felt about those
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actions in order to create the interpretation of the play; these elements operated as
different interactive, moving parts of the production as a whole. Stanislavski’s detailed
instructions in his rehearsal notebooks indicate that, as a director, he was very specific
about how the play should be interpreted—using his techniques for portraying internal
psychology— in order to be well received by the MAT’s audience. Benedetti quotes this
section of the notebooks:
Ranevskaia: Has the cherry orchard been sold?
Lopakhin: {202 Guiltily. Examining his handkerchief. Looks down.
Doesn’t answer at once}. It has.
Ranevskaia: {203 Pause. Barely audible} Who bought it?
Lopakhin: {204 Pause. Even quieter and more embarrassed} I bought it.
{205 Agonizing pause. Lopakhin feels badly and this arouses the beast in
him. The awkwardness of his position starts to make him angry. He
nervously pulls at his handkerchief…}. (131)
In this case, Stanislavski’s status as the play’s director and his desire for a unified
production overshadow the fact that he is also an actor, and is clearly able to imagine the
character of Lopakhin empathically, despite the fact that he claimed that he would not be
right for the role. Even though Stanislavski’s choice to take on the role for which he
might be deemed most suited by audience standards reinforced the personality types of
both idealist intellectuals and ambitious capitalists, there remained plenty of room for
commenting on the characters’ actions. The actor playing Lopakhin might, on his own,
have decided to interpret the man as having unbridled joy at his new acquisition of the
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orchard, producing a different meaning for this scene. But the movement and interaction
involved in dialogue with his company—in choosing which characteristics to combine
with what kinds of emotional responses to produce various meanings, and other internal
conflicts with the playwright and other people working on the production—were frozen
by the necessity to have a strong director who could provide audiences with a consistent
product. Stanislavski’s own characterizations and interpretations were set in place, as was
his procedure for how an actor should relate realistically to a character.
Interestingly, while one of the assumptions about Stanislavski’s technique that
emerged as it was exported to the United States was that it should always be used to serve
the playwright’s intentions, Chekhov believed he had written a completely different play
than Stanislavski had produced. The Cherry Orchard was a comedy, in his mind, while
the MAT production, at least as it stood shortly before Chekhov’s death, was tragic in
tone. The fixed interpretation attributed to Stanislavski was a result of the production’s
status as a commodity—as was the way Stanislavski’s “System” lent itself to play
interpretation. He himself claimed that he was equally concerned with how to devise an
objective foundational technique for the actor dedicated to truthful playing and with
questions regarding untapped possibilities for the actor’s imagination. He wrote, “Is it
possible that we, the artists of the stage, are fated, due to the materiality of our bodies, to
the eternal service and expression of coarse realism and nothing else? Are we not called
to go any farther than the realists in painting were in their time?” (My Life in Art 428).
Stanislavski’s “System,” then, was in truth a contested set of rules that arose out of
dialogue between him and other artists. It was full of contradictions and questions, but
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eventually took on the appearance of being a reified product that could be sold to other
actors and other companies.
Selling The System in the U.S.
The process of commodifying the “System” in a way that privileged certain
elements of Stanislavski’s work continued as it was exported to the United States.
Stanislavski and the MAT were ruined financially after the Bolshevik revolution, and he
took the company on tour through Europe and the United States in 1922-24, staging The
Cherry Orchard and other productions in order to make money. Some of the company’s
members remained in the United States rather than returning to the Soviet Union, most
significantly Maria Ouspenskaya, Richard Boleslavsky, and Michael Chekhov (Carnicke
14). Ouspenskaya and Boleslavsky were certainly not the first to open an acting school in
the United States. As Adrian Cairns points out, the first University program offering a
theatre degree was Pittsburgh’s Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1917, predating the
visit of the Moscow Art Theatre by several years (22). But the dissemination of the
concepts being investigated by Stanislavski, which are now so widely established as the
foundation of the craft of acting in training programs in this country, was no doubt in part
due to the influence of this visit and the establishment of the American Laboratory
Theatre.
In its early stages, the pedagogical techniques continued to involve dialectical
adaptation and exploration, and The American Laboratory Theatre was expressly focused
on ensemble work. Foster Hirsch writes that, “With a fervor that must surely have struck
some of his American students with its distinctly un-American sentiment, Boleslkavsky
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idealized the benefits of group training” (60). He also insisted that American students
learn to take Stanislavski’s principles and transform them into something specific to their
own cultural backgrounds. The tenets they followed were: “1. This theatre must grow
here by itself and must get its roots into American soil. 2. It must begin slowly, training
young Americans for the stage in all its departments. 3. It must be recognized and
organized as a living social force, recreating itself each generation from the thoughts and
material of its own times” (Hirsch 59-60). Twenty students at the school worked for
months on a production of a play by Princess Amelie Troubetzkoy (a senator’s daughter
from Virgina who had married a Russian prince) entitled the Sea Woman’s Cloak. The
process for this production involved classroom work, rehearsal workshops and, finally, a
public performance for paying audiences—the research and preparation process were
more important to the company than the final product, which ended up being very well-
received by its audiences regardless.
While the rehearsals for this production were clearly an ongoing and moving
process, the American Laboratory Theatre’s experimentation was not able to remain
completely insulated from the economic and systemic pressures of capitalism. The Lab
was financed by a wealthy patron named Miriam Stockton who, like Stanislavski, had
wealth that afforded her the time and luxury to focus only on “artistic” values, and she
and other patrons encouraged Bolaslavski to direct the school in order to develop the
refined artistic sensibilities of the MAT’s Russian visitors in young American actors.
After the initial stages of the school’s development, both Boleslavsky and Ouspenskaya
took on commercial work to supplement their incomes, Boleslavsky as a director on
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Broadway and Ouspenskaya in small roles in Hollywood films (which performances
Hirsch describes as “archly theatrical, ‘Russian’ in a sentimental, what-the market-wants
manner” (63)). When Stockton took issue with Boleslavsky’s commercial work, he
criticized Broadway’s capitalist, money driven tendencies and protested that real art was
difficult to come by in this country, but defended his choices by saying that he had to
survive in a practical sense. After several years during which he was often absent from
teaching, the American Lab Theatre folded and Boleslavsky moved to Hollywood to
direct films. The work both he and Ouspenskaya did for commercial purposes seems to
be less focused on translating Stanislavski’s work for ensembles of American actors and
more likely to result in stereotypical, rigid reproductions of Russian “personality.”
Although he was dedicated to ensemble playing, the need to settle on certain rules
for an objectified technique was also among Boleslavsky’s goals, and this point might
also have contributed to The System’s eventual commodification. He was reported to be a
charismatic lecturer and dynamic teacher, he had the exotic aura of being a Russian
émigré, and while adapting the rules of acting was in practice a group effort of the
American Laboratory students and teachers, Boleslavsky’s individual name was more
easily packaged and marketed as the author of this methodology. His early insistence on
developing the processual, investigative, ensemble oriented spirit of Stanislavski’s work
was deprioritized when it came time to set technical rules down in written form. His
book, which came out before Stanislavski’s own writing was translated into English and
was therefore the first published manual of Stanislavski-based techniques in the United
States, is still assigned in training programs across the country. Like Stanislavski’s works
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on “the actor,” the book’s dialogic form reflects the dilemma of an artist devoted to
dialectical thinking within a capitalist culture. The collection is an adaptation of some of
Boleslavsky’s lectures at the American Lab, and is written in the form of a dialogue
between himself (“I”) and the acting student (a young girl he calls “the creature”). In her
introduction, Edith Isaacs sees his writing style as a reflection of the unique intellectual
contribution of an actor. She writes,
The actor is usually word-shy and inarticulate. Often he does not know
what it is he does or how he does it, that makes him an actor. Even if when
he knows, it is difficult for him to say it or write it. He can only express it
in action. His language is a language of movement, of gesture, of voice, of
the creation and projection of character by things done or left undone. (8)
Thus, even though Acting: The First Six Lessons is itself a commodity, the idea of
“acting” as a finished product is balanced by Boleslavsky’s choice to constructed as a
dialogue. Its title might also be understood as an indication that learning cannot truly be
simplified enough to be summarized in a few rules. These lessons are only “the first six”
among many other possible ones, and “an actor cannot be made between luncheon and
dinner. … the profession may take a lifetime of work” (11). While the simple summary
of “acting” sells books, the idea that it can be pinned down, objectified and described
within the covers of a book is only an illusion perpetuated by the drive for profit.
The Group Theatre’s Reanimation of Stanislavski
Although the American Laboratory Theatre folded, the process of interrogating
Stanislavski’s work was continued by The Group Theatre, who met outside of the context
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of the American Laboratory to conduct their own theatrical investigations. There was
quite a bit of activity in the realm of activist performance during the 1930s—the Living
Newspapers and other projects undertaken by the WPA Federal Theatre Project were
considered “documentary” plays, taking as their subject matter relevant issues of the
time. Clurman and Clifford Odets followed this pattern, turning their observations of the
economic conditions in New York during the Great Depression into productions such as
Waiting for Lefty in 1935, which addressed the Taxi Strike of 1934. In this particular set
of economic and cultural circumstances, The Group was using the principles of
“realistic” acting in much the same way they were used in France in the late 18th Century
–representing the abominable conditions of the increasingly impoverished working class
in order to reach for a transformation of those conditions.
The Group’s original impulse was in resistance to the commercial world of
Broadway theatre, and they were specifically interested in the combination of activism
and theatre. The training they undertook together was closely focused on the interaction
of a group of people rather than on the strength of individual actors alone, and Adrian
Cairns points out that they considered their work “a training ground for citizenship”
(134). As Harold Clurman wrote, “We must help one another find our common ground;
we must build our house on it, arrange it as a dwelling place for the whole family of
decent humanity. For life, though it be individual to the end, cannot be lived except in
terms of people together, sure and strong in their togetherness” (Fervent Years 30).
Clurman had studied in Europe during the rich time in which Stankislavski’s work was
being developed and training schools were being established, wrote a thesis at the
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Sorbonne on French Drama of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and saw the Moscow
Art Theatre perform before their tour of the United States. Like Stanislavski, he read
widely in the theory and history of acting, and was devoted to experimentation in theatre
(Cairns 132). While the establishment of Method acting in the United States is usually
associated with the individual names of Clurman, Lee Strasberg, Stella Adler, Cheryl
Crawford, Elia Kazan and Sanford Meisner, the revolutionary work The Group produced
in New York in the 1930s was truly the result of the collective attempt of 28 actors and
three directors to experiment with the ideas they learned from Russian and European
sources and create something relevant to their own time and place.
Like The MAT and the American Lab before them, The Group’s work could not
escape economic pressures forever. There were a number of factors that affected the
activity of The Group and contributed to its demise, including artistic differences and
personality conflicts. However, Adrian Cairns suggests that their real downfall was the
inability to find a permanent location or a source of regular funding to pay actors and
support their work (136). Despite Clurman’s opinion that theories of acting should
remain the secrets of the actors rather than be released to the wider public (a deliberate
mystification of process that defined these people as “The Group” rather than “group
theatre” in general, which, I would argue, also contributed to the later reification of the
training as “The Method”), some members of The Group attempted to start an actual
training school associated with the company that was open to other actors. The school
closed shortly after it was opened, in part because of the company’s rigorous touring
schedule, and a wider public did not have direct access to the ideas behind the training
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until members of the company conducted private lessons or taught in other New York
schools to support themselves. It was after The Group dissolved that Adler, Crawford,
Kazan, Strasberg and Meisner started their own schools and “an indirect Group training
took root and had its more lasting influence” (135). Already, the training began to be
individualized and the collective, activist elements that were foregrounded by The Group
began to dissipate.
The training eventually became a commodity itself, and the link between The
Method, Strasberg, and actors’ genuine production of emotion on film were how it
entered the popular imagination. As David Krasner points out, “The term Method Acting
itself is most closely associated with Strasberg and the Actors Studio,” and his particular
emphasis on leading actors through affective memory exercises designed to reach an
actor’s subjective emotional triggers (20th Century 134). Initially, though, Strasberg
himself wanted primarily to train actors in a way that resisted commodification. As David
Garfield writes,
Strasberg, who was reading a great deal of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky at the
time, defined the actor’s problems in Marxist terms. … The actor in the
American theater was a ‘commodity.’ He was a victim of the ‘type
system,’ which in the craft of acting paralleled the capitalist system of
production at its zenith. Typing an actor was industrializing him and
turning him into a mechanism for manufacturing a specific product; typing
or commodifying was the inevitable result of the capitalist development of
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the theater as a business. In such a theater the actor felt there was no
opportunity to develop artistically or technically. (21)
This interest in celebrating a Marxist-inspired playing style in resistance to Broadway’s
aristocratic bent is also underlined by Colin Counsell, who writes that Strasberg
considered The Group’s work “proletarian theatre”: “If aristocrats are formal and
mannered, masters of the stage’s artificial conventions, proletarians lack such mastery
and are rough and awkward. But by avoiding established formulas they are free, capable
of genuine expression” (55). Adler had similar anti-capitalist concerns – in the quote I
used as an epigraph to this chapter, she states in a television interview with Bob Crane in
the early 1960s that the country was at a turning point when it came to acting, and that
Amercian actors were in danger of prioritizing individual monetary gain rather than
investigation into larger cultural and intellectual concepts.
They held similar anti-commercial and artistic goals, but The Group famously—
like the Moscow Art Theatre—had to struggle with internal conflicts on many issues. In
other words, rather than being a unified and monolithic entity dedicated to rigid
principles, the ensemble was a changing, multifaceted organism. But despite internal
conflicts, The Group was able to sustain enough commonality to continue its activities for
some time. As Helen Krich Chinoy writes in the introduction to her collection of
interviews reprinted from Educational Theatre Journal, “The probing of the inner life,
the wrangling, the apostasies, all would seem to add up to a disastrous experience for the
participants. Yet something uniquely rewarding held them together” (447).
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Most sources cite the intellectual disagreement regarding methodology between
Strasberg and Adler as the most significant in the company’s history, and some even go
so far as to attribute The Group’s demise to that argument. Adler, having gone to study
with Stanislavski, stated that The Group was approaching things in the wrong way, and
that they should consider the importance of the outward physical circumstances of the
play rather than simply the actor’s personal truth. Strasberg, who was influenced not only
by Stanislavski but also by Vakhtangov, insisted, for the most part, on emotional truth.
Their investigations into these problems of acting —for Adler, imagination,
circumstances and theatricality; for Strasberg, strong emotional truth and personal
connection—and those of Sanford Meisner, whose focus was on impulse and immediate
behavior—continued on into the decades after the Group split apart. What might have
been considered the inevitable difficulties faced by actors in dialogue with each other
about questions of representation and craft has often been understood as an irreconcilable
difference between individual teachers.
The individualization of the training schools and the conflict among the members
of The Group might be seen as both a function of and reason for the commodification of
acting—rather than being understood as an ongoing conversation about particular
problems, each separate “answer” became a particular school. Kazan, Crawford, and later
Strasberg started The Actor’s Studio, Stella Adler began her Conservatory, and Meisner
worked with the Neighborhood Playhouse. In addition to individuating their concerns
about acting, the need to support themselves led many Group members, like Boleslavsky
and Ouspenskaya before them, to sell their skills to Broadway, film and television to
82
make a living. Stella Adler, while she consistently warned against giving in to
commercial motives, eventually opened a branch of her conservatory in Los Angeles and
taught courses there. In the Stella Adler archive recently acquired by the Harry Ransom
Center for Humanities Research are some notes transcribed from a course on “The
Meisnerian Method” taught by Meisner himself in Hollywood, at the end of which some
participating actors were selected to be contract players for Twentieth Century Fox.
Strasberg took over the role of director at The Actors Studio from Elia Kazan while he
became a successful director, first on Broadway and later in Hollywood. Even though
each individual teacher was devoted to investigating a different aspect of acting that was
in truth only one part of a dialectical process—emotion, character, behavior, etc.— the
separate schools claimed objectivity because of the need to understand “the art of acting”
as a sellable commodity. Interestingly, while Krasner points out that Strasberg is most
often associated with The Method, each teacher claimed the term or some variation of it
at some point in his or her teaching. The use of the title might be understood as a way to
continue the spirit of The Group after its dissolution, showing that although there were
differences, there was also a commonality of purpose that held the members together as a
family. Because of the continued circulation of actor training in an increasingly capitalist
economy, however, it might also be analyzed as one way the process of work was further
subsumed and packaged under one name so that it might be more easily bought and sold.
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The Method, The Regional Theatre Movement and University Theatre Programs
The dispersal of The Method, or Stanislavski-derived theories of acting, around
the country was another outgrowth of capitalist goals and resistance to them. The
growing pressure towards commercialization placed geographic limitations on those who
wished to make careers as actors, as New York and Los Angeles became the commercial
(and therefore “legitimate,” in a money-based culture) centers for theatre and film artists.
The regional theatre movement began as an attempt to resist this profit-driven and coastal
bias. Joseph Ziegler counts The Group, which he calls “a theatrical commune,” and the
Actors Studio after it, as precursors to the regional theatre movement. He cites the
“commercial Broadway theatre as it existed then and as it exists now” as the reason for
The Group’s demise, as well as the allure of film opportunities on the West Coast (14).
The regional theatre movement was an attempt, as Ziegler sees it, to decentralize
geographically, giving local communities a closer connection to theatre, and also to
decommercialize it. He points out that after World War II, to a new generation of well-
educated and well-traveled theatre-makers “work in the theatre—any theatre—was far
more important to them than where their theatre might be located” and that “in addition
to working locally, the regional theatres were dedicated to permanence, ensemble actors
and the production of classics; rather than commerce, art was their ultimate goal” (15-
16).
Interestingly, however, while the Little Theatre movement at the turn of the
century was focused on the interactive work of groups, Zeigler points out that regional
theatres seemed to require a focus on strong individual leadership (hence, the necessity
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for each to have an artistic director). He writes, “There was always one person who either
began the group or quickly took control. Decisions were more a matter of decree, even
when they appeared to be arrived at by the group. That one person’s rule was absolute, if
not despotic. The first regional theatres were expressions of the very real ambitions of
their leaders” (25). One might also flip Zeigler’s analysis to suggest that the collective
labor of the groups of people that comprise these theatres was represented to the
American public as the work of one person because of the pressure exerted in a capitalist
economy to do so2. The tendency of these theatres to be publicized as the product of
strong leaders—Minneapolis’ Guthrie Theatre was associated with Garland Wright,
Actors Theatre of Louisville with Jon Jory, etc.—could have proven to be an effective
way to counter the growing profit motives of Broadway and Hollywood. The American
focus on individual strength was built into their structures from the beginning, but they
were not-for-profit organizations. Their dedication was, purportedly, to Art rather than
Money, in an attempt to create what Stella Adler might call strong regional “cultural
symbols” dedicated to intellectual and social questions. But at the same time the
hierarchy of their structures attributed Art to the mind of a particular individual and
potentially reinforced an elitist concept of who should be involved in making and judging
theatre. This was a flaw in the makeup of the regional theatres that might have
undermined the goal of democratizing theatre and making it relevant to diverse groups
2 This has happened even with the most radical of theatre companies: Yolanda Broyles-
Gonzales argues that the association of El Teatro Campesino with the name of Luis
Valdez is the result of the “great man” narrative of capitalism.
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people within their particular geographical areas. If the artistic director was an expert on
what were the most compelling, germane or important plays to be done, why wouldn’t
experts in theatrical centers like New York be even more attuned to which theatre was
The Best? Perhaps in part as a result of the ideological underpinnings of their processes,
regional theatres were later gradually absorbed, to varying degrees, into the
commercially-driven system: their reliance on the patronage of season subscribers who
wanted to see nationally popular plays or work previously produced on Broadway about
which they had heard required these houses to balance new work or classics with
commercial selections.
The association of the regional theatre movement with MFA acting programs at
universities across the country had the potential to refocus actors’ priorities in training
and make their work more directly engaged with the communities in which they lived.
However, the need for training programs to instill techniques that would make actors
viable in a commercial market limited their ability to experiment with finding new forms
of training and rehearsal or producing work specifically suited to each local region. The
relationship between professional actor training programs and regional theatres ended up
reifying certain elements Method-based training as the craft of acting even further.
Ziegler’s book on the regional theatre movement, which was published in the late 1970s,
ends with a focus on training. He calls for regional theatres to initiate a change “that
defines the character of a theatre as a reflection of its region” (249), and points out that
the challenge, then, is in training young people from local communities. He also writes,
86
In America, young people have been trained for professional theatre
careers primarily in colleges and Universities and in acting schools in New
York. The latter have taught techniques for the commercial Broadway
stage and for films and television; the former, with few exceptions, have
simply perpetuated anti-professional prejudices and have produced
graduates suited not for the profession but rather only for teaching other
people to teach people, ad infinitum (249).
The exceptions Ziegler notes are The Yale School of Drama under Robert Brustein, and
its association with Yale Repertory, Wayne State University’s association with the
Hilberry Classic Theatre, Trinity University and the Dallas Theatre Center, and other
local university training programs that had allied themselves with fully operational
professional theatres.
Interestingly, rather than siding with the pedagogical and academic programs at
colleges or universities, BFA and MFA programs have become increasingly like the
“acting schools in New York” that taught techniques for commercial media. Actors
trained in programs connected with regional theatres are not all selected from local
communities, nor do they usually find work and stay in the regions where they are
trained. The cooperative relationship, especially between MFA acting programs and
regional professional theatres, has continued. But as the regional theatres have struggled
to remain financially viable and also artistically “legitimate,” the economic needs luring
actors and artists to one or the other of the coasts have also intensified. The financial
allure of film and television combined with the need for regional theatres to do work that
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has proven commercially successful places pressure on training programs to produce
actors ready for the market. Consequently, the rift that Ziegler noticed between
professional training and education emphasizing pedagogy, process and intellectual
engagement has extended to departments within Universities themselves.
The chasm between practical professional programs and educational ones
dedicated to intellectual investigations deepened after World War II in the United States.
In “Changing Views of Knowledge and the Struggle for Undergraduate Theatre
Curriculum,” Anne Berkeley discusses utilitarian vs. humanist/liberal arts theories of
education and traces the history of theatre programs along these lines. She states that
shortly after the war, educational theatre emphasized humanist and literary ideals, but
professionalization soon became a significant priority:
In the 1950s, the aim of training teachers and other practitioners for a
growing non-profit theatre increased courses specializing in the crafts of
production, establishing a rift between those who favored a general liberal
arts focus and those who wished to centralize specialized theatre training.
Others sought to combine both goals. With the postwar prosperity,
together with a progressive drive in the 1960s, theatre educators sharply
diverged from their predecessors by explicitly designing curricula for the
burgeoning professional regional theatre. (23)
Berkeley argues that it was during this last period, when they geared their curricula to
professionalism, that theatre studies programs gave in to the drive toward efficiency and
expertise, “completing a transformation from humanism to utilitarianism—from literary
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interpretation to technical training, from an amateur to a professional aesthetic, from the
classroom as a production lab to the university as a “producing unit” (23). This transition
in pedagogical principles from process to product and from interpretive historical
dialogue to singular “unit” in many ways reflects the shift McConachie notes from
understanding theatre as an interactive event to seeing it as a “production”: it is a result of
the capitalist profit motive.
The connection may be simply historical coincidence or it might be attributed to
the process of objectification and commodification of acting as a craft, but this change
also coincided with the establishment of Stanislavski-derived training as the foundation
of professional curricula. Patti P. Gillespie and Kenneth M. Cameron point out in “The
Teaching of Acting in American Colleges and Universities, 1920-1960” that acting was
first established as a course offering at American universities between 1920 and 1960,
and by 1960 Stanislavski was the foundation of most of those courses (61). By the time
theatre programs and regional theatre were connected, “The System” and “The Method”
had lost their initial changing, socially engaged, transformative and intellectual potential
and had become solidified and naturalized as the accepted ideal of actor training for
professional goals.
In the current state of global capitalism, the training of actors is less and less a
matter of exploring an art than of selling the ability to develop “the personality that sells.”
Shelly Frome addresses the problems raised for actors by the increased
commercialization of their “craft” in the final chapter of his history of The Actors Studio:
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As a marketing tactic, the [Actors Studio] MFA program offers graduates
“an industry passport” plus a life membership in the legendary Actors
Studio. The cost is $60,000 ($20,000 per year). This proposition becomes
more remarkable when you consider that back in its heyday 2,000 people
auditioned one year and only two were accepted: Steve McQueen and
Martin Landau. Once accepted, they were members for life. No fees were
attached. … And it had nothing to do with schooling or a ticket to
commercial success. It was a place to get away from all that, take your
time and explore acting as an art (185).
The actors of whom most people are aware (the “stars” of the film and television
industry) are certainly reflections and producers of a capitalist culture – their intellectual
labor as actors is far less significant than their celebrity status and conspicuous
consumption. In addition, those who continue to work in live theatre on or off Broadway
and hope for economic success must now compete with actors who have already
achieved celebrity status in television or films (a friend who recently worked on a
Broadway production agreed that big names are the only way to “make it work”
financially). There is a huge pool of actors who have paid to be trained in BFA and MFA
programs competing for Equity jobs at regional theatres. The current economic situation
exerts a great deal of hegemonic pressure on actors to learn techniques suited to certain
kinds of plays or films, to analyze plays in particular ways, to have a certain relationship
to theatre and film directors, producers, agents and casting directors.
90
M.F.A. and B.F.A. programs are expected, then, to prepare young actors to
attempt to find work in this particular professional environment, and it is certainly one in
which actors seem to possess very little power, economically or otherwise. There is
without a doubt an economic need to teach actors to deal with the “business” of acting,
and to provide training that makes them marketable commodities. These actors have the
understandable need to support themselves – to have comfortable lives – and have what I
see as the admirable goal of making a living in an important profession to which they feel
drawn. Although many actors may recognize that their work is significant and useful to
audiences in different ways, they are ultimately forced to make compromises and, as
Robert Brustein says, decide whether they want to pursue material satisfaction or “loftier
goals.”
The division between practice and scholarship that manifested itself early in the
twentieth century has become reified even more still, and in some cases has deepened to
the point of misdirected enmity between production and theory camps. In Geographies of
Learning, Jill Dolan addresses the contemporary institutional struggle between theory
and practice in theatre and performance programs I highlight here, noting that “those who
teach the practical business of theater and performance – acting, directing, playwriting,
speech, voice, design, movement – are often simply hostile to theory, regardless of its
particular method or inflection, and privilege a more utilitarian view of knowledge in the
field” (2). She argues that “it is vitally important that activists and academics, theorists
and critics and more positivist scholars, find ways to interrupt our repetition of these
debates and learn to work together productively” (i). In an effort to achieve such an
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interruption, acting teachers might begin by noting in their courses that even when their
training is Method-based and to a certain degree “utilitarian,” actors are not expressing
hostility to theory in any way. In fact, even when they study Stanislavski-based methods
they are engaged in a significant historical debate that reflects and produces important
ideas about how people live in the world.
If an alternative to utilitarian business interests is not only introduced but
prioritized throughout actor training on the curricular level, perhaps eventually the strong
physical/intellectual power of actors as agents of transformation might take root in a
broader cultural scope. In the following chapter, I examine more closely the theoretical
underpinnings of current theatre and performance studies programs and suggest that at
this juncture in history, when it seems that the reluctance of actors and other theatre
practitioners to venture too deeply into theoretical territory is almost necessary to their
success in the professional realm, I contend that one way to empower professional actors
is to reframe the relationship between performance studies and theatre studies. While it
appears that systemic and economic pressures make achieving this reconception on the
institutional level an uphill battle, Raymond Williams writes that “we have to revalue
‘determination’ towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from
a predicted, prefigured and controlled content” (qtd in McConachie 172). I suggest how
that transformation might begin to occur on the curricular level, with “actors who teach”
and “scholars who act.”
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Chapter Two
Embodying The Multitude: Acting in a Global Economy
No major talent really becomes major talent without finding some way to
speak for and with his or her own times. Is it possible that the lack of work
is because we have spent too much time training our students to mirror
themselves, to show the world what’s inside of the artist rather than the
world around the artist?
… The first thing I suggest is get your students ready for the “real real
world” not the real world of how to get a job. We actually have something
quite wonderful to offer these industries. In twenty years, let’s try to create
a new actor, an actor who is less self-conscious, less concerned about the
pose of acting, and more concerned about details. As much as I critique
our reliance on Stanislavski, I certainly sound like him now.
– Anna Deavere Smith
All of one’s past – historical and evolutionary – is contained in the body.
… The people we’ve known are no longer outside us. Until we can hear
the dominant voices of those ghosts whom we contain, we cannot control,
to any degree, whom we are to become. When I dream (night or day) of a
particular person, it’s never a photo image of that person, nor is it a
disguise of the person; it is, rather, the person who has become. When we
sat together, we were two. When I am alone, we are both me.
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- Joseph Chaikin, The Presence of The Actor
The control of society over individuals is not conducted only through
consciousness or ideology, but also in the body and with the body. For
capitalist society biopolitics is what is most important, the biological, the
somatic, the corporeal.
- Michel Foucault
Insofar as the multitude is neither an identity … nor uniform … , the
internal differences of the multitude must discover the common that allows
them to communicate and act together. The common we share, in fact, is
not so much discovered as it is produced. … Our communication,
collaboration and cooperation are not only based on the common, but they
in turn produce the common in an expanding spiral relationship.
- Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
Performance offers a new authenticity, based on body knowledge, on what
audiences and performers share together, on what they mutually
construct.
- Dr. Joni L. Jones
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Over the past fifty years, the adoption and adaptation of Stanislavski’s theories
and practices of acting within the “utilitarian” camp of the institutional system of
American training programs has increasingly appeared to place emphasis only on certain
aspects of that training. Those few ideas have become commodified as an objective craft
or science to be mastered by individual practitioners who, in turn, are responsible for
using their craft to represent the lives of psychologically driven individuals in a
recognizable fashion. Concurrently, some derivation of “The System” has often been
represented as the most universally viable and useful technique for achieving this kind of
representation, in much the same way that capitalism is touted as a globally applicable
and generally desirable economic system. But despite the fact that the training itself is
sold as an unchanging “craft,” its actual practice still always involves potentially
confusing and contradictory values: the belief that one must “just be” and “live the part”
of an individual on stage requires close, active interaction with a group of other actors
that belies any claim that internal psychology can be separated from external influences.
At the same time, the belief that one must use the technique to serve the intentions of the
playwright—a concept that appears deterministic in its view that identity and emotion are
always shaped by external forces and technologies—is undermined by the inevitable
presence of the actor’s own subjective emotional and intellectual processes. The
continual allegiance to the pursuit of “truth” is thrown into question by the presence of
Diderot’s paradox—that, for the actor, truth must always co-exist with a leap of
imagination.
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In the post-World War II economic, political and cultural climate—which was
characterized by the gradual transition from internationalism to globalization, in part
through the increased erasure of temporal and geographical boundaries through the use of
electronic technology—citizens of the world were faced with similarly tangled
philosophical questions that made an actor’s task potentially even more perplexing. If
identity is always determined by external economic or cultural laws or “scripts,” does the
individual have any agency in deciding how she or he lives? If not, what are these
concepts of freedom” and “democracy” to which America is supposedly so urgently
devoted? If my own identity is not shaped by a singular force but by multiple cultures and
duties, how do I choose which identity to ”just be?” What motivates which part of my
identity I choose to represent in any given situation—material reward, responsibility to
my communities, spiritual beliefs or mere personal preference? Because actors are
continually struggling to negotiate such contested concepts, their processes might serve
as particularly significant metaphors for living in the current global economic and
cultural climate. And because their actual bodies are always present and clearly at stake
in these processes, live actors are in a particularly strong position to critique the corporate
elements of globalization that involve the disembodied abstraction made possible by
electronic media. Actors can model the experience of inhabiting a real, flesh and blood
body in a technology-based global culture.
Considering again Bruce McConachie’s call for an investigation into “the
relations between historical forms of theatrical expression and the dominant ideology of a
historical period, and the functions of theater in reproducing, modifying, or contradicting
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hegemonic relations of production” (176), one might question how provisional and
physical answers to the ongoing questions of training and rehearsal—how the actor’s
body relates to his or her own identity, to the identity of a previously scripted character,
to an audience, to truth or to imagined circumstances, and to the particular technologies
with and within which an actor is working—reflect and/or resist the metaphors privileged
by dominant ideology in the current historical and cultural milieu. In other words, what
kinds of bodies do specific rules of training and rehearsal create, and what new kinds of
physical metaphors can actors’ bodies produce in training and rehearsal?
During the historic and economic transformation from modernism to
postmodernism that occurred throughout the twentieth century, following the patterns of
Diderot, Marx and, I would add, especially Stanislavski, The Group Theatre, et al,
scholars across disciplines became increasingly more aware of and concerned with the
mechanics and politics of the human body. Foucault shed light on the idea that the
metaphor of the body as a machine, which gained currency in the 17th century and was
essential to the development of capitalism, was combined with the idea of the body as the
source of a biological life force to which people had been granted the freedom and right
to protect. He suggests that together, these concepts resulted in the increased reliance on
the enactment of ideology and societal regulations on and through the details of
individual bodies and their daily functioning: “The setting up, in the course of the
classical age, this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biological, individualizing and
specifying, directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the processes
of life—characterized a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but
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to invest life through and through” (History of Sexuality 139). Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri argue that, through the use of electronic information systems and their integration
into the daily functioning of individual human bodies, globalization has intensified this
process: “In the postmodernization of the global economy, the creation of wealth tends
ever more toward what we will call biopolitical production, the production of social life
itself, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and
invest one another” (xiii).
In general, the concept of embodied knowledge and how our physical bodies both
take on and reproduce certain ideas about the world has infused theories of pedagogy and
artistic practice in recent decades, especially among teachers, scholars and artists
influenced by feminism and Marxism, who have as a goal the possibility of changing
structures of power. Interest in and understanding of human bodies has been an ongoing
project of modern and postmodern thought, and the association of physicality with
knowledge is a particularly contemporary phenomenon. Historically, consciousness, “the
mind,” and ideas were studied separately from the body (and from emotions, as well). In
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness,
Antonio Damasio points out that, “Romantics placed emotion in the body and reason in
the brain. Twentieth-century science left out the body, moved emotion back into the
brain, but relegated it to the lower neural strata associated with ancestors whom no one
worshipped” (39). He add that in the field of neuroscience, “the mind remained linked to
the brain in a somewhat equivocal relationship, and the brain seemed consistently
separated from the body rather than being seen as part of a complex living organism”
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(40). This division is a particularly fraught issue for feminists (and, I would note, for
actors), considering what Judith Butler calls “the classical association of femininity with
materiality” (Bodies 31), and the masculinist mistrust of bodies and of matter3, that places
women in the role of the “ancestors whom no one worships,” who are limited to using
only the irrational, emotional “lower neural strata.” In Butler’s discussion of the linguistic
roots of the “form” and “matter” binary, she reconfigures the feminine, maternal body as
a possible source of change and generation. “This is true for Marx, as well,” she writes,
“when ‘matter’ is understood as a principle of transformation, presuming and inducing a
future” (31). The danger in maintaining the traditional separation between body and mind
(or matter and thought) is evident from Marx’s theory outlined in the previous chapter:
when ideas are removed from bodies they become fixed and naturalized, and changing
the existing structures that privilege some categories of people over others becomes
impossible. Currently, the state of theatre studies programs replicates this separation by
deeming actors as the body and scholars as the mind.
In Critical and Cultural Theory, Dani Cavallero offers the following simple and
clear explanation of the contemporary preoccupation with human bodies in a chapter
examining the trends in scholarship about embodiment in the latter half of the twentieth
century: “the body plays a crucial role in our interpretations of the world, our assumption
3 Here, Butler cites Irigaray, in a quotation that makes clear the danger of maintaining
metaphors of containment with an inside and outside formulation : “Her
speculative thesis is that those binaries [of form and matter], even in their reconciled
mode, are part of a phallogocentric economy that produces the “feminine” as its
constitutive outside,” resulting in the ultimate erasure and devaluing of the feminine
(35[emphasis mine]).
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of social identities, and our acquisition of knowledge. … Experience and knowledge are
inevitably embodied” (99). Because schools are places where consciousness, identity and
physicality are constantly being re-negotiated and changed, pedagogy is a field in which
an awareness of embodied ideas and performativity is particularly important. This
increased awareness that meanings and ideology are carried out through bodily lived
experience has led to a number of recent theories about activist pedagogy that combine
critical theory and reflection with physical action and practice, in order to help students to
become critical participants in culture by encouraging them to consider not only what
they know, but how they embody that knowledge. In classrooms that focus on subjects
traditionally considered “scholarly,” such as history, philosophy or literature, this
approach frequently involves activities that engage students’ bodies and emotional
responses in order to overcome a bias that separates intellectual work from their lives in
practice.
Critical pedagogy is committed to democratic classrooms in which students and
teachers actively examine the politics of the body, pleasure, emotion and desire.
Educational theorist Peter McClaren wrote in the mid-1990s:
Bodies are not placeless, monadic, isolated sites but are the result of
intellectual traditions and the way such traditions have disciplined us into
understanding them; yet they are also compellingly complicitous in the
constitution of the metaphors through which such traditions are
constructed. Hence, there is no way of avoiding bodies. As evident as this
might be, the educational establishment has been exceedingly successful
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in ignoring the body both in the theorizing of educational practice and in
the practice of educational theorizing. (63)
He calls for teaching “in corpore” that emphasizes a hope that is both embodied and
informed. bell hooks cites both Paulo Friere and Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese
Buddhist monk, as influences on her own teaching because each places an “emphasis on
‘praxis,’ –action and reflection upon the world in order to change it.” She particularly
admires Thich Nhat Hanh’s concern with “wholeness, a union of mind, body and spirit”
(14). hooks and McClaren look for ways to help students discover the various roles their
physical bodies take on and reproduce in their daily lives. From the perspective of art
education, Charles Garoian proposes performance art as a means of re-inserting the body
into traditional art classes. He writes, “By calling attention to and acting out the effects of
culture on the self through performance, the (artist’s) body is transformed from being the
resigned object of culture to a reflexive subject, from mere consumer to that of a critical
producer” (54). Performance, for Garoian, interrupts the traditional concentration in art
courses on rigid cultural rules and objects to become a way of understanding the body’s
role in the production of cultural categories and structures; at the same time it offers a
means for students to actively critique and transform culture.
If, following these theorists and teachers, one believes that a renewed
consciousness of the body and how it works (often through performance) is a means of
giving students agency in producing rather than merely passively consuming their worlds,
then it would seem that university theatre departments, where live bodies are already at
stake and actors are in the business of manipulating their musculatures to publicly
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represent identities, would be in a unique position to begin effecting some kind of
change. As I emphasized in the previous chapter, Joseph Roach has observed that
“conceptions of the human body drawn from physiology and psychology have dominated
theories of acting from antiquity to the present. The nature of the body, its structure, its
inner and outer dynamics, and its relationship to the larger world that it inhabits have
been the subject of diverse speculation and debate” (11). Because both the general
theoretical “Body” and the actual mechanics of individual bodies have been scrutinized
more closely since the Enlightenment and especially after Marx, and because bodies are
understood to be the architects and building blocks of politics, economics and culture, it
would seem that the training and practices of actors’ bodies when shaping (and being
shaped by) fictional worlds might be thought of as increasingly significant on intellectual
and practical levels. If there is a biological “truth” – even if it is nothing more than the
fact of embodied engagement with the world and with ideas—an actor might have more
direct access to that experience simply by virtue of asking important questions in a
physical manner; to some degree considering the work they do an investigation into “the
human experience” of having a body is a valid way of imagining it. However, as I
emphasized at the end of the previous chapter, in the field of theatre training, where one
might expect to find more holistic approaches to teaching, biases persist. In part as a
result of economic pressures, courses are still often separated into those that are “idea-
based” and encourage intellectual work, such as theatre history and dramaturgy, and
practical ones that focus on developing students’ bodies and emotional capacities. Even
though many professors who teach history and dramaturgy are careful to engage students’
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bodies in class activities, and acting courses most often do include analytic skills, the
institutional structure continues to separate critical work from practical.
The division of theatre education programs into two camps—utilitarian
professional theatre programs and academic history/criticism/performance studies
programs—enabled artists and scholars in academic areas to question the
commercialization of theatre by taking a critical stance outside of theatre practice, but
this rift devalued and obscured the complexities and revolutionary promise of the
questions actors on the professional track were pursuing. It also obscured the potential for
repressive or exclusive practices within performance studies. As both Jill Dolan and
Phillip Zarrilli have observed, institutional structures combined with a lack of self-
conscious engagement of history and critical thinking in some theatre production courses
(acting, here, in particular) serve to reinforce the “mind” vs. “body” binary. These
conflicts result in the persistent separation within departments between students who are
considered “practitioners” and those who are “scholars,” impeding the possibility of
change by, on a different level, separating consciousness and “theory” from physical
action and practice. While intellectual work is not ignored in “practical” courses like
acting and directing – students analyze scripts, for example, and do research on
characters – the focus remains internal, directed at mastering specific techniques or tools
of analysis at the expense of examining how certain attitudes and actions are historically
and culturally shaped, and how the reproduction of ideology happens through the body.
In the first chapter, I historicized acting and actor training in the United States in
order to reveal how the process of professionalization changed the study of acting from a
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complex, intellectually and socially engaged practice to an objectified set of rules to be
mastered by individual actors. In this chapter, I narrow the focus of my analysis to
contemporary issues of training. I suggest supplementing the curricula in classrooms
previously devoted only to developing fictional characters for performance in plays with
solo performance skills and interview techniques borrowed from anthropology, history
and other fields. I explain how this might be a way to encourage actors to be mindful of
how their work is an important intellectual contribution to their communities that has the
potential to change the way people understand and live their worlds. Because the changes
I suggest come out of a belief that actor training is part of ongoing historical
development, I see this as a continuation of the conversation about representing daily life
into which Diderot, Stanislavski, The American Lab Theatre, The Group Theatre and the
regional theatre movement entered. This conversation also included Meyerhold, Brecht,
Artaud and others whose work deliberately departed from strictly realistic content and
form.
Raymond Williams’s chapter, “Dominant, Residual and Emergent,” in Marxism
and Literature, provides a useful framework for this concept. According to Williams,
“The residual, by definition, has been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in
the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an
effective element of the present” (122). The emergent, on the other hand, is a way of
describing practices resistant to dominant culture in which “new meanings and values,
new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created”
(123). I imagine this training practice as an interaction of residual and emergent
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processes, which, according to Williams, “are significant both in themselves and in what
they reveal of the characteristics of the ‘dominant’” (122). My hope is that introducing
these changes that engage and adapt the residual methodological texts of past artists on a
curricular level might eventually lead to emergent approaches to teaching and learning
acting that stimulate larger structural changes in University and other training programs. I
believe that in order to effectively critique and move past the prioritization of corporate
and commercial goals, the work people are doing in theatre programs and performance
studies programs has to be understood as mutually supportive rather than antithetical.
In this chapter, I suggest that, at this juncture in history, in order for actor training
programs to realize their potential as important sites for investigating the relationship
between global and local culture and values that reach beyond capitalism, they should
adopt a metaphor for the actor’s body that imitates the boundary-shifting and totalizing
pattern of globalization, and at the same time acknowledges and respects difference. It
should be a metaphor that reflects the definition of dialectics I cited in the previous
chapter: “the method of reasoning which aims to understand things concretely in all their
movement, change and interconnection, with their opposite and contradictory sides in
unity.” Because the work actors do always involves the embodied enactment of theories
and ideas, their training and practices offer a place to work through the problems of
separate, sovereign identities and global politics.
Bodies, while they are slippery, changing, leaking, growing entities, do have
boundaries of skin and bones, that, while they function in some similar ways to each
other, are also clearly very different in others. They have frames and coverings that,
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while they are continually transgressed and transformed through experience, allow people
to be aware of themselves as separate, individual entities. At the same time, each of our
bodies is becoming more and more able to transgress its own boundaries and inhabit “the
world” on a larger scale, to take on and reproduce knowledge and ideas on a global level
through the same networks of technology and communication that have been used
successfully to promote the spread of capitalist ideology. The specific details of being a
person with a body, of laboring and interacting with other human bodies, with a desired
goal in mind, and using a variety of different technologies, requires an acknowledgment
of the ways in which people and their experiences are both the same and different, local
and global. I am interested in finding a way for actors’ training and rehearsal practices to
recognize the value of maintaining a sense of individual agency and choice through
defining identity as the embodiment of an ongoing engagement with community, history
and imagined possibility.
My suggestion is that drawing on the historical legacy of Stanislavski’s humanism
might be useful in both its emphasis on learning to identify and empathize with other
human beings, and in its hopeful suggestion that people are agents capable of pursuing
and achieving the desires on which their survival depends; that Brecht’s theories might be
useful in their attempts to render actors and audiences conscious of their historical
circumstances; and that Boal’s work might be useful in emphasizing how the actor’s
rehearsal process can also make possible choice of how one shapes one’s body into a
character; solo performance techniques provide a framework for the public enactment of
individual identity; and ethnographic interviewing and performance encourages
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accountability to a community and the performance of multiple voices and experiences
through one actor’s body. All of these theorists’ work can productively be synthesized
and transformed within acting curricula.
Several of the theatre practitioners and theorists with whom my project is in
dialogue use methods in rehearsal that do not necessarily appear in a final theatrical
production. For example, Duane Krause points out that Michael Chekhov encouraged
actors to work on the idea of “psychological gesture” in preparation for a role, but that
how much of it was used in performance depended on the actor’s “taste.” Krause also
writes that Stanislavskian actors are encouraged to consider the psychological
complexities of their characters, but that in production these contradictions are
downplayed, and that Brecht encouraged actors to use identification and empathy in
rehearsal but not in performance (272). Concurrently with preparation for a play or scene
but separately from regular rehearsals, I suggest that an actor comprise the identity of his
or her character through a solo performance that includes interviews with various
members of a community, pieces of his or her own autobiography, songs, visual
representations, advertisements and other cultural artifacts or texts.
What I hope will be emergent in this practice is a renewed awareness, on the part of
actors and audiences, that social structures and categories, environments, situations and
especially individuals with desires, feelings and ideas are not created merely as the result
of internal and individual processes. Identity is, in fact, multiple, and grows through
embodied social interactions that happen in particular historical circumstances.
Ultimately, it is this embodied interaction that makes change possible.
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Acting and Metaphor Theory
Before I move on to discussing actor training and its multiple connections with
the use of metaphor in culture, I want to describe a physical metaphor for the transition
from classicism and neoclassicism to modernism that came up in conversation with Mary
Overlie, the originator of Viewpoints training, when she did a residency at Texas A&M
University where I was teaching in Spring of 2006. She and I were discussing modernism
and postmodernism, and she explained to me her very physical way of understanding the
historic transition to modernist thinking. Overlie said that she imagined the classical
relationship of the body to space as being a vertical one: she stood with her arms pointing
straight up above her head, which she tilted backward to look at the sky. This brought to
mind, for me, Hegel’s idea of human beings’ relationship to God: they stood in this
position, and their identities and thoughts and feelings entered their bodies from a source
above them. People placed themselves in the same hierarchical relationship to a monarch,
who was metaphorically in a position above their heads. Actors, in this conceptual
framework, would take in the personalities of their characters in the same vertical
position.
With the advent of modernism, the position of people’s heads changed, and their
gaze shifted to a horizontal one. Human beings could now look around themselves for
the source of truth, and consequently became interested in their bodies, in their
surrounding environments, and in machines. Actors could be inspired by people, but also
by the increasingly mechanized world, for ways to mold and move their bodies in
performance. However, while their heads were able to look around, people’s bodies were
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still, in some cases, stuck in this “up and down” hierarchical position. They might move
this shape from place to place to see more things, but they were still accustomed to
imagining themselves as sort of containers for spirit; in the vertical arrangement, their
bodies remained individual and their boundaries stayed put. Marx understood this shift
from the vertical to the horizontal, but his idea of revolution could not occur until people
not only recognized their bodies in relationship to other bodies, but also put down their
arms (so to speak) and felt the interactive movement and the various shapes their bodies
made, or could make, in reciprocal connection with each other. But because people’s
conceptual frameworks had yet to catch up, they organized themselves in groups with
protective boundaries: truth could be enclosed within the surrounding walls of nations,
for example, and their collection of bodies mirrored the model of individual containers
with protective outer walls reaching vertically to the sky.
This image of individual bodies that have been shaped by a hierarchical system
but are beginning to look at the world horizontally is helpful when considering the
anxiety over establishing and maintaining the boundaries of Americanism that pervaded
people’s consciousness in the United States after World War II. In Bruce McConachie’s
book American Theater and the Culture of the Cold War: Producing and Contesting
Containment, he analyzes post-WWII American Theatre using several experiential
elements implied by the metaphor that bodies are containers with an inside, an outside,
and a boundary in between them: protection from external forces, restriction of internal
forces, fixity of location, accessibility or inaccessibility to observation, and transitivity
(the logic stating that if, for example, an individual is within the bounds of container A,
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and container A falls under the category of container B, then the individual is also within
container B) (10-11). In the case of theatre, modernist movements with their separate
manifestos established boundaries that separated them from other groups on the
horizontal plane, in much the same way that countries were struggling to maintain their
borders along geographic lines. Actors had to choose to stand within the borders of one
group or another. And for performers within these containers, certain rules for acting
were prioritized: some understood representation as being legitimate only if it strove to
be objective, while others glorified internal, personal, subjective experience, for example.
Analyzing how people’s conceptual systems help them arrange information and
understand their lives is an important step in determining how to change the way actors
and people move their bodies around. McConachie’s writing about containment is based
on the research and writings of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, some of whose work
deals specifically with how metaphors both determine and are determined by the way
people’s bodies experience the world. In her application of embodied knowledge to
theatre practice, Rhonda Blair engages the work of Antonio Damasio, another neurologist
working in the field of cognitive science who has translated his work for popular
audiences. Damasio’s research addresses the biological roots of consciousness and
describes how the body and brain, reason, emotion and imagination are part of an
interactive, organic whole. The process I propose (which I describe in greater detail in
later chapters) also draws its theoretical premises from the possibility that these scholars’
generous translations of the dense ideas of cognitive theory might illuminate how the
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work of actors and other theatre practitioners reflects contemporary scientific concepts
about the body, emotion and consciousness.
Applying the models these theorists provide is a step towards changing the binary
understanding of the mind and body that separates intellectual and physical work in the
area of actor training and rehearsal practices. Damasio’s understanding of human biology
connects “behavior, intellect, emotion and imagination” (182) and points out that reason
and emotion are inseparable from their interaction with the body as an entire living,
breathing, changing organism. At the same time, it acknowledges that there are both
innate biological and external cultural sources for human feelings, behavior and ideas; as
I cited in the previous chapter, Joseph Roach wrote that Diderot’s questions for the
modern actor were whether the actor’s body is a “spontaneously vital organism whose
innate powers of feeling must somehow naturally predominate” (that is, controlled by
psychological and emotional forces inside the body) or “a biological machine, structured
by and reducible to so many physical and chemical processes, whose receptivity to reflex
conditioning determines its behavior?” (161) (that is, shaped externally by placement in a
certain environment). The theories of these contemporary neuroscientists support the
concept that every actor’s body is controlled by both sides of the paradox in dialogue
with each other. Damasio acknowledges that despite infinite differences, there are also
many commonalities between the way people’s bodies function in the world.
Consequently, as Lakoff and Johnson point out, the metaphors people use to describe
their experiences in some ways “arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we
have and that they function as they do in our physical environment” (14).
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A particularly clear example of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is the “ideas as
objects” metaphor, which involves the concept that “understanding is grasping.” When I
pick something up with my hands, it is much easier to examine it, to look at all of its
details, and to control it: it is a way of understanding ideas in terms of a fundamental
physical experience (20); the movement of the body when examining or holding onto a
solid piece of material that does not move is a familiar one to most people across
cultures. Consequently, the fundamental, biological experience from which the linguistic
metaphor has been derived is physically inscribed in people’s consciousness, and it
becomes difficult to separate the body’s memory from the linguistic use of it; one forgets
that “getting” certain concepts or “acquiring” information is not an actual physical event
that happens, it is a way of describing an experience and making sense of it in terms of
the body. Biology, then, is only one facet of a complicated, moving equation that also
includes how cultural experience is involved in shaping human bodies. Within capitalism,
there is also the matter of consumer culture that has been discussed: objectifying
knowledge becomes even more entrenched as a belief, because prioritizing the value that
ideas are unmoving things makes it easier to exchange them for profit. Such is the case
with acting: one never really “masters the craft,” but because we make sense of the rules
in a way that resonates on a basic physical level and is supported by the economic system
in which we live, the concept seems natural.
Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge that it is difficult—even impossible—to
distinguish between which metaphors are cultural or evolutionary and which are
biological, since these processes are in constant dialogue with each other. The “nature vs.
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nurture” question is, to some degree, beyond the point—the more important task is to
uncover what a culture prioritizes by analyzing the metaphors it uses to describe
experience. In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that the metaphoric
ways people describe their experiences have a tendency to highlight particular aspects of
an experience and obscure others:
For example, in the midst of a heated argument, when we are intent on
attacking our opponent’s position and defending our own, we may lose
sight of the cooperative aspects of arguing. Someone who is arguing with
you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable commodity, in an
effort at mutual understanding. But when we are preoccupied with the
battle aspects, we often lose sight of the cooperative aspects. (10)
So what scholars can do is analyze how the economic and political systems in place at
certain times and locations prioritize and value some elements of a system of metaphors
over others, and unearth the other possible embodied concepts that have been
deprioritized. In the case of “ideas as objects” metaphor, for example, one might remind
people of the changing and slippery nature of thought; with acting, the effort might be to
balance the individual, internal elements that have taken priority with the interactive and
communicative side that tends to disappear.
Lakoff and Johnson write, “In general, the major orientations up-down, in-out,
central-peripheral, active-passive, etc. seem to cut across all cultures, but which concepts
are oriented which way and which orientations are most important vary from culture to
culture” (24). They give as an example Trappist monastic orders. For these orders,
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… LESS IS BETTER and SMALLER IS BETTER are true with respect to
material possessions, which are viewed as hindering what is important,
namely, serving God. The Trappists share the mainstream value VIRTUE
IS UP, though they give it the highest priority and a very different
definition. MORE is still BETTER, though it applies to virtue; and status
is still UP, though it is not of this world but of a higher one, the Kingdom
of God. (24)
So while some experiences of the world are similar on an underlying cognitive and
physical level—which direction is “up” and which is “down,” for example—one might
further analyze how a culture places value on those directional experiences. As suggested
by the language people use to describe their experience, is “up” preferable to “down?” or
is “inside” better than “outside?” If “inside” is prioritized over “outside,” what elements
of a culture are placed in that spot, and which are external? By extension, one might try
to transform a culture’s values by suggesting a shift in the metaphoric and linguistic
systems in place. For example, being able to “grasp an idea” or “master a skill”—both
implying ownership, control, etc.—seem to be in the “up” location in the linguistic
systems of capitalist cultures. Is it possible to deprioritize “grasping” a thing by using
language that implies movement, give-and-take, and creativity, like “stretching” or
“reshaping”?
Acting, Actor Training and Cold War Politics
As I attempted to clarify in the previous chapter and earlier in this one, it was the
hegemonic pressure exerted by unlimited-growth capitalism that led to the placement of
114
certain elements in the discussion of actor training in the “up” and “better” locations, and
obscured the multifaceted nature of the investigations about “human nature” that were
being conducted by Stanislavski and his followers. McConachie recognizes that images
of containment are among the pervasive capitalist metaphors in the culture of the United
States during this period, when the element of inside was clearly preferable to outside:
If figures are perceived as containers, phenomena related to them are
understood to be either inside or outside of those figures. This facet of
containment affects an enormous range of everyday thinking. If, as
Johnson states, “we understand categories metaphorically as containers
(where a thing falls within the container or it does not), then we have the
claim that everything is either P (in the category-container) or not-P
(outside the container).” Thinking with containment as a matrix, in other
words, results in either/or propositions that can lead to a “hardening of the
categories” in everyday life. Looking at reality through the eyeglasses of
containment, the phenomena of the world also seem to possess essences;
one or several of the features “inside” a figure can come to represent the
essence of that figure. (viii)
Throughout the cold war, any artist whose activities were thought to fall outside the
protective container of “Americanism” must be a Communist: you’re either with us, or
you’re against us.
The influence of this “inside/We” vs. “outside/Other” structure on perceptions of
acting as a profession and on the ability of actors to reach beyond capitalist goals in the
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environment of Cold War politics cannot be overemphasized. While Stanislavski had
worked in a modernist climate that was still characterized by the sovereignty of
individual nation states on which European colonialism was based, the exportation of his
System of actor training and its transformation into The Method in this country coincided
with a significant period of transition in the economic and cultural history of the United
States and the world. Numerous smaller groups or nations were being gradually
incorporated into two large containers: Capitalism or Communism. As Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri point out, the modernist politics of colonization and the spread of
capitalism during that phase relied on the creation and extension of boundaries:
The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were
fundamental to European colonialism and economic expansion: the
territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the center of power from
which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system
of channels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the
flows of production and circulation. Imperialism was really an extension
of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own
boundaries. (xii)
Following World War II, the anxiety over establishing boundaries remained, but the
center of power began to shift from Europe to the United States, and the concern was
with solidifying capitalism as a universal good struggling against a communist “Other”—
the emphasis changed from interaction and struggle between multiple sovereign nations
to a binary struggle between opposing ideological forces. While modernist metaphors of
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nationalism, dominance and conquest were still ideologically prevalent, technological
advances combined with increasing exchange across borders combined with “good vs.
evil” rhetoric were setting the stage, so to speak, for the shift to a global economy based
on subsuming difference and erasing boundaries in the name of capitalism.
The dissolution of The Group Theatre and their fragmentation into separate
individual acting schools, each with its own particular approach to “The Method,” is in
some ways a result of their suspected communist activities and their placement outside
the container of Americanism. It might be easier to extend the protective boundaries of
capitalist America to incorporate each individual than it would to colonize the entire
moving, changing Group. Stella Adler’s FBI file, over 100 pages in length, is full of
classified memoranda that detail several investigations into her daily activities throughout
the 1930s, 40s and 50s, and it is clear that the inquiry continued well after it seemed
evident that she was not an active member of the Communist Party. Despite the fact that
it was never actually illegal to be a Communist, the hegemonic pressure of ongoing
scrutiny, public opinion, and maintaining careers made the hearings and their fallout
exceptionally powerful.
David Garfield points out that Elia Kazan’s involvement with the House Un-
American Activities Commission in the 1950s caused further strife among members of
The Group Theatre. He writes,
Kazan, at the height of his career as a film and theater director, was a prize
catch for HUAC because he agreed to speak freely about his past. What
upset and angered Kazan’s friends and associates both in and out of the
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Studio was his naming of names in his disclosures about Communist
attempts to infiltrate the Group Theatre in the mid-thirties. … on April 10,
again in executive session, he presented an affidavit to the investigatory
unit which included a list of one-time members of the Group’s Communist
cell (86).
Kazan stated that he was ambivalent about testifying, but the politics of the situation were
complicated. While being questioned, he claimed that his actions were intended to make
a public display of his opposition to Stalin and his tactics. In addition, facing
imprisonment or blacklisting, he claimed that he did what he had to do to survive and
maintain his career. Kazan’s actions and their implications are revealing with regards to
the later development of training actors: the HUAC and McCarthyism made evident this
“either/or” proposition—in order to remain on the “inside” in Hollywood one must prove
that he or she was a strong, profit-seeking individual—a capitalist. It is clear that for
many artists, because of the aftermath of McCarthyism, the pressure to choose between
commercial work and intellectual engagement became even more intense and loaded with
significance.
Acting vs. Performance Studies
The metaphoric “insider/outsider” structure put in place by the Cold War was
further solidified, on the institutional level, with the development of theatre and
performance in New York in the 1960s and 70s. A number of theatre companies sprung
up in resistance to Broadway and Hollywood, among them Judith Malina and Julian
Beck’s Living Theatre and Joseph Chaikin’s Open Theatre. Theatres like these continued
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in the dialectical spirit of The Group, investigating theories of acting across history and
location and devoting themselves to the interaction of an ensemble of actors. The goals of
The Living Theatre, for example, were expressly anti-commercial and they made use of
the work of Artaud and Meyerhold. As Beck states in his meditations, “To get thru. To
you. Our struggle is to dismantle the death machine. The death machine is capitalism.
Our struggle is to open the doors of the world prison. The world prison is the social
structure. Our struggle is to get thru to the possibility of being” (Meditations 6).
While that company was surrounded by, and in many ways entrenched in, the
economics of capitalism, it struggled to keep its work from becoming commodified
within that system. Beck gives an account, in Storming the Barricades, of the material
conditions surrounding the history of the Living Theater’s productions, which were filled
with financial struggles, legal trouble, and moving from location to location. The
relegation of these theatres that were considered to be “experimental” or “avant-garde” to
a realm outside of “legitimate” professional theatre has a direct correlation to their
devotion to intellectual engagement and social activism. In turn, those who made the
choice not to struggle to such a degree financially and devote themselves to careers as
professional actors continued to be disempowered: although they, too, were engaged in
raising questions about the world and how people live in it, their status as commercial
entities overshadowed their potential as intellectuals or activists.
As the Cold War persisted through the 1970s and 80s, the complicated argument
between professional industry “insiders” and intellectual “outsiders” who resisted
professionalization and commercial goals continued to be reflected in the institutional
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structures of University programs. What Joseph Ziegler noted as an early situation in
which academic programs “perpetuated anti-professional prejudices and produced
graduates suited not for the profession” might also be stated in the converse:
professionally oriented programs frequently took on an anti-intellectual appearance that
was necessitated by the market they were attempting to feed. This institutional split was
actually deepened by the circulation of the term “performance” and the development of
performance studies programs in the 1970s. Joseph Roach credits Richard Schechner,
whose work with The Performance Group on ensemble-based, environmental productions
placed him in the experimental/outsider realm of theatre, with the “bold move” of
disassociating performance and theatre within academia. (Schechner was editor of the
Tulane Drama Review, and after moving to NYU in 1967, changed the name of the
journal to its current title, TDR: A Journal of Performance Studies (“Three Unities” 33-
34). While it was indebted to theatre practice in many ways, “performance” attempted to
escape the limitations of the discipline out of which it grew and took a deliberate stance
outside the margins of traditional (and increasingly professionalized) theatre practice.
While Schechner was always a scholar and his work as a theatre practitioner was
“experimental” rather than “professional,” his background was solidly in theatre studies
and he was part of the faculty of New York University’s theatre department. But as his
collaboration with anthropologist Victor Turner became more involved, the
interdisciplinary Performance Studies program became a separate entity.
While both programs are currently housed in Tisch School of the Arts’ Institute
for the Performing Arts, the graduate program offering an MFA in acting and the
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Performance Studies program, which offers the MA and PhD degrees, are listed
separately, one devoted to professional training, the other to academic inquiry. This
current division, in some ways, limits both realms, and its consequences are varied.
Performance studies becomes less connected to the work of actors as performers. In his
book Performance: A Critical Introduction, Marvin Carlson admits that although his
background is in theatre “I will not be devoting a great deal of attention to traditional
theatre as such, but rather to that variety of activities currently being presented for
audiences under the general title of ‘performance’ or ‘performance art’”(2). Stephen
Bottoms writes that “Thanks to its similarly transgressive claims, performance art has
become a favored stomping ground for Performance Studies, but most forms of theatre
tend to be studiously avoided, as if they represent merely the discarded skin from a
previous, less efficacious life” (175). In this sense, actors seem and, perhaps, feel more
and more powerless in a social sense because their investigations (which do involve
engagement across disciplines: they study cultural trends, history, literature, etc.) are
eventually interrupted by the need for a commitment to commercial goals.
Postmodern Critiques of Actor Training
The cultural metaphors that dominate institutions also pervade the understanding
of how bodies, identities and desire work, and analyzing how the containment metaphor
privileges certain views of identity and the body clarifies why The Method’s association
with professional programs appears so insidious and ripe for critique. McConachie points
out that Strasberg’s Method-based exercises, especially, imply that the body is a
container for individual identity:
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Strasberg’s most notable exercises took for granted the existence of an
essential self, less conscious but more genuine than the mask worn on the
outside for public display. Affective memory, for example, assumed that
past memories locked within held the essential truth about a person’s
identity. And the “private moment” exercise encouraged performers to
withdraw from the ongoing work of a rehearsal to engage in an activity
normally performed in private as a means of ensuring that their emotions
were owing from an authentic center. In short, for Strasberg, the “inner
emotional experience” of every actor was the contained core of his or her
being as an artist. … In Strasberg’s conception, actor, character, and play
were like three Chinese boxes resting inside of each other: the inner self of
the actor nested inside the character she or he was playing, which, in turn,
was contained by the largest box of the three, the fictional world of the
play. (89-90)
Because the establishment of American interpretations of Stanislavski-based methods
like Strasberg’s as the default in professional actor training programs in the United States
happened in an ideological climate that privileged metaphors of protecting individual and
national sovereignty and conquering and controlling an “Other” in the interest of
commerce, the training itself may seem intended to promote a view of the body that
reproduces such ideas. Taking on the identity of a character whose body is not like one’s
own, for example, may appear to be an attempt to extend the boundaries of one’s own
body as a means of “mastering” or “controlling” the identity of another. The need to do
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this in a particularly believable manner, encouraging empathy and emotional connection
in an audience while masking any element of choice or discrimination, seems intended to
manipulate audience members and win them over to a dominant understanding of truth
that serves the interests of groups already in power.
Not only did American adaptations of Stanislavski’s System seem to promote a
kind of individualist and colonialist use of the actor’s body, they also claimed to be
always applicable to any theatrical problem. Such claims to universality made the process
even more suspect to people wishing to dismantle the tools for spreading the dominant
ideology of capitalism. Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the extension of multinational corporate power throughout the world used
the guise of an American nationalism that made rhetorical claims to universality,
freedom, justice and peace. Because The Method’s theoretical foundations, especially in
light of its association with professional actors who sought work in the increasingly
commercial markets of film and television, took on the appearance of supporting and
reproducing the dominant truths of global capitalism, it was ripe for critical and
deconstructive analysis. In the environment of global capitalism—which Hardt and Negri
suggest has involved an ideological shift from an emphasis on nationalism and
international struggle to the illusion of a lack of boundaries, a lack of difference, and a
lack of history—“the productivity of bodies and the value of affect are absolutely central.
… the productivity of the corporeal, the somatic, is an extremely important element in the
contemporary networks of biopolitical production” (30). The motives of any cultural
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practice associated with commercial interests, especially one that deals with “humanity”
and emotion, become even more dubious.
While there may have been some questioning of Method techniques in academic
programs connected with colleges or Universities, many professional acting coaches and
private, commercially-oriented schools embraced Stanislavski-based approaches without
any kind of deliberate and public critical engagement. David Krasner writes that,
particularly when it is associated with Strasberg,
Method acting has enjoyed its greatest success outside of academia.
Within universities, method acting has fallen into disfavor. Despite its
popularity among actors, in university theatre departments “Method
bashing” is vogue. Method acting practices, including motivation,
justification, personalization, affective memory, believability, authenticity,
subtext, organic behavior, and subjectivity, have come under considerable
criticism (6).
Although I agree with Krasner that there has been a tendency to question “The Method”
as such, most university programs that are professionally oriented still immerse students
in some variation of the practices he outlines. The scholarship directly addressing the
complex problems of actor training that was so closely associated with realism came
most clearly out of departments and companies expressly termed “experimental theatre,”
theatre programs outside of the United States, and theatre history programs devoted
primarily to academic writing rather than theatre practice per se. In the growing
postmodern field of performance studies, dominant actor training practices were
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critiqued, while solo performance and other theories of acting were promoted as viable
alternatives. Postmodern opposition, which often relied on the assertion of difference,
relativity, and the negotiation of boundaries based on race, class, gender, sexual practice,
etc., asserted a stance outside of and against dominant claims to universal truth. These
scholars’ focus, because they deliberately wrote from a position external to the
commercial concept of American acting, necessarily took a narrow approach to Method-
based training, singling out certain elements of it that seemed ethically questionable.
For example, Philip Zarrilli, who was chair of the Asian/Experimental Theatre
Program at the University of Wisconsin/Madison until 1998, states in his introduction to
Acting (Re)Considered that the valorization of honesty, believability and the “organic”
naturalizes certain ideas of appropriate behavior and forces the actor to reproduce
categories of identity without consciousness of their historical and social basis (9) .Colin
Counsell, a lecturer in English Literature and Theatre Studies at the University of North
London, is mindful of intellectual developments that actors who continue to embrace
Stanislavski’s focus on the “humanist or bourgeois individual” ignore. He writes that in
sociology, Marxism, Feminism and Post-Structuralism, “behavior is shaped by forces
acting upon the human subject’s consciousness,” while in Stanislavskian methods, people
are “desiring machines, constantly in pursuit of their own aims, their actions dictated by
forces within their psyches, so that the sole author of human action, consciously or
subconsciously, is the individual self” (39). Counsell also examines The Method as it is
associated with Strasberg, noting that
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This conception of the psyche—an inner essence stifled by the outer, its
impulses repressed by social conditioning—has little in common with
Stanislavski’s, but it is one that has long held a privileged place in
American culture. Historically, most of the discourses and ideologies that
have dominated American thought have been without a substantial social-
determinist component, a thoroughgoing conception of the subject as
constructed—not merely repressed—by social environment. Political
discourse of both Left and Right, for example, tends to gravitate about
concepts of liberty and individualism, not the remodeling of social
structures, but the escape from them, into a realization of one’s natural
self. (62)
In Zarrilli’s critique, the actor’s agency and self is diminished by the methods
traditionally used in this country, forcing him or her to represent an identity that
potentially reinforces oppressive social mechanisms rather than questioning them. In
Counsell’s analysis, the problem with “believability” is the illusion that characters (and
actors, and by extension, people in general) have the option to choose to live outside of
ideology. In post-structuralist and feminist criticisms of Stanislavski-based methods,
then, the question of agency in how one shapes one’s body is a central issue of debate.
Actors are seen, in one way or another, to reproduce an understanding of bodies as
protective containers for human individuals who shape their own, perhaps complex, but
largely consistent desires and identities.
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According to these critiques, the actor’s or character’s consciousness within
realism takes on the illusion of being something separable from the material
circumstances in which his or her body is placed. This illusion, especially when
combined with the emotional identification and expression required to “move” audiences,
is thought to make it impossible for actors and their audiences to be conscious of the
forces outside of the individual that influence his or her behavior, and also make it
difficult to imagine new possibilities for action. Interestingly, these particular critiques in
some ways run counter to the materialist reading of Stanislavski and the Moscow Art
Theatre’s work on Chekhov I proposed in the previous chapter: in those plays, the
characters may be full of desire, but audiences can see that their individual identities are
shaped by social necessity and their wishes are forever frustrated by the fact that their
destinies are determined elsewhere. This external, deterministic dramatic structure is
naturalized in commodified professional productions, and the system of exchange takes
away both the actor’s (and character’s) agency. The audience is also inactive in the
Moscow Art Theatre context, intended to be a group who passively observes this
recognizable and objectified form. The various deconstructive and analytic readings of
Stanislavski-based acting in the context of realism clarify how difficult the task of
producing clear philosophical understandings of actor training is, and the importance of
historical context and purpose to understanding how effective training and rehearsal
practices can be as a means of social critique. Most postmodern criticisms themselves
stop just short of suggesting how a shift in the internal vs. external idea of the body’s
relationship to identity might be achieved.
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The major contribution of people who have proposed alternative methods to
Stanislavski’s work is a deliberate consciousness of history and material circumstances
rather than internal focus on the individual: training actors and audiences to take the step
of having consciousness of how their bodies reproduce ideology is essential if people are
to see the true possibility of choosing how their bodies live out their worlds. Several
feminist and post-structuralist critics of Stanislavski-derived methods have proposed
Brecht’s theories and practices as possible alternatives for actors who wish to resist
conventional training and focus on Marxian concepts of historicity and consciousness.
Interestingly, Brecht did not see his own theory as being entirely contradictory to
Stanislavski’s—he understood its main difference as having the test in the public’s
opinion rather than in the actor’s internal mechanisms:
The alienation effect does not in any way demand an unnatural way of
acting. It has nothing whatever to do with ordinary stylization. On the
contrary, the achievement of an A-effect absolutely depends on lightness
and naturalness of performance. But when an actor checks the truth of his
performance (a necessary operation, which Stanislavski is much
concerned with in his system) he is not just thrown back on his ‘natural
sensibilities,’ but can always be corrected by a comparison with reality (is
that how an angry man really speaks? Is that how an offended man sits
down?) and so from outside, by other people. He acts in such a way that
nearly every sentence could be followed by a verdict of the audience and
128
virtually every gesture is submitted for the public’s approval. (On Theatre
95)
Elin Diamond writes that an actor using Brecht’s verfremdungseffekt in
performance “‘quotes’ or demonstrates the character’s behavior instead of identifying
with it. Brecht theorizes that if the performer remains outside the character’s feelings, the
audience may also, and thus freely analyze and form opinions about the play’s ‘fable.’”
She also points out that by challenging the idea that an actor must physically resemble the
character she is playing, verfremdungseffekt makes possible a critique of gender
performance (45). Diamond’s reading of the Brechtian “not/but” offers one way of
encouraging actors to maintain and demonstrate consciousness of what they are
representing, allowing space for commentary on a character within performance and
demystifying the relationship between actor and character. However, in Brecht’s
formulation, the actor and audience still appear as individuals whose consciousness is
capable of remaining outside of the body in order to comment on an objectified (and
therefore reified, in Marxian terms) character. In addition, scholars and performers who
use Brecht in this way often understand his process as one that resists empathy: the
implication is that focusing on emotional and physical identification (a significant step in
the conventional methods described above) is a detriment to consciousness and thought.
The understanding of the body still maintains rigid boundaries between inside and
outside, and also distinguishes between the processes of thinking and feeling.
Other theorists who have used Brecht maintain a mistrust of Aristotelian empathy
and emotion, assuming that it is a detriment to the audience’s consciousness of social
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determinism. Augusto Boal, for example, critiques elements of Aristotle’s poetics within
bourgeois theatre that requires the audience to “leave their brains with their hats upon
entering the theatre” (104). He acknowledges a debt to Brecht, whose work, he says,
gives the spectator “the right to think for himself, often in opposition to the character”
(122), awakening critical consciousness. In both forms, the audience’s relationship to
character is the same as that of actor to character—empathic or conscious. The crucial
difference in Boal’s poetics of the oppressed is the inversion of the
actor/playwright/audience relationship; the spectators become not only actors but also
playwrights: their choice defines the action of the play being performed. Boal is hopeful
in his call for popular agency when it comes to both awareness and change.
He gives a clear account of how workers’ bodies are formed by the tasks they are
required to repeat in order to survive, pointing out that a typist’s musculature is shaped by
sitting bent over at a desk using arms and fingers, while a watchman’s body becomes
attuned to constant walking. Like Marx, Boal sees the possibility of change as relying on
heightening these workers’ consciousness of their own physical alienation. He writes
about “exercises designed with the objective of making each person aware of his [sic]
own body, of his bodily possibilities, and of deformations suffered because of the type of
work he performs” and theorizes that through this awareness people can learn to re-
manipulate their muscles in different ways (127-28). Boal’s theory comes the closest to
proposing methods to develop new physical metaphors for larger groups of people, but
his work also reinforces the metaphor of containment. They may be shaped externally by
labor they are required to perform, but spectators have within them the power to choose
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differently and escape the forces that trap them in these patterns. In addition, Boal
understands his work as outside of bourgeois ideology: “In opposition to that theatre,
another must rise: one determined by a new class and which will dissent not only
stylistically but in a much more radical manner” (79).
Postmodern Thinking and Globalization
While the Cold War emphasized the inside/outside structure and experimental
theatre/ Performance Studies claimed outsider status, the philosophical trends percolating
“within” the “outsider” containers were embracing ideas that seemed the opposite of
bourgeois humanism: scholarship and performance within these programs took on one or
all of the following concerns— difference (especially in resistance to dominant identity
categories), hybridity, border-crossing, surface rather than depth, simulation rather than
authenticity, bodies as objects of culture and subjectivity as a function of history,
movement and change rather than rigid structure, and the group rather than the
individual. Marvin Carlson, in his book Performance: A Critical Introduction, studies the
wide-ranging development of the term, and acknowledges its status as a “contested”
concept that has involved the application of theatrical terms, theories and practices to
many academic disciplines in different ways (1-2). Performance art, which might be seen
as a postmodern extension of the experimental or avant-garde theatre companies of the
1960s and early 70s, was defined by Roselee Goldberg as “a permissive, open-ended
medium with endless variables, executed by artists impatient with the limitations of more
established forms, and determined to take their art directly to the public” (9). It is clear
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that this kind of intellectual pursuit was informed by Marxian thinking, and its impulse
was antithetical to the reification that seemed to be required by capitalist goals.
A resistant form that became a significant branch of performance in the 1990s
was the one-person show that included personal narrative; while it may have reinforced
the capitalist focus on the individual, it opposed the idea of sameness and the assumption
that being American meant fitting into dominant identity categories. In her introduction
to the collection of solo performance texts entitled Extreme Exposure, Jo Bonney writes
that
For better or worse, this century has been the era of the “self”—a hundred
years of shifting from the 19th century emphasis on community to the late
twentieth-century elevation and examination of the individual. Solo
performance, in its naked presentation of a single person(a), is very much
a product and reflection of a century that has given rise to the hedonism of
the twenties, the radical individualism and activism of the sixties and the
so-called “me decade” of the eighties. The nineties finally made room for
the previously marginalized, diverse voices of this society, and the solo
form has tracked these developments. (xiv)
While performers like Spalding Gray, who as a straight white man from financially
comfortable east coast stock fell within some normative identity markers, the form itself
raised questions about identity and performativity: “Gray, particularly at the beginning of
his solo career, had no public image. Through the process of exposing his private self in
performance, Gray actually created a public self as a role to assume with an audience. His
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creation of an identity through the performance act has intrigued critics and audiences
alike” (151). Solo performers falling outside of dominant categories who used similar
techniques to craft public personae embodied the struggle involved in claiming
subjectivity when one does not fall properly within the category of “American.” Kristin
Langellier points out that “the personal in personal narrative implies a performative
struggle for agency rather than the expressive act of a pre-existing, autonomous, fixed,
unified or stable self which serves as the origin or accomplishment of experience” (129).
Robbie McCaulie’s series of performances called Confessions of a Working Class Black
Woman “are intended to ‘bear witness to racism’ and to enact the contradictions of living
in a racist America, which disavows the centrality of black people to American history
from its very beginnings” (Extreme Exposure 248). Holly Hughes, Tim Miller, John
Fleck and Karen Finley are now famous in their efforts to assert identity and personhood
because their famous court battle over the loss of their NEA funding and association with
“indecency” marked them as “outsiders” and “un-American.”
Critical opposition to Stanislavski-based training that followed postmodern paths
of thinking achieved certain crucial successes—overcoming the potential lack of
tolerance for difference in American forms that presented themselves as authentic, for
example —but its possibilities for suggesting alternatives to multinational corporate
motives were limited by the tendency of consumer capitalism to absorb and sell back all
attempts at resistance, as well as by its own exclusive insider/outsider tendencies.
Stephen Bottoms, in fact, genders and sexualizes the Theatre/Performance Studies
dichotomy, presenting a compelling argument that the characterization of performance as
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more “virile,” real and efficacious than the more entertaining, commercial and “fake” is
based on homophobic anxiety about theatricality in general. He writes that “the various
critical debates that, in the 1960s, performed the linguistic and conceptual divorce of
theatre and theatricality from performance and performativity are of far more than just
historical interest. We are still living with these binary distinctions, and with their related
dynamics of potent virility vs. showy sterility” (181).
In fact, despite its theoretical dedication to inclusion, movement, transformation
and flexibility, Performance Studies in many ways failed to completely escape the
emphasis on individual accomplishment and the reification of its goals that were
functions of its placement in a capitalist economy. Its very existence was necessitated by
a University system that maintains a metaphoric emphasis on professionalism vs.
scholarship or utilitarian vs. academic study. And like Method acting is associated with
Strasberg or The System with Stanislavski, Performance Studies is often represented as
the brainchild of Richard Schechner. In a sense, what Bottoms calls the “various critical
debates” provide the “given circumstances” for the rift, and it was Schechner’s objective
to carry out the “bold move” that completed the divorce. While he was part of a larger
historical conversation, Schechner is often spoken of as having been the agent most
responsible for the separation of performance studies from theatre departments. Carlson
writes that “no theatre theorist has been more instrumental in developing modern
performance theory nor in exploring the relationship between practical and theoretical
work in theatre research and in social science research than Richard Schechner” (21).
Although its goals may have included social engagement, dialogue and change rather
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than financial profit, the methodological strategies of Performance Studies were also
similar to those of capitalist development.
While in many ways suggestive of new metaphors, the flexibility and
inclusiveness characteristic of interdisciplinary postmodern art forms hoping to question
dominant capitalist ideology actually fed the strategies for globalization. In
Postmodernism, Fredric Jameson noted that postmodern cultural practices were more
engaged in a critical effort simply to comprehend the new patterns of communication and
exchange that were shaping the world than they were with changing them. “We do not
yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace,” he writes, “in part
because our perceptual habits were formed in that older kind of space I have called the
space of high modernism” (1967). While attempts to understand the new methods of
transferring knowledge were necessary, they failed to propose viable, creative
alternatives to rampant consumerism: “We have seen that there is a way in which
postmodernism replicates or reproduces—reinforces—the logic of consumer capitalism;
the more significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that logic”
(Jameson 1974). Joseph Roach clarifies that the flexibility of performance was easily
contrasted with the perceived stability of theatre, but also that its open-endedness made it
far more viable as a resistant academic discipline within the boundaries of a postmodern
intellectual climate. He writes, “If performance is a fundamentally contested term, then it
is also an extraordinarily opportunistic one, skating rings around other, more rigid
concepts as they take their spills on the slippery surfaces of postmodern culture” (34).
The need to assert itself in resistance to theatre per se excluded more traditional actors
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even if they were interested in using Stanislavskian methods of training for purposes
other than commercial ones; while it was internally producing different possibilities,
performance studies indirectly reinforced the cultural image of an insulated group with
established boundaries.
Producing The Multitude
In some ways, the energy required to resist the culture of capitalism by staking a
claim outside of it legitimates that system, reifies its dominance, and reinforces the
conceptual structure that makes practices of exclusion and inequality possible. In their
book Empire, Antonio Hardt and Michael Negri point out that resistant practices to the
global spread of capitalism have often “relied on a standpoint outside these effects of
globalization, a standpoint of life and truth that could oppose the informational
colonization of being” (34). As an example of what they call a subaltern nation” within
the United States, they choose the Black Nationalist movement in the 1960s:
In the case of black nationalism too, however, the progressive elements
are accompanied inevitably by their reactionary shadows. The repressive
forces of nation and people feed off the self-valorization of the community
and destroy its multiplicity. When black nationalism poses the uniformity
and homogeneity of the African American people as its basis (eclipsing
class differences, for example) or when it designates one segment of the
community (such as African American men) as de facto representatives of
the whole, the profound ambiguity of subaltern nationalism’s progressive
functions emerges as clearly as ever. Precisely the structures that play a
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defensive role with respect to the outside—in the interest of furthering the
power, autonomy, and unity of the community—are the same that play an
oppressive role internally, negating the multiplicity of the community
itself. (108).
They also argue that the progressive functions of movements like Black Nationalism
often exist when they are in the imaginations of revolutionaries, in the activities they
pursue prior to being named, “that is, when the imagined nation does not (yet) exist.”
Labeling themselves as “outsiders,” then, in some ways reinforces the structural
boundaries that make resistance ineffectual.
Hardt and Negri’s concept of Empire has been contested by many leftist critics
since the book’s publication in 2000 on various grounds, including their readings of
Marx, their idea that imperialist politics have been replaced by a new Empire represented
by America and their nebulous concept of Multitude as a global resistant force (which
was clarified in their more recent book Multitude)
(http://www.marxist.com/Theory/review_toni_negri_empire.html). However, I believe
that they offer compelling reasons for the ultimate failure of activist organizations in the
1960s and 70s. Echoing Althusser, they remind readers that, because of the increased
ability of technology to produce consumer desire within the bodies of individual people,
the spread of capitalism relies as much on a rhetoric of multinational inclusion and
incorporation as it does on the conquest and control of geographic territories and entire
groups of people (i.e. Other “nations”):
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Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed
boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus
of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its
open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible
hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of
command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world
have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow (xiii).
In other words, capitalism has not only continued to use the exclusive and repressive
language and strategies of nationalism, it has also adopted some of the boundary-blurring
properties that make progressive movements particularly successful before they have
named themselves. Therefore, while past strategies have “relied on a standpoint outside
these effects of globalization” (34) Hardt and Negri suggest that an external standpoint
based on anti-globalization is no longer viable.4
4 This is an example that came well after the publication of Hardt and Negri’s book, but it
is one that I think explains these concepts more clearly. During the Christmas season in
2005, right wing media personality Bill O’Reilly made a public statement that the
increasing practice for retailers to wish patrons “Happy Holidays” rather than “Merry
Christmas” was insulting to Christians. O’Reilly’s function is to preserve the illusion of a
unified America based on certain religious and moral principles, and his rhetoric is
therefore nationalist. Some retailers heeded his call, but most did not, stating that their
goal was not to promote or reject any religious belief, but to reach more customers. Their
inclusiveness and pleasant wishes seem encouraging and kind, but their goal is monetary.
One might challenge O’Reilly’s America by saying, “I am a non-Christian, and therefore
I will do my Christmas shopping only at stores that use inclusive language.” But the
result is still supportive of the commercialization of Christmas, and doesn’t address the
moral or practical details of differing belief systems or question the very premise of
shopping and its relation to spirituality. How might non-Christian groups demonstrate the
strength of purpose required to protect themselves against Bill O’Reilly’s nationalist
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While they admire and applaud the efforts of current leftist activism that focuses
on the “localization of struggles,” they warn against re-establishing a glorification of the
boundaries of local identities—the exclusionary premise on which modernist colonial
activities were based. The live and local quality of theatre always places actors and
audiences in specific times and places, and might be understood to automatically hold a
position outside of globalization; the natural boundaries of actors’ bodies, as well,
combined with the internal focus of commodified versions of Method training can take
on the illusion of celebrating the idea of individual sovereign identities in a way that is
reflective of nationalism; solo autobiographical performance can also be read in this way.
But this premise implies an understanding of the body that suggests that its shape and
movement and behavior can somehow escape being affected by technology and
globalization, and furthermore a philosophy that identity can be separate from the body
and its interaction with the surrounding environment.
While Hardt and Negri acknowledge the significance of the “deconstructive and
critical” approach to resistance, they also call for a different kind of activism that echoes
Jill Dolan’s call for “reanimated humanism”—what they call an “ethico-political”
constructive strategy. In their more recent book, Multitude, they describe this strategy
more clearly:
language, but also advocate the respect for difference that is the spirit of “Happy
Holidays?” How does one acknowledge and embrace the humanity and goodwill in that
statement and contest its value as a marketing tool?
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You might say, simplifying a great deal, that there are two faces to
globalization. On one face, Empire spreads globally its network of
hierarchies and divisions that maintain order through new mechanisms of
control and constant conflict. Globalization, however, is also the creation
of new circuits of cooperation and collaboration that stretch across nations
and continents and allow and unlimited number of encounters. This
second face of globalization is not a matter of everyone in the world
becoming the same; rather it provides the possibility that, while remaining
different, we discover the commonality that enables us to communicate
and act together. The multitude too might thus be conceived as a network:
an open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed
freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so we
can work and live in common (xiv).
What I find missing in their argument is a recognition that, while the extension of
Empire does rely on the production of ideology on and through individual bodies and
their interaction, the truly new thing that has made possible the elimination of boundaries
and the illusion of sameness is a kind of murderous colonization that is actually a reversal
of the focus on the body initiated during the Enlightenment. The development of mass
communications technology that has erased the barriers of geography also relies on the
appearance of a lack of actual bodies: global capitalism, while it desperately needs
human bodies and their desires for its survival, has thrived on the illusion that people and
their bodies no longer matter. Commerce can happen on a global scale because, in a
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virtual world, it is easier to believe that real, live bodies do not exist. And, as Marx stated,
when ideas are disembodied they become mystified and objectified commodities, and
“the sum total of [people’s] own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing
not between themselves, but between the products of their labor” (320). The supposedly
universal good of disembodied multinational corporate values has continued to be spread
through mass communication systems, resulting in a pre-Enlightenment understanding of
static idealism that ignores the actual experiences of pain or suffering or pleasure on
which the spread of capitalism depends.
The misguided assumption is also that the technologies through which concepts of
the world are carried into all corners of the globe—Internet, television, film, computer
gaming, etc.— must shape and control people’s bodies rather than the other way around.
Again, we are back to Marx’s argument with Hegel: social systems that are abstracted
from people’s bodies are easily mystified, reified, and continually controlled by a small,
powerful group who holds much of the world’s wealth. What Hardt and Negri seem to
call for is a “counter-Empire” that is global and local at once, based on common values
that reach beyond commerce. What is required is a strategic production of subjectivity,
feelings, and ideas that involves a negotiation of global ideals and technologies and the
generative power of desire; but which also deals with the daily facts, experiences and
values of real human bodies. This sounds a lot like acting.
Acting and “Reanimated Humanism”
The pedagogical model I propose is a practical, active, constructive application of
Jill Dolan’s theory of reanimated or reconstructed humanism that is “multiple, respecting
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the complexities and ambiguities of identity while it works out ways for people to share
and feel things in common, like the need for survival and for love, for compassion and for
hope” (22). Rhonda Blair’s re-examination of Stanislavski in light of new understandings
of the body and consciousness in the field of neuroscience and cognitive theory is useful
here. She cites Damasio’s writings, noting that unlike former models of biology and
psychology, Damasio’s work “connects behavior, intellect, emotion and imagination”
(182). Three of his main premises are essential to Blair’s argument: first, that “emotion is
integral to the processes of reasoning and decision making, for worse and for better” (41);
second, that the brain (and therefore both reason and emotion) is inseparable from its
interaction with the entire organism of a body; and third, that the body (and thus the brain
and consciousness) is constantly being transformed by its interactions with objects in the
surrounding environment: “the organism is involved in relating to some object, and …
the object in the relation causes a change in the organism” (20); this change begins with a
feeling and results in behavior. Blair postulates that Stanislavskian actors reflect
Damasio’s “organism/object” interaction: “The actor engages the internal (mental) and
external objects of the text and its given circumstances, and her own mental objects
(derived from memory and personal history); she then accordingly devises a pattern of
behavior” (183). If one includes among the “objects” with which an actor relates the
bodies of other people – other actors, audience members, people with whom she has
interacted and who live in her memory – the actor’s (and character’s) consciousness and
courses of action are transformed by identification with people outside of her. In this
case, thought, empathy and emotion are interactive elements of identity formation and the
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determination of behavior rather than simply a means of reinforcing ideas of what is
normal or believable.
Elin Diamond’s reading of Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia provides a
compelling psychological basis for developing an acting process that echoes Damasio’s
work, incorporating Stanislavskian identification with Brechtian consciousness and
historicity. She writes,
We are continually taking in objects we desire, continually identifying
with or imitating these objects, and continually being transformed by
them. In other words, identification in Freud always works both ways: it is
an assimilative or appropriative act, making the other the same as me or
me the same as the other, but at the same time it causes the I/ego to be
transformed by the other. What this suggests is that the borders of identity,
the wholeness and consistency of identity, is transgressed by every act of
identification. (396)
Diamond also suggests that, “Though identification seems to promote the annihilation of
difference—and thus violence to the other—it may also suggest the problematizing of
models that support such violence. … Rather than upholding the social status quo,
identification might be seen as producing historical contradiction” (390-91). The
rehearsal and training process with which I have been experimenting proposes that actors
can model this kind of identity formation by developing a character through a separate
performance script that incorporates interviews with community members, pieces of text
from the play being performed, and other cultural and historical “objects” that might
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shape a character’s body, consciousness and behavior. Applying this theory in training
and practice allows actors to show ways in which identity is created through multiple
historical identifications—that people are changed, to one degree or another, by the
people they’ve known, and carry on their bodies physical traces of others with whom
they’ve interacted—rather than modeling an idea of identity as consistent and unified. It
also gives actors and the communities with whom they work agency in what is being
represented on stage through allowing them to choose together the multiple and
potentially contradictory objects that shape the character being performed.
I particularly appreciate the term “reanimation” and the fact that it conjures
metaphoric images of a beautiful sort of Frankenstein’s monster of an actor. The practice
of quilting is another metaphor that uses the concept of reanimating a residual piece of
fabric within a newly arranged whole. In her essay “Quilting: A Feminist Metaphor for
Scientific Inquiry,” Maura Flannery argues that employing quilting as a metaphor may be
a useful way to re-imagine science and scientific research. She examines the implications
of using what she sees as a feminine-associated metaphor as an alternative to the male-
identified images of hunting, conquering, colonization and wrestling. This emphasis on
difference is of great importance in quilting, as Flannery writes about when discussing
the many uses of that practice as a metaphor in literature, history and cultural studies. She
states that Elsa Barkley Brown used the idea of an African American strip quilt to talk
about black women’s history: it is “made of scraps without any overarching design but
with an aesthetic appeal deriving from its rhythms and lively diversity” (630). Flannery
talks about the small, detailed, work of science and quilting, and, although it isn’t done in
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silence the way these things are, the difficult work of creating accurate physical and vocal
reproductions of a community is equally as specific and tactile. She writes,
Both endeavors involve a great deal of what the chemist and philosopher
Michael Polanyi (1962) called tacit knowledge: learning that cannot be put
into words, that can only be acquired by doing. Someone can explain how
to focus a microscope, but you’ll never master this skill without doing it
yourself repeatedly until you’ve gotten a feel for it. In quilting, a feel for
the fabric can mean anything from knowing how different colors will look
next to one another to learning how much a particular fabric can be
stretched to fit (634).
It is compelling that Richard Boleslavsky’s advice to the young actor or
“creature” in his chapter on characterization in Acting: The First Six Lessons describes
just such a process. “The Creature” asks, when finding subjects to examine when
constructing a character, “Can I study and interpret just one picture or can I use different
ones?” He replies,
Not only different ones, but living, contemporary personalities as well, in
the whole or in the part. You can borrow a head from Botticelli, a posture
from Van Dyck, use the arms of your sister and the wrists of Agnes Enters
(the last not as a dancer but as a person). The clouds driven by the wind
can inspire your walk. And all of this will make a composite creature, just
as a tabloid makes a composite photograph of a person or event from a
dozen different photographs (88).
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My interest is in developing a way, through understanding the body, consciousness and
identity as being constantly transformed by interactions with other people and other
elements of history and culture, to think of training methods as other texts an actor puts
together to create a “composite creature.” I want actors to retain the useful elements of
Stanislavski-derived training (desire, empathy, and identification), while also being
conscious (in a Brechtian way) of the degree to which a character’s attributes (and an
actor’s choices regarding them) are constructed socially and culturally.
Oral History and Performance Ethnography
In the introduction to Voices of a People’s History of the United States, Howard
Zinn writes of the importance of choice in representations of history. His interest, in that
book, is in giving vocal agency to misrepresented or underrepresented identities, and I
propose that one might also replace the term “historian” with “actor” in the following
quote:
… I knew that a historian (or a journalist, or anyone telling a story) was
forced to choose, from an infinite number of facts, what to present, what to
omit. … there is no such thing as a pure fact, innocent of interpretation.
Behind every fact presented to the world—by a teacher, a writer,
anyone—is a judgment. The judgment that has been made is that this fact
is important, and that other facts are not important and so they are omitted
from the presentation.
This model of actor training involves the collection of personal narrative testimony,
which is used by some scholars in public history and anthropology to give the authorship
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and interpretation of history and culture back to larger communities; it is employed as a
means of giving people a way to participate in representations of the experiences that
have shaped their identities. Paul Thompson writes that because it is a cooperative
process, oral history reconfigures the relationship between history and community:
”Historical information need not be taken away from the community for interpretation
and presentation by the professional historian. Through oral history the community can,
and should, be given the confidence to write its own history” (17). He also points out that
students working on oral history projects find “that the people whom they interview do
not fit easily into the social types presented by the preliminary reading. … Above all,
they are brought back from the grand patterns of written history to the awkwardly
individual human lives which are its basis” (12).
The body of literature on oral history and ethnographic research methods is
equally as substantial as that on actor training. Some of the work theorizing postmodern
ethnographic research in anthropology deals with borrowing performance techniques
from theatre as embodied alternatives to qualitative writing. Using performance is
intended to give researchers a richer empathic experience of the cultures they are
observing, and to emphasize ethnographic research as a processual dialogue rather than a
practice of observation and knowledge. In their essay “Performing Ethnography,” Victor
and Edith Turner write of their pedagogical experiments using performance and
ethnography together, and propose an “instructional form [that] could be a kind of
synthesis between an anthropological seminar and a postmodern theatrical workshop”
(48). Although one of the experimental workshops they conducted took place with drama
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students at New York University, this article focuses closely on their use of dramatic
performance as a means of teaching about ritual to Anthropology students at the
University of Virginia. My interest is in the value of “re-borrowing” theatrical
techniques, examining them through the performance work that has been done in the field
of anthropology.
Because it adds the step of embodying the Others whose stories one is collecting,
performance ethnography offers ways for actors to be conscious of how bodies are
shaped by historical and cultural interactions with other people; how psychological and
emotional impulses might be a result of multiple physical interactions rather than only the
workings of an individual mind; and how taking onto one’s body the words and gestures
of other people makes possible deep experiential and emotional empathy. Dwight
Conquergood writes that, “Ethnography’s distinctive research method, participant-
observation fieldwork, privileges the body as a site of knowing” and that it “represents a
shift from monologue to dialogue, from information to communication” (15, 17). Joni L.
Jones discusses the various elements of ethnographic work that uses performance as a
means of “bodily understanding,” which departs in many ways from the “body as
container” metaphor discussed above: creating a context for a performance that centers
around questions or ideas (rather than following rigid rules of representing a location
with specific boundaries); remaining accountable to the community and taking
representational ethics into consideration (giving a community of people the power to
intervene in how they are represented); acknowledging the presence of the performer’s
own subjectivity (rather than giving the illusion of objective reportage); emphasizing
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multivocality, or shifting and sometimes contradictory perspectives; and participation (or
encouraging interaction with audiences rather than maintaining an “insider/outsider”
relationship between actor and audience) (8-10). Anna Deavere Smith and others who
make use of ethnographic research in performance collect interviews with people in
certain communities, and perform, on their own bodies, the words, gestures, vocal
patterns and emotional responses of their interviewees (as exactly as possible) in order to
engage in an embodied dialogue about culture, experience, and identity. Taking into
account ethical concerns about appropriating the words and experiences of other people,
performance ethnography also involves the step of inviting interviewees to witness and
comment on the process of representing their bodies and stories. As Jones suggests,
“Performance offers a new authenticity, based on body knowledge, on what audiences
and performers share together, on what they mutually construct” (14).
Because Deavere Smith herself is an actor, playwright, and teacher of theatre, and
because she theorizes her own work as a response to psychologically-based “self-
oriented” training, she is particularly important to this project. Debby Thompson reads
Deavere-Smith’s approach as a Brechtian and poststructuralist alternative to acting rooted
in Stanislavski-based training because of its focus on the difference between the actor and
the character she is performing, because of its premise that identity is always shifting and
being negotiated, and because of its focus on community rather than the individual (5).
My interest is not only in seeing her work as Brechtian, and therefore conscious, in
impulse, but also in its potential for re-imagining empathy and emotion. She writes that,
“Even as the actor has the potential to be the other, all others, the tension between the
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self and the other is real,” but that “The effort to cross that bridge is the drama, and it
should not be denied” (House Arrest xviii). The act of attempting to travel across the
bridge results in a visceral kind of empathy and understanding:
I became increasingly convinced that the activity of reenactment could tell
us as much, if not more, about another individual than the process of
learning about the other by using the self as a frame of reference. …
Learning about the other by being the other requires the use of all aspects
of memory, the memory of the body, mind, and heart, as well as the
words. (Fires xxvii)
Here, Deavere Smith’s words have interesting resonances with Damasio’s model of how
the body and consciousness work together and Diamond’s theories of identity formation:
transformation of the body and consciousness are continually occurring as an actor and
the “others” with whom s/he works interact.
Lakoff and Johnson describe such an approach to culture as an “experientialist”
view:
From the experientialist perspective, truth depends on understanding,
which emerges from functioning in the world. It is through such
understanding that the experientialist alternative meets the objectivist’s
need for an account of truth. It is through the coherent structuring of
experience that the experientialist alternative satisfies the subjectivist’s
need for personal meaning and significance. … What [subjectivism and
objectivism] both miss … is an interactionally based and creative
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understanding. … From the experientialist perspective, metaphor is a
matter of imaginative rationality. … New metaphors are capable of
creating new understandings and, therefore, new realities (235).
I propose that actively including oral history interviewing and the ethnographic
performance techniques used by anthropologists and historians and adopted by Anna
Deavere Smith and other solo performers is a way of understanding the actor’s process as
an “experientialist” rather than merely subjective or objective practice. The holistic
understanding of the human body promoted by cognitive theorists seems a particularly
useful way to illuminate how an actor’s body in rehearsal and performance involves a
changing, developing negotiation of boundaries: it is both inside and outside, individual
and collective, subjective and objective, productive and reflective, imaginative, emotional
and rational, global and local. Rather than understanding the goal of “human”-ness and
hybridity as the elimination of difference, boundaries and history, I argue that
incorporating solo performance and ethnographic interviewing into acting classes is a
step toward developing training and rehearsal processes which suggest that being an actor
in a global environment requires a deep engagement with and examination of those ideas.
Imagination and Transformation
In the following two chapters, I describe two case studies in which I worked with
students on researching how the step of creating a community-based and intertextual
performance as part of the rehearsal process can also make possible choice of how one
shapes one’s body into a character; and how the element of incorporating multiple
embodied conversations that do not fit easily into social types broadens the possibilities
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from which an actor can choose when shaping the identity of a character. This project is
concerned not only with making the representation of characters more responsible to
community and concerned with empathizing directly with specific people, but also with
the prospect that live theatre, as an event that involves the interaction of bodies that carry
knowledge and ideas, is a way of transforming the world and introducing new
possibilities for living in it. I am interested in the idea that, at this point in history, actors
are in a unique position to perform both the “real” and the “possible” at the same time.
Because all representation (and transformation) requires a leap of imagination; that an
actor can choose to include among the many physical texts s/he uses when creating a
character imagined ones in addition to those that come from interactions with real people;
and that enacting a character that is a combination of numerous real and imagined texts
within the framework of a scripted, fictional play is a way of representing how bodies and
ideas work together to shape identities and create worlds.
The recent cultural interest in “reality” television, documentary film, and personal
narrative in live performance, and the continued interest not only in realism in theatre, but
also in plays like The Laramie Project, The Vagina Monologues and The Exonerated that
are built from interviews with real people5, betrays a fascination with witnessing “true”
5 This is another area of research that might be pursued in connection with this process.
There is a practical reason for including oral history interviewing techniques and
ethnographic performance strategies in “professional” acting classes because of the
current trend toward this kind of play. But how these techniques are introduced is
important: students should put together their own projects with an interest in ethics and
dialogue rather than simply accurate depiction, in order to raise awareness of their
responsibility to the speakers in this kind of work.
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experience. However, Rhonda Blair points out that Damasio includes imagination among
the elements of consciousness (in addition to emotion and reason) that are essential to an
organism’s survival and ability to envision courses of action that effect its well-being
(183). Similarly, Joseph Chaikin writes that people are drawn to theatre by a “discomfort
with the limitations of life as it is lived, so we try to alter it through a model form. We
present what we think is possible in society according to what is possible in the
imagination. When the theater is limited to the socially possible, it is confined by the
same forces which limit society” (23).
My interest is in how the meaning of “documentary”- style ethnographic
performance changes and expands when combined with the leaps of imagination and
possibility required to enter the fictional world of a scripted play. In order to perform the
people an actor interviews, his or her body must imagine itself as the body of an Other,
attempting to represent a “real” situation. At the same time, in a scripted play, the “given
circumstances” of the imagined world are fictional inventions: an actor’s body can show
how people can take their real physical circumstances, combine them with new and
imagined worlds, and transform their bodies into something different. As Anna Deavere
Smith writes in her preface to House Arrest and Piano, “When the actor makes the future
present for us, we can react to the possibility of a future. When we are confronted with
both the past and the future, we may become energized to reimagine and adjust our
present” (xvi-xvii). If the process through which this happens involves an interactive,
embodied, and sometimes contradictory conversation rather than an internal, individual,
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and mystified method of representing a consistent identity, actors can at once explore
existing social situations and suggest how to live out new, imagined ones.
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Chapter 3
“I Wish I Could Put It All Inside My Body”: Democratizing Identity in Charles L.
Mee’s The Trojan Women: A Love Story
Why was this done? This is beyond knowing. I pray that I could pull it all
inside my body all the murder all the cruelty the ruin the fire the wounds
broken limbs bleeding children my city bring it all deep inside me so that I
could understand.
- Hecuba, from Act I of The Trojan Women: A Love Story
My plays are containers in which I put the stuff of my life: my relationships,
what I’ve been reading, what I’ve seen on television, what people have said to
me on the street. But yes, I do a certain amount of research.
- Charles L. Mee, Jr (www.amrep.org/people/mee1.html)
I think civilization and individual human lives are in a constant process of
being made and remade, so it seems to me good if plays are done the same
way. I do think that first the culture shapes who we are and then we take in
the material from our lives and write something or paint something or
compose a piece of music or whatever it is and what comes out has gone
through the filter of a unique psyche, so it comes out unique also … So it’s
this kind of wonderfully paradoxical creation that’s both a product of the
culture and of some individual’s sensibility. But the tendency to choose that
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it’s either one or the other is probably an oversimplification.
-Charles L. Mee, Jr. (www.community-newspapers.com /archives/
rosegardenresident/20031204/stepout_profile.html)
As The Group Theatre understood not only the content and form of the plays they
produced but also their company’s structure and methodology as a “training ground for
citizenship,” I suggest that the relationship among theatre practitioners and between them
and their audiences can be understood as a model for identity formation and
communication, as well. And I believe that theatre artists of all political persuasions with
any kind of goal, commercial or social, have devoted more than enough time and energy
to thinking about and enacting external conflicts, resistance and battle. The dramaturgy of
realist plays and the analysis actors undertake when working on those plays is generally
based on the conflicting desires of individual characters; activist theatre companies in the
1960s questioned this realist dramaturgy, and in doing so took a stand resisting its
supposedly dominant commercial bent; the structure of many theatre training programs is
plagued by a perceived battle between commercially driven media and scholars
motivated by intellectual debates. This is not to say that I think conflict and resistance are
unimportant; in fact, I agree that disagreement and difference are absolutely necessary
and vital. But because of the years devoted to repeatedly performing conflict, actors’
consciousness will be sufficiently haunted by its spectre for years to come.
If it can be assumed that difference (with or without the implication of conflict) is a
given, then, I am interested in how actors can be encouraged to actively produce “the
common” with their bodies. How might theatre artists and audiences perform empathy
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and commonality without capitulating to the idea that “everyone is the same” – an ethic
that has historically been used to colonize Others and subsume them into capitalism? One
way to begin inventing inclusiveness and cooperation is through transforming the
containment metaphor that encourages an “insider vs. outsider” mentality. While I don’t
believe that the concept of identity can or should be laid aside completely, I am interested
in finding a theory of actor training that adjusts the lens from a conception of the body as
a container for identity, the body as an individual nation conquering and colonizing all
that it encounters, or the body as a machine made purely for consumption, to a quilt-like
“experientialist” metaphor reflective of Hardt and Negri’s concept of “the Multitude.”
This framework allows for the possibility that human identities are ongoing processes of
consumption and production: systems of desire, empathy, interaction and experience that
are at once individual and multiple, reflective and expressive, real and imaginary, subject
and object, the same and different.
My interest is in beginning to introduce these changes on a small scale, within
individual projects or courses, hoping that experimentation with these metaphoric shifts
on that level will inspire larger transformations. Eventually, maybe, this new experiential
and interactive rehearsal process can travel through networks of communication and be
reflected in larger institutional structures like universities or professional theatres. For
example, one of the goals of both case studies I describe was to find ways to generate
commonality between the strategies and techniques of Performance Studies and the
methods of Theatre Studies instead of continuing to reproduce the idea that each field
exists within a separate container with strict boundaries. While Bruce McConachie calls
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for scholars to examine whether production practices in theatre serve to support or resist
hegemonic relations of power, it seems to me that all practices can potentially be
understood to do both. The more pressing project, for the sake of this dissertation, is to
engage in acts of productive or transformative, rather than merely deconstructive,
criticism: what priorities can actors deliberately emphasize through the metaphors they
embody in their work? In this chapter, I use a production of Charles Mee’s The Trojan
Women: A Love Story at The University of Texas in October 2003 as a case study to
describe how this process of training and rehearsal was inspired by Mee’s plays in
performance, and theorize how this particular methodology gestures towards a
reconciliation of “theatre” and “performance” that (if put into use and developed further)
might provide a way to integrate theories of embodied, progressive pedagogy into actor
training at this point in history6.
I was very fortunate to have been chosen to direct this production because, as a
PhD student and someone who was interested in a somewhat unconventional rehearsal
process (as opposed to an MFA directing student or a visiting guest director who already
had a great deal of professional experience), I was not on the list of people who would
normally be considered for the job. Because of its experimental nature and because of my
limited experience as a director, the project was deemed a “workshop production,” which
6 It only very recently came to my attention that a new book on Mee’s work with Anne
Bogart and the SITI Company by Scott Cummings, entitled ReMaking American Theatre:
Charles Mee, Anne Bogart and The SITI Company was published in July of 2006, as part
of the Cambridge Studies in American Theatre and Drama series. I have not included this
book, which uses the company’s production bobrauscenbergamerica as a case study, in
my bibliography because I was unable to locate a copy before the deadline.
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essentially meant that we were given a very limited budget compared to other selections
in the department’s season. We had no money for set design and construction nor were
we assigned a set designer, but were given a limited amount of funding for costumes and
lighting, and designers for both of those elements were assigned to the production team.
Our position as both “outside” and “inside” the standard production season proved to be
both a blessing and a curse. It was a blessing because we were forced to be inventive
when considering the setting for the play, and the focus was necessarily on the actors and
the process rather than the spectacle of a full production. We had license to make atypical
and bold choices (the lighting designer’s advisor, for example, encouraged her to
experiment as much as she wanted and to be as dramatic and unconventional as she
dared, which resulted in beautifully rich choices); because we were officially billed as
part of the regular season, we received the use of the B. Iden Payne Theater for
rehearsals, and were given the same publicity as the rest of the season. At the same time,
we were limited to one weekend for the final production, and a mere four performances
seemed far too few for the intensive time and effort that we devoted to rehearsals.
Regardless of the marginal status we had, my role as both PhD student and director
seemed a step in the direction of changing the insider/outsider structure of our
department.
As another way of eliminating the boundary between performance studies and
theatre, I was interested in combining research and training methods from “both sides of
the tracks” in one main stage production. One significant way that this approach
addresses postmodern critiques of acting and actor training is through the understanding
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that any method of training is, in Raymond Williams’ terms, one among many residual
and emergent texts at play in rehearsal and performance. That is, one common
postmodern critique of Stanislavski-based or Method-related training is the objectivist
principle that those tools are universally applicable to any character or any type of text. I
would contend that the kind of analysis that involves objectives, obstacles and actions
within the given circumstances of a play certainly may be applied to any play in any
historical context, but the meanings it creates are detailed and particular in addition to
“universal” and “human.” New and different meanings emerge in each situation in
combination with enduring ones. Toward this end, I discuss how Mee’s playwriting
technique works together with the theories of acting we put into practice in rehearsal:
solo performance compositions, Anna Deavere Smith’s process of creating performances
through enacting collected interviews on her own body, Stanislavski-based theories that
rely on individual desire, will and action, and Viewpoints training that emphasizes the
relationship of the actor’s body to space and time.
In this chapter, I also read the specific combination of intertexts used in Mee’s play
The Trojan Women: A Love Story together with the historical and material conditions of
this particular production, the choices we made in rehearsal, and the texts collected by the
actors through solo “character study” performances based on interviews conducted with
outside members of their communities. I describe how this process, as an embodied
collection of texts filtered through the interests, discussions and desires of individual
actors and community members, reaches toward a “reanimated humanist” or
“experientialist” approach to actor training. While I don’t suggest that this workshop
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production was effective on all levels, I believe that the questions it raised regarding
subjective experience and objective truth, individual identity and collective interaction,
reality and the imagination, and technology and the human body provide an illuminating
guide for understanding how actors can serve as a strong public intellectual presence in
their communities.
Performance Studies, Jameson and Mee
In performance, Charles Mee’s plays serve as both an example of the Jamesonian
“postmodern condition” in art, and as an answer to the problematic image-based and
ahistorical tendencies of work that typically falls under that category. Viewing Mee’s
work through the history of Marxist aesthetics clarifies the possibility that, when peopled
with actors’ bodies, The Trojan Women provides a particularly rich example of Marxian
praxis at this juncture in history: it shows how theatricality and “the real,” artistic
imagination and historical memory, intellectual engagement and physical enactment must
exist in dialogue with one another across history and within a particular time and place in
order for history to progress. As I suggest in the previous chapter, while Stephen
Bottoms’ argument is compelling and the rift between Performance Studies and Theatre
Studies may be the result of gendered and sexualized presumptions about efficacy,
potency and “the real” in performance, the development of Performance Studies as an
academic discipline might also be understood as a necessary extension of the historical
circumstances of the Cold War. That is, the existence of Performance Studies might
reproduce the insider vs. outsider structure, but the work done by critics and intellectuals
outside of dominant culture at that time paved the way for the kind of hybrid of theatre
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studies and performance studies evident in Charles Mee’s work. Postmodern thinking, as
I suggested in the previous chapter, took the necessary step of engaging with and
understanding the new processes of communication made possible by technology. The
next step is to determine how to make use of this global system in a way that prioritizes
values other than economic growth and individual property.
By the time Fredric Jameson was writing, in the mid-1970s, the world was in the
beginning stages of fully saturated “global” or “multinational” capitalism. In a sense,
everything had become commodified, and, consequently, Jameson names the two most
prominent features of postmodernism as being, “the transformation of reality into
images,” and “the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents”
(Postmodernism 1974), in which human subjects no longer understand their orientation to
each other or to the world and are constantly bombarded with a series of simulated and
objectified images. “We do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new
hyperspace,” Jameson writes, “in part because our perceptual habits were formed in that
older kind of space I have called the space of high modernism” (1967). If Marx was right
in stating that “as individuals express their life, so they are” (German Ideology 150),
postmodern art that rose out of the conditions of global capitalism, “can itself stand as
they symbol and analog of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our
minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects”
(Postmodernism 1971). In other words, modernist subjects were still standing with their
arms in the air, looking around them in confusion as they attempted to assess where to
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stand in relationship to the world as a whole: as they were trying to choose which
container suited them best the protective boundaries of the containers were constantly
shifting and dissolving. As a result of his own entrenchment in this world and of his place
in an intellectual climate that includes the constant interaction of semiotics, feminism,
poststructuralism, and other theoretical frameworks, Jameson’s aesthetic critical work
focuses on constantly historicizing works of art as symbolic acts.
Translated into terms related to acting, Jameson’s theory might be stated as
follows: rather than an actor being the subject of a sentence and a character the object he
or she creates, or rather than the spectator being the subject who looks at an objectified
actor who has become reified as a character, the actor, character and audience are in a
constantly moving relationship with each other, and the play’s meaning changes
according to the detailed historical context of its production. In a sense, this is exactly
what Marx was discussing when he called for a revelation of the “movement behind the
forging”—the emphasis is on change within historical circumstances rather than the
creation of solid objects of representation. But within postmodernism, the movement
appears to be only among the commodified images themselves—soup cans and pop stars
and typified consumers with money to spend— turning to postmodern subject into merely
another disembodied, simulated sign to be shifted around at the mercy of an immense and
uncontrollable ideological system. In this state, the possibility of change and resistance to
capitalism in postmodern art is left in question by Jameson: “We have seen that there is a
way in which postmodernism replicates or reproduces—reinforces—the logic of
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consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a way in
which it resists that logic” (1974).
Charles Mee’s postmodern plays might be examined to answer Jameson’s question:
Mee’s “remaking project” is a website on which he publishes his plays free of charge. On
the site, Mee writes that he does not compose explicitly political plays, but echoes
Althusser’s deterministic concept of subjectivity and ideology with the belief that human
beings are social creatures that “often express our histories and cultures in ways even we
are not conscious of, that the culture speaks through us, grabs us and throws us to the
ground” (http://www.charlesmee.com/html/charlesMee.html). Kara Reilly compares
Mee’s work to Lyotard’s critique of history, which “exposed the dramaturgical structure
involved in the writing of history, a teleological structure implying that history is headed
toward some unseen progress that is part and parcel of the Enlightenment project” (1). In
order to avoid the modernist trappings of realism with its focus on cause-and-effect
progressive narrative, individualism and originality, Mee cuts up and juxtaposes
borrowed texts from various sources. In the “hypertext” framework of this website, his
plays take the form of completely disembodied images, reflecting a Jamesonian view that
the still-modernist subject is confronted, in postmodern art, with only images of history
and left to piece them together in different ways: “in a world in which stylistic innovation
is no longer possible, all that is left is to imitate dead styles, to speak through the masks
and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary museum” (Jameson, Postmodernism
1965). Mee himself is a product of capitalism (his work is funded by wealthy patrons),
and his plays clearly grow out of and reflect, formally, the late capitalist mode of
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production. But where is the potential for resistance, the struggle?
Embodied Hypertext
As made clear by Foucault’s concept of biopower cited in the previous chapter,
“The control of society over individuals is not conducted only through consciousness or
ideology, but also in the body and with the body.” Mee’s own metaphor for how culture
shapes identity implies both that culture has its own physical body: it “grabs” us and
“throws us to the ground,” but also that we are the surrogate bodies (the actors, more
specifically) of culture. In addition to his opinion that, “The decline of theatre as an
essential art form in America coincides with the triumph of naturalism and the well-made
play—which is boring people crazy out of their minds,” (“Shattered” 100), it is because
of Mee’s own physical experience in the world that his plays defy the dramaturgy of
realism and remain open ended and startling. Tidy packages are illusions, but living in the
world requires a bodily experience that defies easy explanation. In an online interview
with Pacific Resident Theatre Company, he explains his proclivity for inconsistencies and
ambiguities that complicate the world for audience members rather than clean
reconciliations:
… he elaborated on his preference for making disjointed plays full of
unmediated sharp edges and “juxtapositions where you’re startled by the
suddenness of life.” Then, in a moment of candor, without a scintilla of
self-pity, he explained why: “When I was 15, I had polio. Suddenly,
without any motivation or aspiration on my part, my entire life was
transformed, really in a millisecond. So my experience of life is that it is
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not a smooth, orderly progress of events that is best understood by some
unifying theory. And I tend to project that persona story on to a perception
of the world itself. To me, those astonishing juxtapositions are how life
feels. That feels true.” (http://www.aldrichpr.com/Reviews_000.htm)
Mee’s resistance to middle class realism is not borne entirely out of a deliberate
“outsider’s” relationship of opposition; rather it is experiential. He uses his own body’s
experience of reality and truth as the formal source for his representations. This extends
to the casting of actors in the play: “There is not a single role in any one of my plays that
must be played by a physically intact white person. And directors should go very far out
of their way to avoid creating the bizarre, artificial world of all intact white people, a
world that no longer exists where I live, in casting my plays”
(http://www.charlesmee.com/html/cast.html). His view challenges the idea of physical
sameness and smoothness perpetuated by the spread of capitalism and the rhetoric of
American ideology, even as it makes use of the same global networks of communication
and acknowledges that the body is in many ways the object of culture.
In some ways, the view that bodies are the hope for revolutionary art in the
current global, technology-saturated economic and political climate seems to be a return
to orthodox Marxism, awakening people to the idea that physical social being is what
builds a world. But it is, as well, a product of the process of history after Marx, of the
questions raised by all of the theorists and artists in dialogue with him. If control is
enacted more and more on and through people’s individual bodies, then potential for
resistance also relies on rediscovering those bodies’ possibility for willful and conscious
166
physical action. This is why Mee’s plays are compelling to me as sources of hope within
the sea of disembodied sameness that is postmodern consumer culture and as pedagogical
tools for actors who wish to make waves in that sea. The plays exist as abstracted images
and words on the internet; but in the act of reading the words, with their undeniable focus
on bodies, it becomes very clear what is missing from the equation. Since these chunks of
text are put together as plays, and like all dramatic forms, they find their fullest
realization when they are peopled by human bodies. The power to complete them and fill
them with movement and life lies with the bodies of actors. He also encourages visitors
to his website to build performances in exactly the way he has created them: by taking the
bits and pieces and recontextualizing them into a new work. Mee’s plays in actual
production, with live audiences, provide a compellingly Marxian form: embodied
subjects in conversation with pieces of all kinds of history, being moved by these objects,
but also consciously moving them around to shape a new world.
In addition, Mee’s work is a practical realization of Williams’ theory of the
residual, emergent and dominant. While I agree with Kara Reilly that Mee’s plays avoid a
teleological and progressive view of history, the canonical texts on which many of the
“master narratives” of European and American drama are traditionally based have not
been discarded: Greek plays provide the structure for many of his works. The Trojan
Women: A Love Story, for example, is a contemporary adaptation based on Euripides’
The Trojan Women, Berlioz’s masterpiece opera Les Troyennes, and the story of Dido
and Aeneas from Virgil’s Aenead. Mee’s method in writing this work involved filling the
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structure of a Greek tragedy with texts from a number of diverse, mostly contemporary,
sources. He writes of The Trojan Women,
This piece was developed—with Greg Gunter as dramaturg—the way
Max Ernst made his Fatagaga pieces at the end of World War I:
incorporating shards of our
contemporary world, to lie, as in a bed of ruins, within the frame of the
classical
world. It incorporates, also, texts by the survivors of Hiroshima and of the
Holocaust, by Slavenka Drakulic, Zlatko Dizdarevic, Georges Bataille, Sei
Shonagon, Elaine Scarry, Hannah Arendt, the Kama Sutra, Amy
Vanderbilt, and the Geraldo show
(http://www.panix.com/~meejr/html/trojan.html).
The result of this method of writing is a web of texts that comment on and collide with
each other, but which make meaning because they are contained within the single body of
this play. When composing Les Troyens, Berlioz himself worked in a similar way: “It
represented the convergence of a multiplicity of influences, literary and musical. On the
literary side Berlioz ascribed a major part to Shakespeare’s influence in addition to that of
Virgil. On the musical side the major influences were those of Gluck and Spontini.” The
way Shakespeare wrote, in fact, was not different—he recontextualized ancient stories
and mythology, mixing them with contemporary language and situations. On the most
recent update of Mee’s website, the plays are divided much like Shakespeare’s are:
tragedies, comedies/romances, etc.
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Mee includes among the texts with which he works in general, “history,
philosophy, insanity, inattention, distractedness, judicial theory, sudden violent passion,
lyricism, the National Enquirer, nostalgia, longing, aspiration, literary criticism, anguish,
confusion, inability”— (http://www.charlesmee.com/html/charlesMee.html). It is notable
that every text is given equal weight in Mee’s work; there appears to be no hierarchy
separating the Greeks from The National Enquirer, and emotions— “anguish, confusion,
inability” are no less significant as pieces of the puzzle than intellectual ideas such as
history or philosophy. In production, I might add, the body becomes another of these
many pieces, as do the individual identities of actors and audience members, the methods
of training used, and – in the rehearsal process we attempted – the identities of other
members of the community.
The Trojan Women and the context of war
After September 11, 2001, the repercussions of the violent and insidious politics
of Empire were becoming increasingly evident. The possibility of including Mee’s The
Trojan Women: A Love Story in the 2003-04 production season came up at a meeting in
early 2003, at which students were invited to make suggestions of plays that might be of
interest to the department. When my friend and colleague Shannon Baley recommended a
feminist re-telling of Euripides’ play, I mentioned that Charles Mee had written a
contemporary adaptation of The Trojan Women that would be timely and an interesting
challenge for student actors. After the meeting I re-read the play, and decided that if it
was chosen for the season I would put myself forth as a possible director: I was very
interested in the play because of its intense focus on both effects of history and war on
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people’s bodies and the possibility of imagining new arrangements of power through
embodiment.
In the introduction to his translation of Euripides’ Trojan Women, Nicholas
Rudall writes, “One year before the performance of the Trojan Women, Athens had
invaded the [neutral] island of Melos.... Athenian forces captured the island, put its men
to death, and enslaved its women and children.....We are thrust into the presence of the
pain of innocent victims of war” (3). Through placing other texts within the framework of
Euripides’ play and Berlioz’s Les Troyens, Mee’s play brings this story into conversation
with other historical moments in which people were subjected to pain and death at the
hands of foreign invaders. Performing this play in October 2003 extended that
conversation to include the current state of the world, and the play’s structure and
methods seemed all the more relevant and important in the context of the techniques,
strategies and reasons given for “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” which had just begun.
The possibility of producing this play came at a time when the United States was
clearly using strategies of both physical destruction/domination and media driven image
saturation for the purpose spreading capitalism. It seemed increasingly important to be
able to distinguish the facts of what was really happening in the world from the
groundless, disembodied images with which we were being bombarded daily, and at the
same time it had become increasingly more and more difficult to find the distinction
between reality and image. Ten years ago, in September 1996, Harlan Ullman and James
Wade, Jr. of the National Defense University published a report entitled Shock and Awe:
Achieving Rapid Dominance. The purpose of Ullman and Wade’s research was to
170
theorize appropriate changes in military tactics for a post-cold war global economy, in
which, according to them, the United States was in a position of military dominance with
no “external danger from a ‘peer competitor’” (viii). The report was the product of an
intellectual engagement with theories of warfare that was undertaken to address the need
to shrink the size of the military and to keep up with increasing technological capabilities
and win the “information war” that characterized the onset of the 21st century. Reading
this report, it occurred to me that acting or theatre in the 21st century might be thought of
as the opposite face of the military: rather than controlling and producing bodies and
information with a framework prioritizing destruction, domination and control, theatre
might use the same networks of production and exchange to encourage difference,
engagement, conversation and community.
The writers of Shock and Awe were interested in making use of the time in which
the U.S. was not actively involved in military combat to determine how its enemies might
be planning to undermine its current position of dominance and counter any potential
strategies. The language of a “revolution” in military tactics pervades the report, which is
careful to emphasize the inclusion of the “psychological and intangible,” as well as the
standard military tactic of physically overwhelming and destroying the enemy’s military:
“Dominance” means the ability to affect and dominate an adversary’s will
both physically and psychologically. Physical dominance includes the
ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neutralize and render impotent.
Psychological dominance means the ability to destroy, defeat, and neuter
the will of an adversary to resist; or convince an adversary to accept our
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terms short of using force. The target is the adversary’s will, perception
and understanding. The principal mechanism for achieving this dominance
is through imposing sufficient conditions of “Shock and Awe” on the
adversary to convince or compel it to accept our strategic aims and
military objectives. Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation and
disinformation, perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed. [emphasis
mine] (xiv)
A number of things stand out about this report in the wake of the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11. First, when used by an opponent,
psychologically damaging military techniques involving deception and manipulation are
deemed terrorism. When used by the U.S. in its initial attacks on Iraq in March of 2003,
they are termed “Shock and Awe.” CBS news reported on plans for the second Iraq war
as follows: “The battle plan is based on a concept developed at the National Defense
University. It’s called “Shock and Awe” and it focuses on the psychological destruction
of the enemy’s will to fight rather than the physical destruction of his military forces”
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews/main537928.shtml).
Interestingly, the techniques and strategies of contemporary warfare employed by the
United States military owe their development to the existence of “think tanks” created to
determine strategies for change—a process completely opposite in outcome but similar in
strategy to that of the Frankfurt school of Marxists who advocated intellectual critical
reflection on cultural practices as much outside of the realm of capitalist production as
possible in order to determine future possibilities for transforming that system.
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The report is also compelling because while it does not deny that the ultimate goal
of the military is still physical destruction to achieve control, it acknowledges the
increasing necessity of manipulating knowledge, psychology, and the understanding and
imaginations of one’s opponents in order to maintain dominance. September 11 itself
might be understood as a symbolic act that made use of just such a “Shock and Awe”
strategy: the idea of America’s global dominance was strategically pinpointed through
tactical physical attacks on the centers of international finance and the United States’
military presence across the world; the attacks overwhelmed the entire population
psychologically and emotionally through the spread of images of the attacks through
electronic media. In retaliation, after fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the U.S. entered
into Operation Iraqi Freedom with the alleged intention of continuing to fight the “War
on Terror” through deposing Saddam Hussein and destroying Iraq’s (fictional) stockpile
of weapons of mass destruction. The President’s statement on the day military operations
began in Iraq was that
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear
weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent
people in our country, or any other. … The United States and other nations
did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to
defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course
toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to
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act, this danger will be removed.
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html)
So while the academic and production sides of theatre departments maintained a
sometimes antagonistic theoretical separation between scholarship and practice during
the same period, people in the business of warfare recognized the need for critical
reflection on historical and technological advances. “War Colleges” worked together with
the administration and the military to figure out how to manipulate information and take
action in the future to maintain a position of dominance. Their goal of dominance
remained the same and might be considered “eternal” or “universal,” but strategies of war
must clearly adapt and adjust. The war continues to this day, more than three years after
President Bush prematurely declared “mission accomplished” and announced that major
combat operations had ended, and well after it became evident that the weapons of mass
destruction that were in danger of falling into the hands of “the terrorists” were an
imagined fiction, perhaps part of the “massive disinformation” required by this new
technique of warfare. In a sense, the performativity of the military—its ability to produce
the conditions that necessitate and enact its own destructive and repressive existence—
has been far more effective than the production of utopian communitas Jill Dolan
suggests can happen in the theatre. When we began rehearsals for the play in September
2003, the president had announced the need for $87 billion dollars to cover the costs of
increasing violence and to step up attempts at restoration: all this supposedly in the name
of democracy. By the time the play was performed in late October, the U.N. Security
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Council had approved a resolution for Iraqi restoration that involved occupation by an
international force led by the United States, despite the initial resistance of some nations.
Pointedly at this time in history, The Trojan Women: A Love Story asks the
question, “what happens now?” and makes evident the real aftermath of war: to the extent
that war has in some ways become about spectacle and image and symbolic acts and even
deception, the real consequences are that actual bodies have suffered and continue to
suffer horrific consequences because of it. In the shadow of the image-saturated world
that led to September 11 and the ensuing war in Iraq, in which it had become difficult to
distinguish between convenient fictions and reality, people began to recognize the
importance of re-examining truth and how to find it. To me, Mee’s play reaches for the
possible truths of the experience of war through invoking bodies. It is about what
happens to people’s bodies as a consequence of being placed in particular historical
circumstances: about the physical and spiritual importance of being human, about war,
violence, death, love and sex, and what happens to people as consequences of those
things. It is also about how the physical effects of these circumstances shape identities
and choices of action, while people also struggle to gain power over their own bodies and
exert agency to change the circumstances in which they are acting. The first act is about
the real damage done to people’s bodies and psyches by war and colonization, and the
second act asks whether or not the pleasures of bodies in love can redeem past harms and
restore hope. The fact of having a body is also what compels me about acting in theatre:
what happens when the live bodies of actors and audience members come together in one
place? How can actors recognize the need for more praxis-based strategies to produce a
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life that has love and pleasure for all people as a priority rather than money and power for
a select few? How can we examine questions about reality and imagination and make use
of networks of communication in order to preserve and enjoy bodies, to make life more
equitable and comfortable for them rather than destroying or repressing them?
The dramaturgy of Mee’s play reflects this same question, especially in the form
of Queen Hecuba’s journey. From the beginning of Mee’s adaptation, Queen Hecuba’s
concern is with understanding, empathy and diplomacy. She continually asks the question
“Why was this done?” and insists more than once on stopping the war and ceasing the
horror that has befallen her city. She seems particularly concerned with experiencing the
pain of war through her body, and evokes the tension between media imagery and real
suffering that is significant to this production:
When the television works one can see the dead bodies in the streets no
one has dared to retrieve … This is beyond knowing. I pray that I could
pull it all inside my body/ all the murder/ all the cruelty/ the ruin/ the fire/
the wounds/ broken limbs/ bleeding children/ my city/ bring it all deep
inside me so that I could understand.
(http://www.panix.com/~meejr/html/trojan.html)
176
There is a sense here that image alone is not sufficient to understand suffering and
destruction—Hecuba prays to be a kind of an actor, inviting the embodiment of others’
pain in order to make an effort to empathize with it and understand—one issue that
marked the importance of producing this play at this time, and through using the process
we did. At the beginning of the act, she is emblematic of a stereotypically feminine or
feminist characteristic: that of nurturing and compassion; hers is a worldview advocating
increased understanding, accepting difference and maintaining peace—she wishes to stop
the destruction of life. In a sense (although Stephen Bottoms represents performance
studies as being more masculinized) at the beginning Hecuba’s philosophy is more akin
to the flexible, border-crossing mindset of postmodern thinking.
At the same time, Queen Hecuba makes the clearest transition in the play, and by
the end has taken on what are typically thought of as more masculine and nationalist
traits. Sarah Bryant-Bertail writes that, “In a gestus that defines the whole performance,
Hecuba the victim becomes the agent of future destruction” (44). Her diplomacy and
desire to stop the war are changed after her pleas to Talthybius not to kill her youngest
daughter, Polyxena, go unanswered. Polyxena is carried away by the soldiers to be
sacrificed in honor of Achilles’ death, and Hecuba’s grief turns to rage:
Oh, my child, this goes past all endurance. Now I am no longer who I was.
My husband dead, my children gone, now my dear, dear littlest daughter,
what god in heaven what power below can help me now as I feel myself
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sinking into a rage I should have died long ago but I was kept alive as
though by the gods saved to witness more and each time to witness worse.
Until now I myself finally feel this rage of war deep deep within me. I
would myself have vengeance. (www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
Hecuba’s change of heart follows the cause-and-effect rules of realist dramaturgy— her
feelings and actions follow as clear results of her circumstances—and so using the
conventional tools of character analysis work well in her case. But also she makes
evident the limits of patience; the cruelty of circumstance and brutality of occupying
forces brings about the apparent need to assert nationhood in self-defense and continue
the spread of violence. When Hecuba calls Aeneas out of hiding to leave Troy, create a
new, strong nation, and to return and seek vengeance against the Greeks, she is
emblematic of the Stanislavskian and stereotypically masculine desire, agency and action.
In the dialectic of Mee’s play, both feminine and masculine, feminist theory and
“bourgeois humanism” can be seen in one complex character; in addition, the first act is
dominated by one worldview and the second by another, but each contains interactive
traces of the other. So rather than a solid container for truth, Mee’s play and characters
are moving, changing, interactive organisms.
Embodied empathy and intertextuality
Inspired by the form of Mee’s plays, in which “characters do not develop
psychologically but are the ‘variable sum of random moments,’” (Bryant-Bertail 41), this
rehearsal process involves collecting texts related to the play and characters and putting
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them together in solo performances devised by each actor. In order to allow the variety of
people and cultural artifacts with which she is in an ongoing conversation to intersect and
overlap, the actor might understand her way of working as deliberately intertextual. In
Marvin Carlson’s essay “Invisible Presences – Performance Intertextuality,” he discusses
the way in which “ghosts” of previous performances are imprinted on the consciousness
of audience members and influence their reception of a play. He uses as an example Jean
Stapleton:
A recent article in New York Newsday, for example, began: “Three of the
most–loved women in America will be on stage together tonight. There’s
actress Jean Stapleton. There’s Julia Child, as played by Stapleton [stage
figure and character]. And there’s the invisible but inevitable presence of
Edith Bunker, the loveable Queens housewife Stapleton created for All in
the Family.” Although Jean Stapleton is a stage actress of considerable
experience and ability, any role she plays at this point in her career will for
much of the audience be ‘ghosted’ by the ‘invisible but inevitable’
presence of Edith Bunker (113).
Jean Stapleton’s identity as an actor, then, is clearly shaped by a number of overlapping
and even conflicting discourses. While the woman onstage appears as a single identity,
she represents a variety of voices and stories. Those ghosts are also present for Stapleton:
she carries on her body the memory having thought about, interacted and empathized
with other characters, and in some sense shapes those memories into a new and different
character.
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Carlson discusses intertextuality and ghosting mostly in regard to audience
reception. He suggests that the elements of production – a known actor, costumes, scenic
elements, etc. – carry with them the resonance of previous experiences, which then
influence our impressions of a performance. In other words, we see (and are affected by)
the “ghosts” of former roles in the actors who are onstage in front of us, or of plays we
have seen before in the theatre we are attending. He also discusses the possibility that
directors might capitalize on this effect on the production end, deliberately re-using
motifs throughout a body of work in much the same way as Charles Mee does in his
plays. In the process we undertook, the actors, in rehearsal and performance, were
encouraged to deliberately conjure and engage the memories of people with whom they
had previous conversations through the gestures and shapes their bodies made, the
choices they made about characters’ desires and actions, and the feelings they
experienced about their characters’ situations.
The solo performances were intended to increase the actors’ awareness of various
relationships and materials that shaped their performances of these roles (such as their
own autobiographies, the work of other actors who have performed the role, etc.), texts
that included conversations with friends, family or other members of their communities
not directly involved with the production. I described the creation of these solo
performances in terms of the “composition” exercises Tina Landau describes in her and
Anne Bogart’s work:
Compositions are assignments we give to the company to have them
create short, specific theatre pieces addressing a particular aspect of the
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work. Anne and I use Composition during the Source-work period of a
rehearsal to engage the collaborators in the process of generating their
own work around the source. The assignment will usually include an
overall intention or structure as well as a substantial list of ingredients
which must be included in the piece. … These ingredients are to a
Composition what single words are to a paragraph or essay. The creator
makes meaning by their arrangement. (28)
Included in these students’ “lists of ingredients” were some of their characters’ lines from
the play, pieces of outside research regarding their characters (many of which were
mythological and already carried with them certain stories), songs or other artworks they
associated with their characters, all of the Viewpoints, and, most importantly, snippets of
the interviews they had conducted on topics related to the play, performed as exactly as
possible. The idea was that the actors would weave traces of these various conversations
and interactions into solo “character study” performances, which would haunt them again
in the context of the larger production of The Trojan Women, allowing their bodies in
rehearsal and performance to be the site where the memory of all of these different texts
intersected. So as opposed to understanding identity and desire through the lens of an
“insider/outsider” perspective (a character’s feelings and desires are discovered internally
and revealed on the outside of the container/body, or an actor steps outside of the
character and observes behavior while performing it), actors could imagine their
embodied experiences of these performances as hands drawing thread through a number
of different kinds of cloth to create a quilt.
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Ideally, this process would have been undertaken in the context of a separate
course aligned with the play, in order to give the actors time to work on all parts of the
construction of their characters, but the department’s curriculum had not been arranged to
accommodate such an extensive project. Because they were not taking a course on
building solo performance compositions or ethnographic interviewing, I had to find ways
to introduce these ideas through other means. During the audition process, Rebecca
Hewett—a PhD student and the production dramaturg with whom I was working—and I
introduced some very basic Viewpoints vocabulary and then asked students to create
short performance compositions in groups that were based on scenes from the play, so we
incorporated composition work into the audition process to expose actors very early on to
the idea of putting together their own performance pieces. To honor Mee’s request
regarding casting, in auditions we were not necessarily looking for people who appeared
to be the “best” actors in the traditional sense, but for those who seemed to work well in
groups, who seemed to be enthusiastic and creative, and who seemed open to new ways
of working. Rebecca encouraged me to resist casting actors who might typically be
considered appropriate for the roles in the play physically or in temperament, and made
suggestions of actors who might even be considered opposite what people might expect
to see, but who would bring complexity, depth, and thoughtfulness and dedication to their
roles. We ended up with an ensemble cast of very bright, dedicated and energetic actors
who committed their bodies and labor to the process even when we were working
through rough patches.
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At the first cast meeting, we watched and discussed videotapes of Anna Deavere
Smith’s performance work, and the actors practiced interviewing each other and
embodying the responses they heard in those interviews. During the summer before the
production was scheduled to begin rehearsal, I mailed packets to the actors that included
material on in-depth interviewing techniques and a sort of “recipe” for composing a solo
character piece. They were to find people in their communities (however they wished to
define that) who were connected in some way with their characters, conduct interviews
with those people, and compile those interviews with other texts of their choosing into
performances to be shown at one of the first few rehearsals. While these performances
were not technically ethnographic studies, they were intended to contain some of the
elements of performance ethnography Joni Jones describes. Jones includes among the
requirements for ethnographic performance the idea of “context:”
The performance should center around an idea or question rather than
provide a general ‘you are there’ atmosphere. The idea or question
constitutes the context for the performance. … the referents not only
include tangible artifacts and actual members of the culture being
presented, but also video footage and audio tapes that give the audience
the ‘real’ culture to contrast with the world created in the performance. (8)
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In our production, the context each actor was trying to capture was a question or idea
related to the concept of identity formation through his or her character’s “given
circumstances” in the play. While for the most part there were few artifacts from these
students’ actual fieldwork (although we did discuss how it would be interesting to piece
together the characters’ costumes from items borrowed from interviewees), thinking of
learning about their characters’ emotional experiences through the process of
communicating with other people about similar issues allowed them to get away from
only looking “into themselves” for inspiration; the formation of their characters’
identities was a social and interactive process rather than an internally contained one.
The actors, all undergraduate theatre students, received no special academic credit
for this production, and I was impressed with the rigor with which many of them
approached work on these separate solo projects. There was certainly some confusion at
the beginning of the process and reluctance on the part of some actors that didn’t seem to
be resistance to the ideas so much as a lack of understanding of the purpose of the
assignment, or an understandable inability to devote extra time they did not have to what
was already a long rehearsal schedule. The performances (which I describe in more detail
below, in the context of reading the various production texts together) ran the gamut from
compositions including multiple interviews with friends, family or other community
members who had connections with their characters emotionally, culturally or otherwise
through experience to character studies pieced together from songs, texts that were found
in books, newspapers or magazines or originally written for these pieces, and bold
physical interpretations. Essentially, the actors were taking on a kind of collective
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production dramaturgy and performing their findings through their individual bodies. As
they enacted this work individually for the group, they were providing the intellectual and
physical foundation for the rest of our rehearsals. To clarify the process for the audience,
we included the following note in the program: “In preparation for this production, the
actors interviewed various people about topics related to the play and created
performances based on those interviews. They have taken some of the physical responses
of their interviewees and used them in developing characters, in order to also bring, as
much as possible, their bodies and experiences onto the stage.”
The Trojan Women: Experiential Reality
Mee has designated the first act of this play “The Prologue,” and the second act
“The Play,” a contrast that seemed to support the choice to emphasize the tension
between technology-based mediated images and physical bodies by making the first half
a rehearsal for what was to come. The blurb describing the play clarifies somewhat Mee’s
reasons for making these designations: the destruction and violence of the first half is
what makes possible, perhaps even necessary, the continuation of war and death: “The
play by Euripides, set in the modern world, in which we see Troy in ruins, and a world
reduced to such disarray and anguish that it will never recover again, but will, instead,
spread death and disorder out into the world in all directions”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). With questions about the truth of bodies and
the power of fictional images in mind, I was intrigued by the possibility of setting the
first act of Mee’s play—which examines the idea of “the real”— in the Payne Theatre
populated by audiences and actors; that is, I wanted to set it in the current location and
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time, but with a somewhat fictional framework. I introduced this idea by encouraging
actors to think of themselves as being in this theatre during a time of war. Of course this
was, in a sense, the truth. But I also asked them to imagine that the boundaries keeping
the war in a distant location somewhere across the world had been erased, and their
bodies were in the place being destroyed. In this scenario, the people on stage are “shell-
shocked” actors and laborers in the theatre, alternately preparing for a play and trying to
make sense of the violence that has shattered their world—they sometimes lapse into
their characters’ lines from Euripides’ play and sometimes forget they are supposed to be
rehearsing and simply talk about what has happened to them. This kind of fragmentation
was impossible to sustain, as it wasn’t clear to the actors how to get this situation across
to the audience, but it was the framework that informed the design of the act. I was
interested in emphasizing experience and memory at the beginning and making the
second act about the possibility of redemption through love and imagination.
Mee describes the opening scene of the play as follows:
Lights very slowly up on 100 dark-skinned “3rd world” women
making computer components at little work tables.
Early dawn.
As the dawn light comes up very slowly, the Berlioz gradually
fades.
The women are in torn clothes; they are in shock; many have been
raped.
Their tables are set out on dirt.
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Behind them, the city is a smoking, still-burning ruin.
Black ashes rain down continuously on the stage.
(www.charlesmee.com/trojan.html)
Budget limitations prevented us from following these stage directions, and so we had to
suggest the effects of warfare and colonization in a different way. Our first act had no set
– the Payne stage was completely open, and all of the backstage area and stage machinery
was visible. The first person who entered the space was the piano player, who we placed
downstage left seated at an upright rehearsal piano. He began to play as the Trojan
women entered from all possible doors and wings and sang a haunting arrangement of
“All the Way.” (Mee’s script calls specifically for the Billie Holiday arrangement of this
song, but because of our limited budget, Bradley Griffin, who generously agreed to direct
music for the production, arranged the song himself. I selected the rest of the songs in our
production from the public domain). We attempted to give the impression that the women
were both there for a purpose and were seeking refuge from the “war” outside. The
lighting designer, Jessica LaBaugh Rapier, described the initial light cue as follows:
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Audience comes into a smoky, dimly lit, chaotic space. There are patterns
and shadows everywhere and some fixtures seem to be misplaced and
misfocused, shining comfortably in the eyes of those entering the theater.
There is a sickly, yellowish tinge to the light. The entire stage is visible.
Light emanates from usually hidden spaces like the catwalks, the
hallways, the partially uncovered pit. The overall feeling is one of
unplanned, uncontrived chaos (1).
Some actors carried their own light sources, and there was a ghost light present on stage.
The actors were dressed in contemporary street clothes—again Mee suggests particular
designers for some characters (Yves Saint Laurent for Hecuba, for example) in order to
clarify the class difference between royalty—Hecuba and those related to her— and the
Trojan women who are from laboring classes, which becomes a conflict later in the play.
Blair Hurry, our costume designer, simply dressed the “royals” in more elegant attire and
the others in more casual clothing—we considered the possibility that Hecuba,
Andromache and others might have been the “diva” actresses in this company, while the
others were non-speaking actors or stagehands.
While Euripides’ play begins with a conversation between the gods Poseidon and
Athena regarding the fate of the Trojans and Greeks, the gods and fate in Mee’s version
are only occasionally invoked through ideas like numerology or Tarot cards—his
adaptation is modern/postmodern in the sense of making the shift from a hierarchical
arrangement with the heavens to a horizontal arrangement with people, the earth, nations,
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and mystical concepts that are invoked by numbers or cards but suggest the idea of fate.
He begins with human beings, and focuses on the ways human beings experience, make
and remake their own worlds. The Trojan Women starts with women speaking
monologues that describe the details of their experiences of war. He includes actual
testimony by survivors of Hiroshima and of the Holocaust, and makes those the words of
the Trojan women into whose world the audience enters at the beginning of the first act.
The extremely explicit and brutal quotations Mee has chosen focus very closely on actual
bodies and what they suffer in horrifying situations of war: even when reading the play
online, the language he has chosen makes it impossible to ignore the specters of suffering
bodies. After the chorus of women finish singing, Hecuba, who was the wife of Priam,
the former King of Troy, rises from underneath a pile of rags and begins her lament.
Last night: a child picked up
out of its bed by its feet
taken out to the courtyard
swung round by a soldier in an arc
its head smashed against a tree
all this done while another soldier held back
the child’s mother
all this done right before the mother’s eyes.
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
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The other women onstage follow, delivering a series of long disjointed speeches that
frequently include equally grotesque and painful images. For example one, named
Valerie, says,
I was holding my son still, and I looked down at him. Fragments of glass
had pierced his head. Blood was flowing from his head over his face. But
he looked up at me and smiled. His smile has stayed glued in my memory.
He didn’t understand what had happened. And so he looked at me and
smiled at my face which was all bloody. I had plenty of milk which he
drank all throughout that day. I think my child sucked the poison right out
of my body. And soon after that he died.
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
This passage is exemplary of the visceral and devastating language that constantly
invokes the tortured bodies of women that Mee includes in this act of the play. The fact
that much of the language comes from the actual embodied experiences of people to
whom we had no access gave the words that much more weight, and gave the sense that
the intense suffering they represented should be treated with intense respect.
How could we achieve this kind of reverence? Our own experiences of war in
general and, in particular, the current war in Iraq, were limited to mediated images that
seemed distant and sometimes unreal. While we were aware of what was being done in
the name of the country of which most of us were citizens, we had no way of physically
empathizing with the actual human beings whose homeland was being invaded, nor had
any of us seen first hand the kind of destruction and pain described by Holocaust and
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atomic bomb survivors. Conducting interviews with people whose bodies suffered certain
kinds of traumas was a way of imagining these characters using the concepts of bodily
understanding and context about which Joni Jones writes; thinking of Mee’s characters as
different “contexts” rather than as a rigid set of traits that were predetermined by a
playwright allowed them to make connections that connected the “internal” world of the
play with the “outside” world in which it would be performed. The solo performances
provided some actors with a means through which to identify with the characters whose
traumatic experiences they were to represent, and many of the actors’ interviews
overlapped with their characters’ lives through a physical connection. Within any kind of
representation, the use of this technique might be ethically questionable: having
interviewed “real” people, regardless of who they were or what they had experienced,
might be used as a mark of authenticity to bolster claims to truth; but in the realm of this
production, the experience of the process was for the sake of actors participating in
interactive communication rather than for proving a correct interpretation of character.
In Mee’s play Andromache (whose husband Hector, the eldest son of Hecuba and
Priam, was killed by Achilles in the war) attempts to speak several times in the beginning
of the first act, but finds that she cannot. When she hears that she will be taken to Greece
by Neoptolemus, the son of the man who killed her husband, she finally launches into a
monologue that lasts for three pages of text. She begins by describing a pleasant memory
of her privileged life, but immediately veers off into a traumatic memory of a bomb being
dropped during the war. Hecuba pleads with Andromache to “remember her station,”
intending to keep her from agitating the Greek soldiers, and the young woman does just
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that. She remembers all of the rules her class and position required her to follow: diets
and sexual mores and etiquette, and then says that if she had known things would end this
way she would have lived very differently. Her secret desires bring to mind Foucault’s
idea of biopower, specifically through the realm of sexuality. The power and privilege of
the group to which she belonged (power that is derided shortly after her monologue ends
by the Trojan women who come from less privileged classes) relied on the regulation of
her body’s true wants—she describes diets she has been on as being at war with her own
body, for example. Her revelation of her secret desires is liberating, in a sense, as she is
attempting to use her voice as a last grasp at gaining power over her own body, and the
language she speaks after such a long repression is among the most startling in the play:
And I can’t help myself from thinking, too, if I’d known there were other
things I meant to get things I would have liked if I’d known it was going
to end so soon. When I was a girl I had a horse I loved so much I wanted
to take him right inside me or suck his cock. And I would have done it,
too, if I hadn’t been so timid. Or I’d have hung myself in the bathroom
things I didn’t do because I was afraid, put a rope around your neck to get
a more intense feeling you know cross dress wear pants and a necktie
stand on a chair and hang from something while you use some cream and
a vibrator I was always afraid I’d slip and fall but when you think about it
now I might as well have run the risk.
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
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Andromache’s floundering grasp for power ultimately backfires: not only will she be
taken to Greece by Neoptolemus, but Talthybius notices that her infant son, Astyanax, is
still alive and orders that he be taken away and killed like all other Trojan men have been.
The actor who played Andromache, in her solo performance, chose to focus on
the experience of being physically limited by the expectations of class and beauty. She
interviewed a young woman who had won a beauty pageant, and who discussed the
expectations placed upon her as the winner. In the performance, the actor sat on the floor
looking in a small, hand-held mirror and carefully applied makeup as she, in the role of
the woman she interviewed, described the experience of trying to maintain a very low
weight without letting people know she was doing so: experimenting with diet pills,
laxatives, etc. The actor then had the experience of speaking as a young woman who had
struggled through ongoing attempts to control her own body, and at the same time of
publicly revealing a dark secret that underlay her polished veneer. The context of the
character of Andromache was a question about who writes the script for women in the
middle or upper classes and who chooses whether or not one performs that script
properly. The actor’s preparation for the character was to engage with that intellectual
question through having an embodied experience of the feelings involved in a struggle
shared by her character and the subject of her interview. On stage, in Mee’s play, her
body stood in for multiple people at once—the mythological character of Andromache,
Mee’s characterization of Andromache, the woman from whom Mee borrowed the text
for her lines, the actor’s friend who had won a beauty pageant, and perhaps other
audience members who had been through similar attempts to control the size and shape of
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their bodies. It also brought the concept of imperialism to a personal and local level as
well as a global one: nations who occupy other countries are attempting to own other
people’s bodies and coerce their participation in a set of rules they may not have chosen.
Performing the character of Cassandra, one of Hecuba’s daughters, raises similar
questions about power and the body, but this performer must also manage a context that
includes her mythological possession of an exceptional power of perception that other
people believe is mental illness. Cassandra enters shortly after Andromache’s monologue,
making a similar attempt to seize power from the men who will force her to be taken by
King Agamemnon. In mythology, Apollo gave Cassandra the ability to see the future, but
when he found out that she did not love him in return, he placed a curse upon her so that
no one would believe her predictions. She is, in some ways, emblematic of the action of
power on the body, as she was punished for not capitulating to Apollo’s desires. She is
often represented as being completely mad by the end of the Trojan War, and in Mee’s
play she enters in a rage. While she may be forced to follow the wishes of the invaders,
she does not do so willingly: “Not for me the life of mourning the tears the nursing of my
sorrow.” She invokes sadomasochistic imagery in her predictions of how she will enact
her dominance over her future husband:
Let’s have him, then, bring me into his home. Let me lie down with him
stretch him out on a board put weights on his chest. Is this a man who
likes to be bitten all over his body on his neck and chest? Does he like to
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be laced with needle and thread like a spider’s web sewn down to his bed
immobilized? Then he’s chosen well which woman here to take back
home with him. (www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
The actor who played Cassandra divided her solo performance into three parts. The first
interview she performed was with a friend who spoke frankly, on condition of
anonymity, about her experience of having been sexually abused. The second was with
another friend who claimed to be an empath and whose family was full of women who
had dreams that predicted the future; this friend said that despite the fact that she was
certain she had this power, she never told anyone about it for fear people would think she
was crazy. In the final part of her performance, the actor chose a quotation from a
schizophrenic and had each of us in the room read a line from the quotation in order to
emphasize the fragmentation of that person’s thinking. The actor gained a new empathy
for the loss of power experienced by her friend who had been abused, and a clearer
understanding of the discovery of a power that may seem threatening and must be
controlled or kept a secret. At the same time, she had us as audience members speak as a
schizophrenic, and experience as a group the attempt to make sense of our own
fragmented thinking. Among the intertexts with which this actor was working were
experiences of the ultimate loss of sexual power, the discovery of a power that had to
remain a secret, and the psychological struggle resulting from the body’s memory of
those experiences. The dominatrix fantasies that form Mee’s Cassandra’s “madness”
become a reaction to the impossibility of the situation in which her body was placed; her
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rage becomes understandable, and her strong will in the face of her circumstances
became all the more admirable.
Masculinity, Action and Colonization
The problem of imperialist politics and colonization is the reason for the first act’s
emphasis on the continued violence done to citizens of occupied territories even after the
terror of warfare has supposedly ended (on Mee’s website, the play is part of a tetralogy
entitled “Imperial Dreams”). Interestingly, the men in the first act frequently lay claim to
the language of action, and naturalize their behavior through allying that language with
gender identity: acting is doing something, and doing something is being a man. They
enter shortly after the chorus of women finish discussing whether or not Aeneas should
be sent to avenge the wrongs done to Troy. Talthybius, a Greek messenger, comes to tell
Hecuba that she and the other women of the island (including Hecuba’s daughters) are to
be taken as wives and slaves by the Greek invaders. He presents himself as a diplomat,
and claims that the news he brings is not only beyond his control, it is “not to his taste.”
He goes to great lengths to explain that he is a cultured man capable of great sensitivity,
delivering a litany of his refined tastes, and attempts to rationalize his horrible news. His
supposedly diplomatic speech without a doubt echoes the self-righteous reasoning
President Bush gave for the war in Iraq, with his claim that, “The United States and other
nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat
it.”
Talthybius makes the enslavement of the Trojan women sound inevitable, a result
of the unreflective action required by the pace of the contemporary world: “These days
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war is so unsparing. Once upon a time men fought by day and grieved at night; they had
the opportunity to consider the world that they were making; but now they fight both day
and night, It leaves no time for grief and so men have come to adopt a certain hardness
that never leaves them even when the shooting stops”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). Bryant-Bertail states that in Tina Landau’s
1996 production of Mee’s play at the University of Washington, Seattle, the men arrived
and left “in a cloud of manly operatic glory” (44). As a visual metaphor for Talthybius’
placement of himself above the fray and his unwillingness to allow his body to interact
closely with the victims of war (or its perpetrators, the soldiers who accompany him
when he enters), the lighting designer pointed out that we might actually make use of the
hydraulic Genie lift normally used for lights and set construction. We had the actor
playing Talthybius remain on the lift at its highest setting for the entire act, except when
he lowers himself to engage in conversation with Polyxena.
For most of the act, the soldiers, named Bill and Ray-Bob, remained on either side
of the lift at the bottom. Talthybius was to represent the people in power who had the
luxury of removing themselves from the physical realities of the situation, and could
believe the illusion that the war was actually ended. The soldiers, on the other hand,
express the idea of power exercised through the body:
BILL: The war ended? You say this to the men: the war is not ended, they
say, we are the war, We ourselves are the war.
RAY BOB: Men act. We know this. Attach no value to it, particularly. To
act is to be. No more, no less. (www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
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Significantly, Talthybius’ and Bill and Ray Bob’s words show how dangerous the
language and politics of action without thought can be in the context of colonization and
control of other people’s bodies to support the lifestyle of an elite and untouchable few.
The male characters in the first act of the play (with the exception of Aeneas)
carry with them the challenge of representing the colonizers and perpetrators of war.
Menelaus, who started the Trojan War to get back his wife back from Paris, arrives late in
the act seeking Helen so that he may take her away from Troy. Mee’s Menelaus is clearly
affected by the war in which he has just been fighting, and his long speeches, once again,
seem to focus on his own body and his control over it, his physical ability to dominate the
women to whom he speaks, and his right to have power over Helen’s body through the
institution of marriage:
I said she is my wife. I said: I’ll have her back. The truth is I can sleep in a
bed of ice if I choose I can detach my head and let it trundle off
somewhere on its own. At times I feel myself going down a steep and
winding staircase to a bottomless depth but I look with wonder at my
hands from time to time when they’ve gone numb. They’ll do anything I
like. Take my cock in one hand and rub it on your bellies and hang you on
a peg to cut you open do you think if I cut the artery in your neck you’d
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spurt blood? I’ll have her back or kill you one by one until I’ve cleared by
path to her. (www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
Menelaus’s violently sexual speech, following shortly after Cassandra’s, takes on an
entirely different meaning; his is the destructive speech of an aggressor driven by the
laws of masculinity and property, rather than someone trying to take back his own body
from someone who had stolen it.
The actor who played Menelaus chose to interview someone whose story was
probably the most closely connected to the actual experience of war and violence: his
entire performance was based on one interview with a man who had been a mercenary in
Peru. The performance involved the actor sitting at a table with a single harsh light
focused on his face. When the light went out, he would ask a question as himself, the
interviewer. When it came back on, he performed the former mercenary’s responses. The
mercenary spoke of spending a great deal of time getting special training to be in the
military, and how it then became very tempting years later, when someone offered a great
deal of money to do the same thing he had been doing for free. He pointed out that
getting paid to fight in a war was especially appealing after he had been forced into
tedious employment otherwise, and spoke of the pleasure and thrill he found in the
experience of being in a war situation.
The words “this is how men are” are continually spoken throughout the play, and
often refer to the experience of warfare and its influence on concepts of masculinity. It
was compelling that the instigator of the Trojan War was constructed only through one
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interview: there weren’t as many voices in his performance, but the use of one voice for
an aggressive force representative of war and colonization seemed appropriate. At the
same time, his need to assert his identity and control don’t escape outside forces. Mee’s
Menelaus is driven by competition for his wife, and the mercenary’s identity was shaped
by material needs and his training as a soldier. In general, all of the texts with which
actors were working in the first act raised issues of the “real” effects of suffering and of
repressive material situations on the bodies and identities of people, and at the same time
the development of a strong desire for action and agency to escape those situations or
change them.
A Love Story: Imagination and Possibility
While the first act of our production was intended to invoke ideas of the “real”
and realism, the second act was intended to be about performance; or, more specifically,
if the first act was about representation, the second act was about possibility and
imagination. Yes Mee calls the second act “The Play,” and the environment is intended to
be a very different one from the previous setting: “The dramaturgical rules have shifted
here: this is dreamland, a world of drift, heaven”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). The dream-like setting for this act also
emphasizes the body, but this time it is about healing and pleasure: it is intended to be set
in “A spa. Exercise machines of all sorts. Bowls of fruit. Bottles of Evian water. Fresh
flowers. Piles of towels. A hot tub. Women are working out on these machines. This is
the chorus: they are, variously, patrons and instructors at the spa”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). In our production, the story of Dido and
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Aeneas took place in a world of image and artifice that existed in conversation with the
“reality” of the first act.
Again, the lack of budget for set design prevented us from creating the spa world
Mee calls for. But I thought it would be compelling to have the act reflect the idea of a
“post-war” world as much as possible, and so we decided to set Carthage on a suburban
lawn that suggested the suburban expansion of the 1950s U.S. At one point in the act,
Dido says to Aeneas,
I was thinking we were traveling by camel in the desert, and we decided to
stop and rest on a lawn in the suburbs. My blouse was off. And there were
all these people playing croquet around us. … It was a wonderful
community in this village and we were having a feast at a long table
outdoors and someone gave me a baby and it was you.
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
Hence, Dido’s “dreamworld,” a world of image, artifice, possibility and pleasure was the
inspiration for this act. We covered the stage in astro-turf, projected a Technicolor-blue
sky on a scrim at the back of the stage, and I bought garlands of artificial red roses with
which to drape various items. There is supposed to be a hot tub in Mee’s spa, but we
chose a plastic inflatable wading pool of the kind one sees on suburban lawns, and to
make water I bought blue and silver Christmas tinsel. There were certain references that
we hoped to make, but which proved to be impossible because of budget constraints. For
example, I had hoped to open the act with the theme song for Douglas Sirk’s film
Imitation of Life, and to have the costumes for Dido evoke Lana Turner’s character in that
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film. Some of the choices—the saturated color and artificial flowers, for example—were
inspired by Sirk and the comment his film made about the concept of identity as an
elaborate performance.
The lighting designer describes the initial image of the second act in the following
way: “Blue blue afternoon sky, warm sun streaming in from the west, bright green lawn.
This is a world cut from a magazine, almost cartoon-like in its color and precise
definition of shape” (Cue Sheet 4). We decided to use the main curtain between acts, so
that when it rose to reveal the second act setting, it would be clear that this was a
proscenium stage. Aeneas and the soldiers from the first act, tattered and weary from
their long journey, entered from stage right just below the proscenium to give the idea
that they were entering a picture from outside the frame. In addition, Rebecca Hewett had
the idea to costume the women as different laborers in this suburban neighborhood— a
mailwoman, a milkwoman, a grocer, a maid, etc. – that one might expect to see in a
Norman Rockwell painting or other of that sort of Americana from the post-war U.S.
Having these people speak the sexually explicit language of the chorus in this act would
have served multiple purposes: pointing out the labor of the upkeep of such a neatly
trimmed, well-scrubbed idea of family life, and belying the wholesome, repressed veneer
of the fifties through having these women talking about the pleasures of the body. The
ideas for costuming had to be abandoned, but again, they were among our first impulses
when imagining the design of the act.
Our solution was to combine the idea of suburban America and a spa, and to turn
this into a sort of suburban country club at which the chorus members were dressed in
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white tennis outfits—in this way we were able to refer to the idea of healing and the body
through making reference to recreation and pleasure. As the curtain rose, the piano player
(now seated upstage right at a grand piano) accompanied the chorus as they sang “I Wish
I Could Shimmy Like My Sister Kate” and performed a dance number (choreographed by
Dustin Wills, who played Aeneas) reminiscent of production numbers from screen
musicals like Singin’ in the Rain. When the soldiers appeared downstage right, the
women welcomed them into the dream world and tried to comfort them, as the men sang
the praises of the physical joy they find in contact with women: “I like to put my head on
a woman’s breast, have her arms around me so that I can’t escape, and fall asleep.”
Dido’s entrance, after which she gazes at Aeneas and falls immediately in love, was
accompanied by the song “Every Little Movement (Has a Meaning All its Own).” While
we weren’t able to use the Imitation of Life theme song, this was the lyrical equivalent in
the public domain, and was even more appropriate for the theme of the act: “Every little
movement has a meaning of its own/Every thought and feeling by some posture can be
shown/And every love thought that comes a stealing/o’er your being must be
revealing/all its sweetness in some appealing little gesture/all its own”—the song is all
about acting and love (or affect in general, really) as performance.
Despite the fact that we wished to highlight theatrical images and artifice in this
act, the focus is still on the body. This act poses the question of whether or not the
pleasures of a body in love can redeem past harms and restore hope; whether through the
deliberate performance and production of love one can transform the world. The texts
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Mee chose to set the tone for this act came from the Kama Sutra. Here, the chorus
describes to soldiers who have entered their world a variety of sexual positions:
CAROL: You know if you grasp your penis and move it in circles inside
her we call this Churning the Curds.
JIM: Unh-hunh.
ANDREA: Or, drawing up her feet, she might revolve her hips so that
your penis circles deep inside her, we call that the Honey Bee. Or if she
sits astride you, facing your feet, brings both her feet up to your thighs,
and works her hips frantically, this is known as the Swan Sport.
ALICE: Or, catching your penis, she guides it into her quim clings to you
and shakes her buttocks; this is called the Lovely Lady in Control. …
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
While “The Prologue”—which I read as representing historical memory and how it
imprints itself on bodies—emphasized the trauma inflicted on people during wartime
through the use of the actual words of victims describing what had been done to them,
this segment is about the pleasure of sexual bodies, and how one can choose to enact that
pleasure in different ways. This act is about the possibility and hope that can heal the
body through love and sexuality. The trauma of the previous act is still alive in the
soldiers: there is a section in the middle in which one soldier mentions that “Sometimes I
dream the world is ending everything is burning and there is nowhere to run,” which sets
off memories of the war in Aeneas and the others, but their anguish diminishes when the
language returns to pleasure.
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Dido is queen of the hyper-sexual women who live in this world, and the “dream-
land” over which she rules might be seen as the “feminist utopia” described by one of the
chorus of women in the first act: ‘In a very real sense, feminist utopias celebrate what we
usually think of as traditionally female tasks and traits: nurturance, expressiveness,
support or personal growth and development, a link with the land or earth”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html).
Mostly, Dido speaks in poetic and sensual language. As she begins to remove Aeneas’s
clothes before she bathes him in the pool, she says: “In spring, I think the dawn is most
beautiful. In summer, the nights. In autumn, the evenings”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). She also reads Tarot cards. Mee describes
Dido as “a black woman in her thirties,” but the woman we cast was an Asian woman,
and in a quarrel with Aeneas near the end of the act, she points out her “otherness.” She
asks if he feels he must leave her because he is afraid of her difference: “Because I’m
Asian? … Because I’m foreign to you? … Because I’m a woman?”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). Again, the contrast between the colonization
and control of the first act and the exoticism of the second act somewhat reflective of the
argument between Stanislavsky-based actor training and more experimental methods, or
the rift between theatre and performance studies. Dido and her world (the second act) are
exotic and Other, but also represent a world that frames the body as a center of pleasure
and comfort and love, welcoming, warm and inclusive. The world from which Aeneas
comes is the one that has been destroyed by conflict, and seeks deliberate action, strong
identity and strict rules.
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The actor who played Dido also played one of the chorus of women in the first
act, and constructed her solo performance in three parts. In her first interview, she spoke
with a woman who claimed to have been under the power of a “love spell” at one point in
her life, evoking the exotic and potentially superstitious side of Dido, but also the concept
of love at first sight. The second interview was addressed to her character in the first act,
and was with a woman who had been sexually assaulted, who revealed the ongoing scars
the memory of that experience had left on her psyche. The last interview was with an
exotic dancer, who described what she has learned about men from her work. She ends
this interview with the dancer expressing the desire to do the work she does to gain
sexual agency: “I’m doing this for me.” Throughout the performance, in between
sections, she used three Madonna songs, which were both a reference to her own
subjectivity and identity (she is an avid and vocal Madonna fan), and a reference to her
final interview: the dancer reveals that she used these three songs the first time she
performed in a strip club. Her performance highlighted the compelling questions about
sexuality and power that the play raises, as she took on her own body the identities of
women who had experienced power through the public enactment of sexuality and also
who had been victims of attempted disempowerment and lack of control over their own
bodies and emotions. Invoking Madonna as one of the intertexts also brought up the idea
of deliberately manipulating signs of identity to achieve agency through sexuality (in
contrast with the cause-and-effect structure of the first act in which identity and agency
are often coerced by outside circumstances).
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The character Aeneas serves as a bridge between the play’s first act and the
second, and so in our production the actor’s performance involved carrying the realism of
Act One into the second act’s theatrical world. When he appears at the end of Mee’s first
act, Hecuba tells Aeneas to “Give up hope. Your time has come to find all those who
have survived, take them to a new country and build a home. Make it strong. Put your
trust in power alone. Make a nation that can endure.” He launches into a monologue
detailing the gruesome results of war he has seen and their effects on his psyche: “I’m not
a child. After the things I’ve lived to see.” In the original story (not a part of Euripedes’
play, but of Virgil’s Aenead), Aeneas leaves Troy and goes to Carthage, where he falls in
love with Queen Dido. Here, the story is the same… on his way to found Rome, he gets
sidetracked when he finds a beautiful woman in an exotic world and falls in love.
The traditional story of Dido and Aeneas ends with Mercury being sent to order
Aeneas to leave Carthage and fulfill his destiny. He departs sorrowfully, but must uphold
his duty and his promise to Queen Hecuba. Again, in Mee’s play, there are no gods
forcing Aeneas to do his duty. What reminds Aeneas he must move on are the ghosts of
history from the first act: laws of masculinity that his body has taken on and his
responsibility to his country. He must leave, he says, because “This is a woman’s world
… not a world I’ve made. The world I promised I would make. … A world without false
hope. A world not built on sentiment. Ideas we used to have of how things could be
before we learned in our time who we really are. A world that can endure”
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html). When Dido points out that this could be his
home, that he could change his path and devote his life to love, Aeneas is joined by the
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other men in reciting a litany of the laws of masculinity. We had divided the text of this
speech up among the men, because they are intended to overlap with Aeneas “in frantic
explanation.” By happy accident, all of the men were having trouble learning the lines of
this speech, and so we ended up having them line up together (Mee’s stage directions call
for the men to be lined up against the back wall), and pull folded up scripts very
deliberately out of their pockets and read from the sheets of paper. In this case, Aeneas’s
choice to leave was his own: he decided to be a man of action; but it was a choice shaped
by the script of who he, as a man, is supposed to be: “men are meant to DO something or
else they’ve just never existed” (www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html).
The question that drives the argument between Dido and Aeneas is one of identity
and agency: who makes choices to stay or go, and what drives those decisions? While she
is poetic and exoticized and representative of the “Other” in this act, at one point Dido
also expresses a stereotypically feminine view of love, one garnered from mythology and
Hollywood movies alike:
You know: All great love stories end in death because the truth of life is
that all of any of us ever have is one great love in life, not two or three or a
hundred. Just one. And when we die—whether sooner or later it doesn’t
matter, because that’s all we are given in life, only one chance at real love,
and all the rest is just what comes before and after—and if a love story
ended differently it would be untrue.
(www.charlesmee.com/plays/trojan.html)
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Aeneas argues: “No. We make our own choices.” This comes at the end of the Tarot
reading, about which the two disagree: are the cards predictors of fate, or are they open to
interpretation depending upon one’s perception? Does will make a difference? Or is
destiny set in place?
Unlike in the mythological story, Dido does not commit suicide at the end of
Mee’s play. She tells Aeneas to go, and then, in a moment in which the war of the first
act enters into the love of the second, all of the couples on stage fight violently. Dido
fights with Aeneas in the pool and tries to drown him, and Mee leaves it up in the air
whether or not he dies. We chose to leave the question of will and determination, of the
“truth” of this story, up in the air, and ended the play with the two locked in an exhausted
embrace on the ground center stage. We wanted to end with the idea that while people’s
bodies are shaped in many ways by outside forces, there is still the possibility that love,
pleasure and hope and a combination of imagination and action can bring about change.
Aeneas, as the bridge between the first and second acts, contains elements of both worlds.
While he is able to converse in Dido’s language of love and eroticism—“I love your hair,
I love to brush it and wind it around my fingers. I love your ear”—he also feels beholden
to his promise and feels that he must move forward and accomplish something.
The actor who played Aeneas put together a compelling performance from his
experiences traveling in Europe over the summer. He set up chairs to appear to be the
seats on an airplane and projected slides from his own travels on a screen in the
background. He designated shifts in character by moving seats in the airplane for each of
three interviews about leaving loved ones behind. The first was a straight man who talks
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about his lack of interest in commitment and his tendency to end relationships by just
leaving women he has taken up with. The other was a woman discussing her experience
of falling in love with someone and having to leave him, and the third was someone
discussing the death of a loved one. Interestingly, the actor chose to focus on the
experience of love rather than that of war and action. But because his character was
woven together from people with opposite points of view—the stereotypical masculine
fear of commitment and the woman whose has a strong desire to stay with the one she
loves despite her need to leave and pursue a career, for example—his performance
carried traces of a number of perspectives on Aeneas’s dilemma. And to a certain degree,
his dual purpose in the play— building a strong nation and acting within the expected
boundaries of a stereotypically masculine identity or relishing the pleasure of love,
sexuality and community and building a world based on goals other than conflict or
vengeance—is another element reflective of the rift between identity-and-action-based
actor training and ensemble-driven work built from a community this process attempted
to reconcile.
The Viewpoints, Ideology and Identity Formation
As another step toward that reconciliation between the idea of theatricality and that of
real experience, I imagined the solo performances not only being used by the actors a
“way in” to empathizing with their characters, but also to use some of the external
physical mannerisms of the people they interviewed to create movement and vocal
patterns for their characters. The actors were working with “external” sources as patterns
for their characters, but those sources included actual people and not just stereotyped
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images. As a way of incorporating the bodies and voices of the interviewees into the
production, when rehearsals began at the end of August, we used the solo performances
in conjunction with both the standard Stanislavski-based techniques of script analysis and
The Viewpoints. Here again, I was experimenting with the idea of showing
interconnecting and moving boundaries between these theories rather than the rigid and
exclusive ones usually assigned to methodologies for working on plays.
The Viewpoints are
a philosophy of movement translated into a technique for 1) training
performers and 2) creating movement on stage…. [they] are the set of
names given to certain basic principles of movement; these names
constitute a language for talking about what happens or works on stage….
[they] are points of awareness that a performer or creator has while
working. (Landau 21)
I was first exposed to this training and rehearsal technique through the work of the SITI
Company, of which Charles Mee is a member, and who popularized it to the degree that
Viewpointing is now taught and used widely across the United States and the world.
Mary Overlie, who originated this work and currently teaches in NYU’s Experimental
Theatre wing, stresses that these spatio-temporal relationships are occurring in the world
all the time; for her, these “points of awareness” are a physical means of research, and
using them is a matter of simply noticing one’s body and how it relates to space and time.
The Viewpoints operate in an improvisational structure. Actors begin moving
around the stage or rehearsal room, gradually increasing their consciousness of a number
211
of elements of time and space, including (for the SITI Company) tempo, kinesthetic
response, repetition (within and outside of the body), shape (again, internal and external),
gesture, architecture, spatial relationship and topography. This vocabulary can also be
invoked in rehearsal, and gives actors more agency in creating stage pictures: for
example, rather than saying “move downstage right before this line,” a director might
say, “I’m not getting a sense of the power dynamic between the two of you. Change your
spatial relationship a few times and we can see which way clarifies that.” The use of
Overlie’s research begins to transform the relationship between actors and director from a
vertical/hierarchical one to a more horizontal and democratic arrangement.
Many people who use The Viewpoints see it as an alternative to Stanislavski-
based psychological character analysis and use it as a statement of opposition to realism,
but in fact it works quite well together with the concepts of need or desire, obstacle and
action within an ensemble of actors. The Viewpoints encourage actors to negotiate being
both individuals with desires and goals, and being part of a group whose energy influence
how they choose their actions. In a recent workshop I attended here in Austin, the
instructor (a member of the SITI Company who has also worked with Mary Overlie)
stressed that improvising in this way is about making physical choices, acting on those
choices, and noticing the consequences of one’s actions. The consequences then lead the
actor to the next course of action. Some method based techniques (Meisner’s approach in
particular) are also about making choices and noticing the effect of those choices on
one’s partner, then allowing the reverberations from one’s actions to stimulate the next
action.
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The difference, perhaps, is that Viewpoints begins with the body: the actor’s
attention is on the physical and public aspects of identity and action, but it does not
preclude the actor having internal psychological responses or desires. Emphasizing
immediate bodily reactions (kinesthetic response) and repetition, for example, gives
actors the opportunity to see how their emotional responses and habits are being formed
in a social setting—they see how their bodies take on patterns established by the group,
and alternately how their actions can change those patterns. Stanislavski-based work has
a similar result, but begins with words and psychology: the actor’s attention is on
developing his character as an individual, although the external stimuli (the playwright’s
words, the director’s directions, the other actors’ actions) and physical manifestations of
that work are essential to the development of the character in later stages. The “internal
vs. external” containment framework makes it difficult for actors trained in Stanislavski-
based techniques to recognize the interactive parts of analysis and training, while using
the The Viewpoints as an intertext helps reveal how individual desire and action change
according to the movement of a group.
The first few rehearsals involved intensive Viewpoints workshops with PhD
student Jaclyn Pryor, during which the actors learned the theory and practice of that
technique in more detail. As luck would have it, the Payne Theatre was not in use during
the weeks that led up to the production, and we were able to use the theatre where the
play was to be performed for the remainder of our rehearsals, so that the architecture of
the space itself became another intertext in our exploration of this play. During the first
few rehearsals in that room, I asked the students to choose one or two of their characters’
213
lines from the play and one or two physical gestures from their character study
performances. While a group usually has to be careful not to let the elements of repetition
and kinesthetic response overwhelm Viewpoints improvisations, I was interested in
seeing if deliberately using physical gestures from interviewees as the physical idioms
that are repeated throughout an improvisation might make clear the process through
which physical behavior gets learned, repeated and passed on, sometimes almost
unconsciously.
We did not have time in this rehearsal process to work specifically on deliberately
stitching together characters from the physical mannerisms of various people. But I
hoped that through having performed the exact words and gestures of other people
talking about what had happened to them, and then having some of that material
performed again by the group as a whole, the students’ solo performances would, through
the process of ghosting as described above by Marvin Carlson, infuse the performance
itself with the spirit of many people’s experiences. Beginning the process by focusing the
actors’ attention on, first, having conversations with people around them about topics
related to the play and, second, on the physical experience of their live bodies as an
interactive part of a group, I hoped to encourage them to consider their process of
creating character as being socially formed through a variety of texts; rather than being
exclusively internally and psychologically produced, the order of the rehearsal process
was intended to make actors aware of the importance of their bodies’ situations in
historical contexts in the formation of identity.
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Acting and Performance Studies: A Love Story
After our solo performances and Viewpoints workshops, we used a variety of
approaches in rehearsal to stage the play in the few short weeks that remained, and the
shift in dramaturgical rules Mee describes between the first and second acts did not really
become clear to us until we began to try to embody the words of the different acts. The
first act lent itself particularly well to an exercise to which I was first introduced while
studying at three-week intensive training workshop with the SITI Company several years
ago and that Bogart and Landau refer to as montage or storyboarding. Similar to Boal’s
Image Theatre exercise, in this technique actors create “snapshots” or storyboards for the
scene on which they are working: “Five shots or takes, each one a maximum of fifteen
seconds long, separated by blackouts, during which those in the audience close their
eyes” (Viewpoints Book 143), keeping the Viewpoints of space always in mind. This
process lends actors a great deal of agency and creativity, as they are encouraged to think
like painters, sculptors, filmmakers or photographers. They then add movement to get
from one still image to the next. In order to arrive at what these still images might be,
however, we began each rehearsal with a discussion that used fairly typical language of
play analysis: why might this scene be in the play? What role does it play in the act as a
whole? What is your character’s relationship to the others? Does she have a goal or desire
in the scene? What does he want from the other characters? What are some options for
possible actions he or she might perform to achieve that goal?
In the second act, the collage of events and images did not lend itself as well to
either the language of Stanislavski or the technique of storyboarding the scenes with still
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images. The dreamlike quality of this act was more like a piece of music or a dance
performance, in that it worked best when the actors moved while attempting to determine
how best to determine what purpose each section of the act served. There is the litany of
sexual positions, there are many songs, there is a segment in which everyone couples off
and begins dancing, terms of endearment are exchanged and lovers quarrels ensue and a
Dido gives Aeneas a Tarot reading, but all of these fragments are not tied together by a
through line of progress, necessarily. The connections are free-associative and time
seems condensed—what happens in Dido and Aeneas’s relationship over the course of
this act might take years in real time. The dramaturgy in this act is driven by desire, but it
is mostly erotic and emotional rather than being about conquest and control. The structure
of the first act is, for the most part, conflict driven and cause-and-effect related—it might
be understood to be the “Stanislavski-based” act; the second is something “Other,” the
feminist and poststructuralist “performance studies” act that is less logical or rational.
However, this play’s title encapsulates Mee’s dialectical and interactive writing
style—neither side is a container that exists on its own separately from the other. Bryant-
Bertail writes that in Landau’s production,
In post-performance discussions and interviews, many spectators, as well
as the actors themselves, seemed to search for continuity between the two
acts with their starkly contrasting sites and atmospheres. Even though
there was no more Hecuba, Andromache, Menelaus, Talthibius, Polyxena
or Cassandra, the audience recognized them in the actors and searched for
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signs that the actors or characters remembered what had taken place in the
horror of Troy. (46)
One might read The Trojan Women: A Love Story as two different faces of one play—the
first face is devastation and war, the second is love and pleasure; the first is the “real”
representation of women, the second is a fictional romance; the first is based in historical
fact, the second in fantasy; the first act, while it is the women’s story, is masculine in
spirit, and the second is feminine. But the title might also be read as two separate clauses,
one describing each other—there are clearly elements of each act in the other. The
change in Hecuba is actually motivated by her love and devotion to her daughter, and the
war itself was a result of the romance between Menelaus and Helen. At the end of the
second act, Dido “grabs Aeneas by the hair and pushes him under the water,” attacking
him violently: she ravages his body in order to get him to devote his life to loving her.
There is a sense that one side cannot exist without the other.
In a sense, the process on which we were just beginning to work was reaching
towards what this play achieves (that is, difference, movement and interaction within the
totality of a play), but through the actor’s body on the level of building an identity.
Performing multiple voices in their construction of one character was intended to suggest
the idea that identification supports the complexity and collectivity of individual people
rather than annihilating difference. In short, we were reaching toward what George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson might call an “experientialist” view of acting, a performance
that,
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depends on understanding, which emerges from functioning in the world.
It is through such understanding that the experientialist alternative meets
the objectivist’s need for an account of truth. It is through the coherent
structuring of experience that the experientialist alternative satisfies the
subjectivist’s need for personal meaning and significance. … What
[subjectivism and objectivism] both miss … is an interactionally based
and creative understanding. … From the experientialist perspective,
metaphor is a matter of imaginative rationality. … New metaphors are
capable of creating new understandings and, therefore, new realities. (235)
There is undoubtedly a great deal of work still to be done in investigating the kind of
process I suggest here, particularly with regard to accountability and participation, that
would turn this process into a true conversation between community members. But I
began by examining ways to work with the concepts of context, subjectivity and
multivocality: how is a strong individual subject shaped by historical context, and how
are other people a significant part of that context? And how can democratizing a
person’s/character’s subjectivity become the grounds for future action? With the
preliminary work we had done in the early rehearsals under our belts, the questions of
individual desire involved in Stanislavski-based analysis—what do I want, what am I
doing to get what I want, etc.—became less about simply determining the playwright’s
intentions or the “appropriate” course of action a character should take, because the
answers were based on a pool of knowledge that came from multiple sources; the
movement of the characters’ bodies was not simply being dictated by the language of the
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play, because the interpretation of that language was infused with a variety of embodied,
experiential evidence.
For example, one actor who played a member of the chorus of women in both the
first and second acts spent the summer interning in New York City. She included in her
performance an interview with a man discussing love, divorce and heartbreak, and later
revealed that she had arranged an interview with Charles Mee. He agreed to an interview,
but did not want to discuss the production itself or have any input in the way it was
produced, and she did not reveal who the speaker was until after her performance was
over. Consequently, the playwright’s own feelings on the topics of the play were included
among the words of all interviewees, and were given equal importance as those others.
The actors could speak confidently about their opinions of what might be happening in
various scenes and act as strong individuals, with full awareness that their individual
subjectivity was directly tied up in the interaction of a larger group of people. And they
could engage their imaginations and create new possible combinations of text, image,
sound and movement while at the same time attempting to empathize closely with the
experiential truth of the voices of their interviewees that made up the characters they
were performing.
In the program notes for this production, Rebecca Hewett quoted Mee as saying
that one one of his strategies is “to extend the boundaries of what’s considered normal
and acceptable for what it is for a human being to be” (“Shattered” 99). In the interview
this quotation came from, Erin Mee writes that “People who have had no place in the
conventional theatre, people who have been excluded from the mainstream, are put
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onstage, given a platform from which to speak. And that, finally, is what is most
important about my father’s work. He makes room for the marginalized, the rejected, and
the outsider” (87). Developing characters through a collage-like process which includes
collecting interviews and devising an identity through the process of performing them
makes it possible for actors to see the power they have to extend the boundaries of what
reactions are appropriate and believable. In addition to understanding how their actions
are formed by the material conditions in which their bodies find themselves, actors who
use such a process might also consider how their work as performers can transform
understanding and suggest new possibilities. In the following chapter, I discuss how this




“It’s Nice Hearing Your Voice:” Queering the Real and Naturalizing Theatricality
as Ava Coo in The Strip
If history is to be creative, to anticipate a possible future without denying
the past, it should, I believe, emphasize new possibilities by disclosing
those hidden episodes of the past when, even if in brief flashes, people
showed their ability to resist, to join together, occasionally to win. I am
supposing, or perhaps only hoping, that our future may be found in the
past’s fugitive moments of compassion rather than its solid centuries of
warfare.
- Howard Zinn, from A People’s History of the United States
I thought I hated her a lot, but then she scratched my back and I felt, I
don’t know, a comfort, a safety, and it was confusing to me because I
thought I hated her and ... well I mean it wasn’t sexual or nothing ‘cause,
shit, what do I know about sex anyway? I’m just some chick who pretends
to be a chick so people will look at me in a different light so Christ, you
know, what’s that about?
- Ava Coo, from Phyllis Nagy’s The Strip
Anonymous drag performer: You’re gonna play a female drag
impersonator, right?
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Me: I’m gonna play a fema … a female who’s playing …
DP: … a man.
Me: No, a female who’s playing a man who’s playing a woman.
DP: Wait a minute … no, so you’re playing a man who’s a drag queen.
Me: I’m playing a girl who’s playing a man who’s a drag queen.
DP: Okay, that doesn’t make any sense!
Me: Like Victor/Victoria style.
DP: Ohhhhh! You’re playing … a girl … wait … you’re playing a girl
who’s playing … a man … who’s playing a woman. I get it. Okay. I don’t
understand this play. It must be very strange.
Me: It is very strange, but it’s …
DP: But you’re also creating a piece … a, like a, disser … a report or
something?
Me: I’m creating a performance that’s … basically I’m creating a
character from a bunch of different interviews.
DP: And you’re gonna use this character in this play.
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Me: Exactly.
DP: But the play’s already been written.
Me: Uh-huh!
DP: Okay.
Me: But the performance hasn’t. It’s a separate … It’s a separate thing
from the play. But … yeah. That’s … that’s what I’m doing.
- from a telephone interview with a Los Angeles-based drag
performer
We got possibilities, little fella, endless possibilities.
- Tina Coo, from The
Strip
Concocting an imagined persona (particularly while paying particular attention to
gender) by piecing together a series of interactions with people and images—both
fictional and real—is a theatrical and queer endeavor that involves desiring, fantasizing
about, and eventually believing that one can take on the identity of a person entirely
different than oneself. It is also human: everybody does it, even the most heterosexual
and masculine of men. As a drag performer I interviewed in connection with this chapter
phrased it, “I think a lot of boys, when they’re young, they study the guys they wish they
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were like, you know, the tough guys, and that whole tough guy thing is learned, it’s not
natural. It’s from children studying the football players and the movie stars.” This
cobbling together of an identity requires the embodied work and energy of re-enactment
and imitation, and it also relies on the great physical pleasure and joy of interacting with,
observing closely and listening to other people’s bodies. It is theatrical, and at the same
time “does something;” it is both entertaining and serious business, imaginative and real.
In this chapter, I theorize how my own work building the identity of Ava Coo in
Phyllis Nagy’s The Strip through re-enacting pieces of a series of interviews in the
framework of a solo collage-like portrait of her character was an attempt to naturalize
queerness, difference, and theatricality as universally human qualities. At the same time, I
hope to reveal how the same process queers the traditionally “bourgeois humanist” and
masculinist process of building a nation that does something. Ultimately, I am suggesting
that universalizing queerness is the key to achieving Hardt and Negri’s idea of a
Multitude that works to embody a world that embraces difference, pleasure and love
rather than money and private property.
Theatre is Okay for Girls
Since modernism shifted the focus from deities and more-than-human monarchs
to other “regular” human beings as models for behavior, actors have become increasingly
important sources from which people learn how to shape and move their bodies in
accordance with the laws of masculinity or femininity. Consequently, the actual tools
used by actors to create public personae and fictional characters are among the most
significant means of spreading ideologies of gender. During the spring semester of 2002,
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as I was preparing to play Mr. Darling and Captain Hook in the U.T. Department of
Theatre and Dance production of Peter Pan, I went to buy a Ben Nye makeup kit (the
standard makeup used by most actors), as suggested by the department’s costume area. I
stood at the counter at The Bazaar, a costume shop in south Austin, and looked in awe at
the array of false eyelashes and beautiful wigs styled into complicated up-dos, and
thought that this must, without saying so on the sign, be a shop for drag queens and
strippers, built to suit the needs of those who wanted to convert their usual bodies into
over-the-top femaleness by adorning them with the glittering equipment of their trades.
I asked the man behind the counter for the size kit I could afford (transforming
one’s body comes at no cheap price), and he looked through his stock until he found the
one most clearly suited for me: the one with “white female” marked boldly on the side in
black sharpie. “How odd,” I thought, “that the reason I’m buying this kit from this store
is to better convert my white female body into two different white males.” It made me
think about all of the tools I use as an actor and the assumptions behind those tools: how
putting them on, like makeup, is usually geared towards helping me reproduce the
particular categories of gender and race to which my body dictates I am most suited; and
how knowing this might just make it possible for me to actually use the tools I have to
question and subvert the rules of the identity I might be expected to take on rather than
reinforcing them.
In the previous chapter I dealt with the broader pedagogical implications of using
this interview-based “experiential” process with actors working on a play that was about
nationalism and colonization in a time of war and the effects such concepts and events
225
have on people’s gendered bodies. Through experimenting with this interview-and-solo-
performance based process from the position of director while working on The Trojan
Women, I started to get some idea of what kinds of meanings it produced while I
considered the overall picture of the production. But, as an actor, I also wanted to try the
process on my own body: I wanted to see if and how working in this way felt different
from my usual set of tools. I have an ongoing investment in addressing the problem
Lauren Love raises in her essay “Resisting the ‘Organic’: A Feminist Actor’s Approach”:
As a feminist actor, my performance experiences in conventional theatre
grow increasingly frustrating, because my corporeal presence within its
representational frames demands my complicity with an ideology I seek to
resist. … Given this, how do I reconcile my politics with my work as an
actor in conventional theatre? (275)
While the previous experiment with this process was focused on pedagogy and training
(the actors were all undergraduate students, many of them theatre majors, and so I was
positioned as something like a teacher as well as the director of the production), I also
wondered how I could begin to propose this process as a supplementary one for
individual actors working in more traditional rehearsal environments. That is, I wanted to
see how it might be meaningful or helpful when used in a context that was not dedicated
exclusively to working with community-based interviewing and solo performance in
order to see what problems might arise for actors who are interested in making their
professional work more socially engaged. While the work I did was not in a professional
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context, in this chapter I begin to examine how an individual actor might use this multi-
faceted process as a means of critiquing normative rules of gender and sexuality.
After I had begun to take interest in this ethnographic/oral history/solo
performance approach to training actors, a colleague of mine in the PhD program at The
University of Texas, Chase Bringardner, announced that he would be directing Phyllis
Nagy’s play The Strip as a Laboratory Theatre production. As was the case with the
mostly cross-gender cast production of Peter Pan I mentioned above, the opportunity to
work on this particular play was in part a result of my placement in the recently
established Performance as Public Practice program at UT. Because the director was a
student in the same doctoral program of which I was a part, he shared my interests in
finding new ways to combine critical theory and performance practice, and was
extremely cooperative and encouraging regarding the work I was doing. I went through
the audition process with other people, but was also able to explain my reasoning for
wanting to play the part of Ava Coo: the role of a woman who dreams of a successful
career as a drag queen coincided particularly well with my research interests.
I mention this because in some sense, my own subjectivity has been formed in an
environment that directly inverts the typical problem for women working in professional
theatre. If an actor is typically imagined as merely a vehicle for the words and ideas of a
playwright, she is often limited to reproducing certain kinds of roles in the interest of
making money. I was in an academic situation in which people were devoted to questions
of identity, social engagement and the role of artists as public intellectuals, and so in
some ways the development of this process acting was the result of the ideological
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framework with which I was surrounded. At the same time, I chose this particular
program because of questions and concerns I already had about acting and being an
actor.7 Like Stanislavski, then, whose experiments with acting were inspired by problems
presented by the dramaturgy and content of particular plays but whose interests extended
well beyond those contexts, I am assuming that this way of working can be adapted for
use on plays with other kinds of content and form, and will produce different meanings
together with those texts. In other words, I see myself both as a product of my given
circumstances and an agent trying to turn what I have learned into an emergent set of
tools that is transmissible to other contexts.
Phyllis Nagy is certainly an appropriate playwright to choose to provide a literary
framework within which to explore a process that is concerned with negotiating
boundaries in global geographic terms as well as in terms of gender politics and queer
7 Again, it was significant that this was a Lab production, outside the purview of
the regular production season in the Theatre and Dance Department: this project was
situated more “outside” the realm of the regular production season than The Trojan
Women had been. The Laboratory Theatre was used during the day as a classroom and in
the evenings as a performance venue. But, unlike the Payne and Brockett Theatres that
were dedicated to training students on a professional track (usually MFA designers,
directors and actors, and undergraduate theatre majors) a significant portion of the Lab’s
season was set aside for experimental student productions. These productions received no
financial support from the department, but there was an application process and
productions had to be approved by a faculty committee. In a sense, the Lab was the “Off-
Broadway” or even “Off-Off Broadway” venue of the department, whose pedagogical
function was less professional in nature and therefore made room for a wider range of
script choices, experimentation in production practices and in-depth intellectual
investigations of a different kind than might happen in an official departmental
production.
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theory. Nagy was born in New York but took up permanent residence in London as a
writer for the Royal Court Theatre in the early 1990s, and so questions of national
identity and traveling between countries or cities (as well as across time) are significant
in her work. In addition, Elaine Aston places her historically among young British
women playwrights who, while they represent lesbian characters in their work, are
involved in questioning the idea of identity based on sexuality or gender. Aston contrasts
Nagy with playwright Bryony Lavery, whose ongoing concern has been with lesbian and
gay politics, writing that, “Nagy, on the other hand, tends to contest gay and feminist
orthodoxies in the interests of stirring up gender trouble. Her theatre is less about
claiming an identity than exploring the possibilities that arise when identity gets
displaced” (100). Nagy’s play is, in this sense, aligned with the theories of materialist
feminism and queer activism, for which, as Dolan writes, “The assertion of identity is not
the goal, as it is in feminist identity politics, but a point of departure for a multivalent,
shifting ground of subjectivity….Identity becomes a site of struggle, at which the subject
organizes and reorganizes competing discourses as they fight for supremacy” (Feminist
Spectator 88). For an actor this poses a compelling challenge: how does a person who is
supposedly in the business of building an identity work on a script that is about taking
identities apart?
In this chapter, I describe my approach to constructing Ava Coo, a character
whose life is shaped by her experimental performance of gender, her ongoing need to
become an individual person of significance with something important to say, and—
surprisingly enough to her—her body’s desire for physical comfort, pleasure and love.
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Through the work I did on this character, I started to recognize how my interest in this
process of character development was influenced by my background in feminist theory,
gender performativity and camp, and also by queer sexuality; I noticed a number of ways
in which developing a character intertextually with regards to gender overlaps with the
history of drag, specifically with the practice of men piecing together and performing a
feminine identity that is ostensibly opposite their biological sex. As Esther Newton puts
it, “The effect of the drag system is to wrench the sex roles loose from that which
supposedly determines them, that is, genital sex. Gay people know that sex-typed
behavior can be achieved, contrary to what is popularly believed. They know that the
possession of one type of genital equipment by no means guarantees the ‘naturally
appropriate’ behavior” (21). The Strip makes clear how this practice can be useful, also,
as a feminist practice: it begins with a telling line from the play’s mysterious catalyst,
Otto Mink: “Female impersonation is a rather curious career choice for a woman, Miss
Coo.” Ava Coo, a woman who dreams of a career as a drag queen, is driven by a desire to
succeed, but her particularly queer variety of “success” is in some ways determined by
the ambiguously gendered dictates of her body:
I don’t really look like a girl. I’m too … something. I mean, I got big tits
but they look fake, or so this guy from Hoboken told me. I went to beauty
school with this drag queen, Tina, and I think I kind of look like her so …
so. It was this or Star Search. I figure the TV camera doesn’t lie, but
maybe a smoky scuzzy club full of drunken queens will (185).
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Because her actual body doesn’t fit the version of femininity sold by the television as
“real,” she learns to choose an environment in which her failure to be a typically
beautiful, feminine woman works in her favor. So while she is technically the “right” sex
to play a woman, she borrows the practice of drag as a means of pointing out that even
most women have to perform their gender in one way or another.
In preparation for playing the role of Ava Coo, I hoped to see what happened if I
attempted consciously (and also in some ways unconsciously) to construct her through a
series of “real” interactions with people whose experiences intersected with her fictional
ones, rather than relying exclusively on abstract or consistent ideas of who her character
might be psychologically. My interviewing process was based on themes from the play
that I wanted to explore through the development of this character: drag
performance/gender performativity—an examination of hybridity and border-crossing
regarding gender and sexuality; and a more literal discussion of travel and border
crossing involving people who had been on road trips. My starting point for these
interviews was less than ideal, as far as community-based processes go. I didn’t have a
specific community whose issues the performance was attempting to address. But my
attempts to find people to participate in the project reflected Ava Coo’s meetings and
interactions in the play: I found the people with whom I would work by chance. I sent
emails explaining the process, and the people who responded were colleagues, friends, or
friends of friends. One was a colleague who had traveled to Slovenia and crossed the
border to Croatia; another was a friend whose experiences intersected with both
questions: she worked in the sex industry and, while she had previously considered
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herself somewhat “butch,” learned to put on femininity as a costume. She had also
undertaken a long road trip across country that she considered a kind of “coming of age”
experience. The other two were drag performers: one whose work I was able to see in
person, and the other (with whom I was put in touch by a person responding to a mass
email) who lives in Los Angeles and has a very specific character he had been
performing for years. By building Ava Coo through my interactions with these people, I
intended to create, with my body, a person who was not driven by one consistent thing
but multiple, contradictory ones; and who was not successful in conforming to an “idea”
of identity, but was constantly changing and becoming something different through her
historical interactions with other people.
Nationhood, Gender and “Acting”
Inspired by Elin Diamond’s theory of identity as a history of identifications, the
interview-and-solo-performance based process I discuss is dedicated to re-imagining
actors’ bodies using a model that is multivocal, always in process, and a means of
emphasizing the interaction of various people who comprise one person’s identity. I was
also inspired by reading Howard Zinn’s The People’s History of the United States and
The Voices of the People’s History of the United States, in which he writes the history of
this country that emphasizes the internal conflicts and interaction among different classes
of people that make up the nation; he also offers pieces of the experiential stories of the
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people involved in those interactions.8 Near the beginning of The People’s History, Zinn
writes that “The colonies, it seems, were societies of contending classes—a fact obscured
by the emphasis, in traditional histories, on the external struggle against England, the
unity of colonists in the Revolution. The country therefore was not ‘born free,’ but born
slave and free, servant and master, tenant and landlord, poor and rich” (50). The writing
of history, it seems, often focuses on external conflict between supposedly unified nations
in much the same way that traditional actor training in the United States emphasizes
conflicting desires between individual characters. If identity politics based on gender and
sexuality can be understood to classify people according to gender and sexual practice as
a way of struggling against an external “dominant” straight white masculinist culture,
materialist feminism and queer theory, in questioning categories of “Women,” or “Men,”
“Gay,” “Lesbian” or “Straight,” addresses differences based on race and ethnicity,
economic class and other elements of social existence within and among what were
previously considered unified biological identities.
8 I might, of course, have chosen any of a number of political theorists, historians,
anthropologists or sociologists writing about resistant practices, alternative nations or
coalitional politics, but when I began working I was reminded that I had never read
Zinn’s books. I picked them up to read for pleasure and to redress this lack in my
(typically American) history education, and found that they were entirely appropriate to
what I wanted to say about acting. I am particularly drawn to Zinn because of his populist
approach and the generosity of his writing: he writes history for the people about whom
he writes in a way that is broadly accessible. I have also chosen him because of his
reputation as both a 1960s-era political activist who resists from the “outside” and a best-
selling author who has learned to work within the contemporary capitalist system of
exchanging information.
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The usual understanding of Stanislavski-based acting relies on a humanist concept
of internally-based, stable identity and action that is akin to theories of nationalism, and
that view of acting in association with realist dramaturgy has been questioned (as I have
pointed out in previous chapters) most frequently by Marxist scholars and feminists,
whose goals as theater scholars and artists are analogous to Zinn’s attempts to give voice
to under-represented or misrepresented populations. I am proposing that actors might
imagine that the way Zinn writes history—admitting the existence of a nation called the
United States that is engaged in struggles against other nations, but focusing on the
difference within that nation—might be akin to their process of building a seemingly
individual character (who is eventually engaged externally with other characters) through
their bodies. Using metaphors of the body for national and political purposes is nothing
new: people speak of the “body politic” for example, and the “health of the state” or “the
long arm of the law.” My interest is in turning those metaphors around: considering each
actor’s individual body as what once might have been seen as a separate nation, but also
proposing an understanding of the actor’s body that reflects somewhat of a contemporary
global humanist—and ultimately queer—understanding. That is, I want to propose that
the actor’s body can reflect a new metaphor that transforms the rigid boundaries of
containment to more fluid and interactive concepts, and at the same time preserves the
strength of claiming human agency.
Gender and sexuality are both important identifying factors determining the
modernist “with us or against us” construction that defined (and in many ways still
defines) the United States as a nation. In order to live within the protective container of
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Americanism and participate in the prosperity of this country, men and women need to
look and behave a certain way. The idea of America as a container for people who
possess certain characteristics, hold defined set of values, and behave in a particular way
works well in the service of colonization and control: “America desires this country’s
resources. This country’s population is culturally different than most Americans, and is
resistant to being taken over. America has to use two tactics: active physical force and
domination, and deception to convince this population of their similarity to ‘all people.’”
I have deliberately used the term “tactics,” which is typical language of “acting,” here,
because it is not only the process of defining a nation’s boundaries and creating an
identity that is exclusionary and destructive, but also what that nation does in relationship
to people who do not live within its protective container that perpetuates suffering and
inequality. Nationalism requires a somewhat theatrical process of manufacturing an
identity and making that nation’s existence believable, and at the same time calls for the
mobilization of that identity—doing something—with a particular goal in mind.
Because it results in deliberate and unreflective action against “outsiders,” the
containment metaphor requires anyone who doesn’t wish to accept his or her own
“sameness” to take a deliberate stance of resistance outside of the dominant and exert a
great deal of effort resisting its attempts to either incorporate or destroy his or her
identity. The recent debates over marriage are a perfect example of this issue: a recent
New York Times article began with the sentence “New Jersey’s highest court ruled on
Wednesday that gay couples are entitled to the same legal rights and financial benefits as
heterosexual couples, but split over whether their unions must be called marriage or could
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be known by another name, handing that question to the Legislature”
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/nyregion/26marriagecnd.html). The idea that
marriage is “normal” and therefore legally reserved only for people who remain within
the bounds of properly gendered heterosexual behavior is an attempt to preserve the rules
that determine what is or is not a legitimately American way to behave. It seems like a
small matter, but has major performative consequences: gays and lesbians are forced into
a sort of “separate but equal” situation if they wish to participate in certain legal and
financial benefits, and as a result reinforce the concept that there is an “inside” and
“outside,” a “normal” and “abnormal,” that makes discriminatory thoughts and practices
still viable. The laws regulating gender and sexuality are, of course, the central concerns
of feminist and queer activists whose lives are directly affected by how gendered and
sexualized bodies and their activities are perceived and controlled. Women, lesbians,
bisexuals, gay men, transgendered people, and in general people who define themselves
as “queer” are among the marginalized groups who are historically under- or
misrepresented, and whose interests and physical and emotional wellbeing frequently
continue to suffer by their perceived lack of agency in the writing of history and shaping
of the world.
Actors, as I have pointed out in earlier chapters, are also overlooked as potential
historical agents: in some sense, actors’ marginalized social status and their close
historical association with the body and sexuality marks them as queer or, to a certain
extent, feminizes them. “Men act,” says Ray Bob in the first act of Charles Mee’s The
Trojan Women, “We know this. Attach no value to it, particularly. To act is to be. No
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more, no less.” This concept—naturalizing deliberate, immediate and unreflective action
and making it seem necessary to masculine identity—is repeated again in the second act
when Aeneas says to Dido, “Men are meant to DO something, or else they just never
existed.” The word “act,” in this case, refers to the exertion of power in expectation of an
effect, or, as Webster’s dictionary defines it, “to carry into effect the determination of
will.” This distinction is important to make, considering that the meaning of acting in the
“Other” or theatrical sense, as Stephen Bottoms observes, connotes the opposite of virile
masculinity;
Theatre may be ‘okay for girls,”—but, as is still apparent from the grossly
disproportionate ratio of female to male applications to most theatre
programs—it is simply not something that “real men” do. To act, to play a
part, to dress up in tights is not properly manly, entailing as it does the
‘unnatural’ construction of a presentational artifice (such ostentation being
traditionally assumed to be more ‘naturally’ the preserve of women). To
be involved in theatre is—ergo—to be feminized, if not downright
effeminate. (176).
Action in the Austinian performative sense, then— “real” acting—is work, and the
purview of straight men, and “fake” acting in the theatre is the nonprocreative play of
women and gay men. Again, the idea of who owns the “legitimate” or “real” is reinforced
by a metaphoric structure that requires people to choose one identity-“performance” as
action -or another-acting as “theatre.”
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If the practice of theatre itself can be thought of as existing outside of dominant
culture and in that sense imagined as a separate nation or identity group, it is certainly a
conflicted and queer one, full of all sorts of gender trouble on a theoretical plane. Stephen
Bottoms contends that Theatre Studies, the more commercial and “entertaining” of the
two camps, has recently been categorized as feminine and (in Richard Schechner’s terms)
“homosexual,” and supposedly less than efficacious, and Performance Studies is seen as
more masculine in its association with action and change. But it is Theatre and its
association with the Method’s allegiance to authenticity and action that is often
masculinized within academia, and with which many feminist and queer theorists have
taken issue. The primary concept of identity in the theatre in a traditional sense is usually
thought to be the human being as a “desiring machine,” as Colin Counsell elegantly
phrased it, taking action based on his or her needs—much like the men in Mee’s play
who were meant to DO something. However the real “truth” of the character’s actions is
understood to originate in the words of the playwright rather than in the body of the actor.
In feminist and psychoanalytic terms, then, the actor is feminized in his or her association
with feeling and the body, but—as was clarified by the forum of actors in the first
chapter—it is the playwright’s words that shape the body into its “authentic” form, and it
is the playwright who makes change possible. The playwright is masculinized in his or
her association with words and agency. In this case, the authenticity and realness of
actors’ performances serves to reinforce the illusion that people are free to shape their
own identities, rather than to expose the pressures enforced by the social scripts inherited
by virtue of their gender, race, ethnicity, sexual practice, etc. However, while in theatre
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the playwright can be clearly identified as the author of the action and the actor as the
person who carries out that script, in regular social situations the agent defining gender is
less identifiable—who chooses and changes the given circumstances that are masculine
and feminine qualities?
Considering the gendered aspects of actor training as a separate area of
scholarship, the Performance Studies side is the one that takes on a more feminine cast:
the kinds of training that have been embraced as “performance” are not couched in the
masculinist and humanist language of objective, obstacle and action. In addition, Bottoms
notes that queer theory has tended to side with Performance Studies (performance art by
women and queer artists is rarely termed “theatre” although much of it takes place in
theatres and uses theatrical elements), but he questions,
whether or not gay and lesbian concerns have had, in effect, to
present themselves as dynamically subversive of the ruling order in
order to find this accommodation within our disciplinary
paradigms. This is not to say that homosexuality is not always, to
some degree, subversive in a heterosexual world. Yet there is,
perhaps, a certain pressure to dress up in macho drag, to appear
queerly virile (183).
As I noted in previous chapters, many of the precursors to Performance Studies in the
realm of experimental theatre—groups like Schechner’s own Performance Group, Beck
and Malina’s Living Theatre and Joseph Chaikin and The Open Theatre—dealt more
often with “physical actor training” that emphasizes ensemble playing and physical
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movement, and avoid psychological analysis. They placed an emphasis on the body
rather than playwrights’ words as the source of the “real.” Their inspiration in the realm
of dramatic theory—Artaud and Grotowski—while they themselves were men, took
interest in the ritualistic elements of theatre and felt that the reliance on the “logos” of
canonical masterpieces had to be eliminated in order to access truth. Often, queer
theorists associated with performance studies and performance art focus on the body as a
source of change, action and transformation and devalue plays. Who and what, then, is
feminine and who and what is masculine within actor training? Is action and change
feminine and queer, or is it masculine and heterosexual? Is the deliberate construction of
identity always gay, or does everyone engage in that theatrical practice? Gender is all
mixed up, here, and the answers to these questions become merely a matter of how one
frames experience.
My interest in pointing out all of these contradictions within theoretical
applications of gender to theatre and performance is not to prove or disprove any of them,
nor to offer a new way of assigning gender to theatre/performance or actors themselves.
Rather, I mean to point out that the “undefining” of gender and sexuality that happens
when one looks more closely at how people choose to call certain elements of theatre or
performance masculine or feminine reveals why the realm of acting is fertile ground for
re-framing conversations about gender. This chapter introduces the possibility that the
“experiential” and interactional process of actor training in which I am interested serves
to destabilize gender by productively combining elements of both the theoretical
“masculine” and “feminine.” At the same time, because it involves a physical interaction,
240
in some sense this process puts the “sex” back into gender; it allows for the possibility
that physical desire—not only desire in a Freudian sense of libidinous drives (although
that is undoubtedly important sometimes), but the desire for one’s body to experience the
pleasure of love, security and comfort rather than simply conflict and the power of
“winning”—often drive a character’s choice of how he or she performs gender.
The Body as a Given Circumstance
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, what Jill Dolan defines as cultural or “radical”
feminism connected femininity directly with biology and valorized women’s bodies:
“Cultural feminists … elide the difference between sex and gender. In their analysis, the
biological basis of women’s difference from men—primarily focused on their
reproductive capabilities—gives rise to a formulation of femininity as innate and
inherently superior to masculinity” (Feminist Spectator 6). Cultural feminism, then, was a
kind of alternative nationalism that celebrated the feminine body as a site of a stable and
identifiable gender identity. Judith Butler is perhaps the most oft-cited theorist who
focuses specifically on the performativity of gender and sexuality, or how the rules
governing “men” and “women,” “straight,” “gay,” and “lesbian” are reproduced through
bodies doing actions according to certain juridical formations. Initially, in Gender
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Butler proposed a definition of gender
as the social iteration of sex; she called it the
stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of
substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy of gender
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ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance
of gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts
within the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the
social appearance of gender. (33)
She maintains that if the illusion of naturalness is revealed to be the result of various
interacting coercive systems, one might introduce a subversive variation in the repeated
acts that constitute gender. In other words, gender is not biological but an elaborate social
performance. But while it is not “natural,” gender is nonetheless “policed”—the choices
one has in performing gender are limited by the social expectations placed on a person
because of her biological sex. Choosing to defy those expectations carries consequences.
Drag is possible, then, but its subversion of the rules of dominant ideology marks one as
“excessive” or “theatrical” or an “outsider.”
In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler expands on her complicated thesis to clarify
some questionable issues: first, she acknowledges that, as a person trained in the field of
philosophy, she has in the past spoken of the body abstractly, avoiding what theatre
scholar Stanton Garner, in Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in
Contemporary Drama, terms the “problematic facticity” of physical presence. She
acknowledges a problem with considering gender as purely a social phenomenon: “the
social construction of the natural presupposes the cancellation of the natural by the
social” (Bodies 5), and it is the “natural,” the biological body, with which femininity has
been traditionally aligned (and consequently maligned). Butler’s concept of
performativity engages closely with psychoanalysis, linguistics and poststructuralism in
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order to grapple with the “inside/outside” binary with regards to gender, and she
emphasizes that Irigaray’s concerns were with the fact that “women,” as a category, are
historically the unintelligible Other—the Lacanian “lack”—that must be colonized,
defined and spoken for by the masculine “Logos.” In terms of the “containment”
metaphor outlined by Lakoff and Johnson and applied to Cold War theatre by Bruce
McConachie, the feminine in its location outside the container of a masculine “norm”
poses a threat, as the body poses a threat because it has traditionally been understood to
rest outside of the realm of logic, and presupposes movement and change.
While Butler herself brackets theatre in her discussion of gender performativity, I
cite her at length because her concerns and arguments extend the issues for actors I have
been discussing into the realm of gender and sexuality, and also reiterate the questions I
have been exploring thus far. Trained as a philosopher, she might seem able to sidestep
the actual materiality of the body that seems to exist whether or not it is “intelligible” in a
theoretical sense, an actor must always deal with the matter of the body directly, both
before (in training) and during (in rehearsal and performance) the process of fitting it into
a set of “compulsory frames.” In the introduction to Bodies That Matter, Butler states that
“If gender is the social construction of sex, and if there is no access to this sex except by
means of its construction, then it appears not only that sex is absorbed by gender, but that
‘sex’ becomes something like a fiction, perhaps a fantasy, retroactively installed at a
prelinguistic site to which there is no direct access” (5). The practice for actors (although
their bodies have likely been inscribed with a particular gender), is the opposite of what
Butler describes … the play’s words are clearly the “fiction,” the imagined possibility,
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but their “real” physical bodies undeniably exist prior to the circumstances of the play
into which they must be fit. It was this problem … how to willfully shape the body to fit
the words that created a character … with which Stanislavski began to grapple, for
example. For the actor, the body is an obvious, messy, unwieldy and problematic fact,
and how best to cope with that fact in the context of a script of one kind or another is
what his or her intellectual and physical project involves. As Elin Diamond points out,
this is why theatre can be such a powerful place for examining the processes and rules of
gender and sexuality.
The idea of a unified identity is both upheld and belied by the presence of a live
body. In an essay entitled “Identity’s Body,” Sidonie Smith addresses the idea of
autobiography and bodies, posing the question “What does skin have to do with
autobiography and autobiography with skin?” (267). She writes,
… the body only seems to anchor us in a finite, discrete, unified
surround—a private surround, temptingly stable and impermeable. There
is only apparent continuity since, paradoxically, bodies, at once so close to
us as to seem indissoluble from a notion of “me” or “I,” can also disrupt
the too-easy stability of singular identities (Martin 81). The bodily home
can be an illusive terrain, perhaps the home of a stranger. If it is only
apparently continuous with our identity or identification as an individual,
then the politics of the body can open up a space of contradiction, drift,
homelessness, a gap through which a complex heterogeneity destabilizes
our sense of any stable identification. (267)
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Smith’s description, here, coincides closely with Antonio Damasio’s understanding of
body as an “organic whole,” which is different than the “commodity” concept of unity.
That is, human beings have bodies, and our bodies are, to some degree, similar: they are
the same in their difference and interconnectedness. Each body is a system that lives,
breathes and changes, sometimes contradicting itself, and is part of a larger interactive
system that is also moving and changing.
Pleasure, Desire and the Invention of Self in The Strip
The Strip and the interviewing process with which I am beginning to experiment
hinge on what seems to be a particularly queer question about the presence of the body
for an actor: what role does physical pleasure and desire—both sexual and otherwise—
play in both invention of self and the inevitable ongoing changes of the body? In addition
to gender performativity, the concept of the materiality and pleasure of people’s bodies
with relation to queer sexuality is essential to the question of how this process of acting
allows for the possibility of human agency without lapsing back into the ideals of
bourgeois humanism or capitalist models of power and success. Essentially, the idea is
that one’s body can and does find physical pleasure and comfort in embodied exchanges
with other people (“I love to listen to your voice”), and that it can be the biological (and
human) drive toward this pleasure (as opposed to interpellation into dominant ideology)
that often compels one’s performance of identity.
The structure of Nagy’s play replaces the cause-and-effect logic of realism with a
dramaturgy of chance combined with embodied desire. Each character is on a journey set
in motion by Otto Mink, but the paths they take change somewhat based on the people
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they meet along the way and, importantly, the physical reactions they have to those
people.9 Aston points out that The Strip bothered critics because it evaded their attempts
9 The opening montage of the play emphasizes the interconnectedness of all the
characters’ lives, and at the same time makes clear the importance and difference of live
theatre. While in a film montage each location would likely be shown in sequence, all
activities in all locations—London, Las Vegas, Long Island; nightclubs, casinos and
apartments—are seen at once. On the small lab theatre stage, this might have had a
“global” effect, showing how each individual scene and location connected with all of the
others. In addition, scenes in The Strip are not intended to follow one after the other with
clear distinctions in between. Nagy writes that “Scenes should begin and end in overlap;
that is, except where indicated, there is never a blackout and the action of those on stage
is continuous. It is possible that the physical action of any scene begins before its
preceding scene ends, and so on” (182). The setting as Nagy describes it is supposed to
be “A fluid, non-naturalistic landscape dominated by an enormous three-dimensional re-
creation of Sphinx and pyramid which represents the exterior of the Luxor Hotel, Las
Vegas, Nevada. It never leaves the stage" (183). Since there was no budget for set design
or construction in our production, the reference to the Luxor Hotel and direct image of
Las Vegas did not dominate the production. The “fluid, non-naturalistic landscape” was
easily possible, however, and because of the small, intimate stage and the bare minimum
set, the effect was an emphasis on the close interconnectedness of people’s lives and
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to summarize its plot, and both she and Michael Coveney (who wrote the introduction to
Nagy’s collection Plays: I) draw parallels between the related-but-separate plot lines of
Nagy’s writing and that of Shakespeare. As Aston emphasizes, however, while
Shakespeare’s comedies strive for harmony and re-establishment of order at the end, The
Strip takes apart the normal order and shakes it up so people make different, new, and
unexpected connections, so that when they finally come together in the same location at
the end of the play, it is unclear what order will result from some of these reunions: all
we are left with are “endless possibilities” and a great deal of hope for a different and
better world.
What Aston calls the undoing of the characters’ identities I would define as the
kind of complication and depth that begins with the pleasure of physical interaction and
develops into deeper connections that result in transformation. This is not to say that the
characters abandon their notions of identity: it is impossible for them to completely
disregard the cultural scripts that have been written for them or the roles they have
imagined for themselves. But what Lakoff and Johnson might call the “experiential
evidence” of their bodies’ interactions or what Elin Diamond might refer to as their
“history of identifications” transform the templates of their identities into something
experiences despite the fact that story lines take place in different parts of the world. The
context of the production highlighted both the global/international themes of the script
(the way people’s relationships can exist across geographic and historical borders) and
the physical ones (the way people’s identities are changed by direct interaction with the
physical bodies of other people).
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more inclusive and complex. When Loretta and the handsome Tom meet in his jewelry
shop, for example, she has him place her engagement ring on back on her finger after he
has examined it and suggested that it is not a real diamond. He does so, and the mere
physical performance of that act “makes her day”: the memory of her husband having
done the same brings her great pleasure, and she begins a close connection with Tom.
Loretta—whose husband Lester has grown “mean” and is intolerant, racist and
homophobic—doesn’t discover until later that Tom is gay, by which time the two have
become fast friends. The interaction of their two bodies – and the comfort, strength and
pleasure that connection brings them—changes both for the better; the two remain
different, but can make a human, empathic and ultimately physical connection that allows
them to live with and enjoy that difference. Loretta even invites Tom home with her to
open his own beauty salon and capitalize on his difference: “There’s no gay running a
beauty salon in Roanoke, Tom, believe me. It’d be kinda like a monopoly” (250).
Lester Marquette, Loretta’s fugitive husband, begins the play staring at “a couple
of homos” whose activities he can see through the window of his hotel room. In another
compelling turn of events, he meets one of the homos—Tom’s obnoxiously dominating
partner Martin, who suffers from a mysterious illness that may explain why he is
obsessed with controlling his body through exercise—at a bar. Nagy effectively queers
southern “old boy” culture in this scene, as Tom, unaware that he has stumbled into a gay
bar, compares it to his favorite watering hole at home, “the only place in the entire
Shenandoah Valley where a fella can hook up with his buddies, take a break from the
missus and the kids. Relax. Shoot some pool” (207). The two strike up a physical
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relationship in which Martin consistently demonstrates his physical power over Lester: he
beats him at arm wrestling, he grabs his testicles as he forces him into a painful weight-
lifting session, and, eventually, he grabs and kisses him. Later, the typically homophobic
and violently racist Lester admits the power that Martin (whose political views conflict
with his own, but who shares Lester’s intense devotion to masculinity) has gained over
him: “I can’t leave Martin. I hate him, but every time I get up to walk out that door, I
think, hey, man, you gotta do a few more dishes or there’s dust under the couch I got to
clean up. … I wanna strangle him and kind of like, you know, hang out with him … All
at the same time (251).
Ava Coo’s transformation happens in a similar way. From the beginning, she is
driven by her desire to succeed as a female impersonator, and goes on a journey to find a
club called Tumbleweed Junction, where the mysterious Otto Mink has suggested she
might find her calling despite her lack of “talent.” She travels with Calvin Higgins, a
lovestruck man obsessed with representations of history, who is ostensibly there to
repossess her car but ends up calling her attention to what it means to have someone—
Kate, specifically, as well as her mother and Calvin himself— care about her.
The scenes between Ava Coo and her mother, Tina, are particularly compelling in
this regard. Unbeknownst to Ava, Tina is working at Tumbleweed Junction, her ultimate
destination, as a cleaning lady. While Ava is on her trek across the country, the two speak
once over the telephone, but according to Ava have a shaky connection. While Tina is in
her trailer in Las Vegas, Ava is at Kate Buck’s apartment halfway across the country, but
the two are both visible to the audience. Nagy gives the stage direction that the activities
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the two are performing as they speak on the phone—Tina chopping vegetables and Ava
drinking whiskey—intensify over the course of the conversation. The strong physical
relationship between mother and daughter is emphasized in this scene, as Tina magically
seems to know where her daughter is, how she is looking, and even what she is wearing,
although Ava has made no mention of those things. Again, this exchange is a
pleasureable one for Tina. She says to Ava, “It’s nice hearing your voice.” In fact, shortly
after this conversation, Kate reveals that the phone has been out of commission for quite
a while—the connection the two had was made in some mysterious way.
In another scene, Ava and Calvin are standing at the side of the road as she sorts
through outfits for her club act as Tina scrubs the floor and records a letter to Ava into a
Dictaphone. The director of our production staged it so that we were on opposite sides of
the stage, and as Tina’s news of how things in her life had taken a turn for the worse
intensified, Ava became more and more agitated and angry in her conversation with
Calvin, suggesting that she and her mother have a strong connection that somehow defies
physical distance. It is at the end of this scene that Calvin points out Ava’s major flaw:
“Why do you never notice when people care for you, Ava?” (246). Ava’s
transformation—learning to accept how essential the people who care about her are to her
identity—begins with this scene.
While Ava’s performance of gender begins as a desire for fame and a nebulous
kind of “success” at being somebody who people pay to see perform, the more she travels
and learns and fails to achieve her financial goals, her predetermined ideas of who she is
fall apart. Through experience, she begins to understand her need for and the
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transformative power of physical desire and connection. Perhaps the most significant
thing that happens in her travels is that Ava meets Kate Buck, who on first impression
she pegs as a psychotic lesbian. Based on what she has learned should be her reaction to
such a person, Ava immediately decides she hates Kate, but at the end of the play’s first
act the two make a physical connection that confuses Ava’s initial reactions. She explains
at the end of the play,
I thought I hated her a lot, but then she scratched my back and I felt, I
don’t know, a connection, a safety, and it was confusing to me because I
thought I hated her, and … I mean it wasn’t sexual or nothin’, because…
aw, fuck, what do I know about sex anyway? I’m just some chick who
pretends to be a chick so people’ll look at me in a different light, so,
Christ, you know, what’s that about? (258)
It is through her connection with Kate’s body, and the surprising, unexpected comfort
and sexual desire she gains from it, that Ava becomes a different person. She begins to
learn that fulfillment, identity, approval and love, don’t come from achieving some
perfect ideal of success, but from accepting real contact with other people. The traces of
her past interactions – with her mother, Kate, Calvin, the drag queen Tina who inspired
her search for a career – are all contained in her body and in combination create her (ever
changing) identity. Combining queer desire with a more global, humanist concept of the
body bases the agency through which gender identity is often compelled on pleasure and
love rather than on productivity, mainstream acceptance or financial growth.
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Identification, then, is less sinister when it is based in joy or comfort rather than
exploitation and unchecked capitalism that puts money and power in the hands of a few.
Constructing an Identity Through Imagination and Action
The question of agency is important in Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter: who
controls the iterations and re-iterations of gender? She writes,
If gender is a construction, must there be an ‘I’ or a ‘we’ who enacts or
performs that construction? How can there be an activity, a constructing,
without presupposing an agent who precedes and performs that activity?
How would we account for the motivation and direction of construction
without such a subject? (7)
This question is one that was crucial in postmodern identity-based art: how can a person
shaped by a number of conflicting discourses still assert subjectivity and identity? Does
the supposedly dominant class, for whose benefit the existing rules of gender, class,
sexuality, etc. are theoretically formed, exercise some kind of will or desire in creating
the “regulatory frames” through which gender is made legible? Does anyone have a
choice in how one’s subjectivity is defined and one’s body is shaped? Can wanting to be
a particular gender, for example, make it possible to do so? Butler proposes a redefinition
of the substance of the body “not as a site or a surface, but as a process of materialization
that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call
matter” (9). That effect, she later points out, is the consequence of power and discourse,
which, while they don’t actually fix or reify anything, always produce the circumstances
for later action (in other words, the historical situation that provides the context and basis
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for action) and the terms by which that action is readable. Ultimately, she advocates a
dialectical understanding of gendered bodies that is comparable to Raymond Williams’
call to consider works of art as processes rather than objects, but she recognizes that the
eventual “effect of boundary and surface” is key to setting the parameters for action.
As many scholars who critique Stanislavski-based acting have noted, the
believability and authenticity that serve to obscure the “process of materialization” Butler
describes is also what characterizes the psychological methods of training with which
most actors in the United States are familiar. As Phillip Zarrilli writes, the valorization of
“honesty” and “believability” in acting,
…stems from the predominant viewpoint implicit in realistic acting that a
character when enacted must conform to ordinary social reality as
constructed from the spectator’s point of view. The audience needs to be
convinced that the character is behaving as s/he would in “ordinary life”
within the “given circumstances” of the scene. (9)
There are numerous dangers in perpetuating the “bourgeois humanist” allegiance to both
honesty and agency in acting, especially as it relates to gender. First, it naturalizes
gendered behavior, makes it seem impossible to change, and absolves people of the
responsibility they have in producing certain kinds of behavior. At the same time, it
denies that people are beholden to the rules of gender: they seem to be actively choosing
how they live, without any acknowledgement that choices falling outside the realm of
“normal” might carry with them serious repercussions. Again, Zinn’s work is useful,
here, because as an anti-war activist, he analyzes how naturalizing gendered behavior is
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used to justify war. In the documentary about him entitled You Can’t Be Neutral on a
Moving Train, Zinn points out that many people easily accept the existence of war by
citing “human nature” or by claiming that men are programmed to desire battle. He
disagrees: in his personal experience as a bomber pilot in WWII, he says, none of the
men were naturally driven by a desire to kill—it was the circumstances in which they
found themselves living that led them to do so. While the repetition of the “script” and
the laws for how men are expected to behave are eventually taken for granted as natural,
fixed and arising from innate desire, the testimony given by people about their lived
experience often reveals that gender and sexuality are more interactive processes. The
dominant cultural rules defining men and women exert pressure to behave in particular
ways, and repetition of that behavior makes their bodies take on particular shapes; but
there can also be other, more forceful circumstances that pull their bodies in other
directions. As a result, gendered behavior comes to mean something different on each
person’s body and in different historical situations depending upon what compels it.
But to a certain extent, it does seem that the illusion of unification and identity (no
matter how provisional) makes it easier to take clear and direct action. Zinn points out
that
Around 1776, certain important people in the English colonies made a
discovery that would prove enormously useful for the next two hundred
years. They found that by creating a nation, a symbol, a legal unity called
the United States, they could take over land, profits and political power
from favorites of the British Empire. In the process, they could hold back
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a number of potential rebellions and create a consensus of popular support
for the rule of a new, privileged leadership (58).
Zinn acknowledges that, putting the exclusionary and exploitive nature of this practice
aside, latching on to the illusion of unity was an “act of genius” to a certain degree: it
changed the course of history and transformed the world. His project, however, is to
reveal the labor and the resistance on the part of the people whose labor was being
exploited, but whose work actually built the nation. One can’t help but wonder, reading
his book, what might have happened if the African slaves, Indians and poor whites who
were being manipulated and exploited had not been prevented from coalescing in a
similar fashion and taking action against the class of men who had manufactured their
control.
In suggesting a shift in actor training that emphasizes the multiple processes
through which identity is created, in a fashion similar to Marxist historians or feminist
critics, I do not mean to deny that some of the potential power of this method of working
involves the step of allowing the multiple voices that make up a character’s identity to
coalesce, during performance, in a single actor’s body. It is my hope that, while
demanding consciousness of and respect for difference on the part of actors and the
communities with whom they work, this methodology will also point out how the actor’s
creation of an individual character models a utopian performative, or what Zinn calls
“fugitive moments of compassion;” it makes it possible to have faith in strength of
presence and individual identity while still maintaining awareness of the complicated
history that went into that presence.
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In The Strip, it isn’t simply the displacement of identity, but that “undoing”
combined with the characters’ intense need to imagine and create identities from which to
speak and act that drives the play forward and makes possibility and transformation
happen. Aston points out the significance of imagination, possibility and desire to all of
the characters:
All of Nagy’s characters in The Strip have to live through second-hand
identities that inadequately stand in for who they really are. While this is a
conditioning force in their lives, they still have the freedom to be
performative, to become other than they are. Tina fantasises that she has a
real life with her husband and real contact with her daughter; Loretta
transforms herself into Lady Marquette and takes off with Tom and Suzy.
(103)
In the same way, Ava Coo wants to invent a persona for herself, and one that chooses
where she goes and what she does. She bristles at Calvin’s repetition of her poetic name,
and insists that he abbreviate it to simply “Ava. A-V-A. Get it?” Her one-name persona
has resonances with powerful pop (and drag) icons like Madonna, whose song “Rescue
Me” provides the background for Ava’s lip-synch at beginning of the play, and whose
self-invention and re-invention were the basis for her postmodern success. In the same
scene, on the road to Tumbleweed Junction, Ava asserts her individual choice to go on
this trip, despite the fact that her supposed fate was set in motion by Otto Mink: “THIS IS
MY TRIP. Okay? It’s my trip, it’s my car, it’s my map, and we go where I say we go.
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And we are going south. As soon as I can figure out why my friggin’ car won’t start”
(202).
While deterministic forces such as fate (Suzy has a fascination with astrology),
destiny (Mr. Mink’s mysterious appearance in all character’s lives leads them to their
ultimate destination: Las Vegas), courts of law (Lester and Loretta are fugitives from the
law because of his participation in a murder), malfunctioning cars and unreadable maps
are balanced with courageous moments of exercising what Aston would call “the freedom
to be performative.” Interestingly, the deliberate claims of identity in order to do
something are most pronounced in American characters like Ava Coo and Loretta. When
Suzy, Tom and “Lady Marquette” arrive on the steps of an abandoned law court (where
perform their own ceremony of justice), they have the following exchange:
Loretta: Whatcha scared of sugar? We’re alive and kicking and there ain’t
a thing can touch us now.
Suzy: How can you be so sure of that?
Loretta: I believe.
Suzy: In what?
Loretta: In my belief.
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Tom: She’s got a point, Suzy. I haven’t been afraid of anything since,
well, since I’ve met Lady Marquette. (232)
While the characters in this play are queer in their resistance to normative socially-
assigned identities, they also reveal a stereotypically American truculence that is
productive and active, defining identity in the same sense that Zinn describes the
“genius” of defining a nation. These assertions of identity involve acting in both senses:
they pretend or imagine in the theatrical sense, and actively do something in the
Austinian sense of performance.
Building the A-V-A Monopolylogue
Part of the reason the step of creating a separate performance is important in this
process is because it is a solo and often autobiographical practice that centers around
asserting identity, but also one that is associated closely with queer identity politics and
an emphasis on the performer’s live body. Jill Dolan terms solo performances in which
one actor performs multiple characters on his or her own body “monopolylogues,” a
practice she writes about in an effort to show how it might “reanimate a humanism that
can incorporate love, hope and commonality alongside a deep understanding of
difference” (64). She points out that the form “models the fluidity of cultural identities
and offers a method through which performers and spectators might experience them”
(67). Dolan’s analysis focuses on Lily Tomlin and Danny Hoch, who perform multiple
characters that are based on people in their memories, but who are fictional creations
borne of their imaginations, and Anna Deavere Smith, whose performances juxtapose
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numerous “real” people’s experiences through her individual body. While Hoch and
Tomlin express great affection for their characters and hope that audiences share in that
palpable love, Dolan points out that Deavere Smith’s “gesture toward radical humanism
comes through a politics of coalition that admits to the pain and the suffering of
difference before love can be entertained as an emotion” (85). My creating a solo
“monopolylogue” of Ava Coo before the character interacted with others through
conflict, desire or love in the context of the play was intended to model—in the same way
that Howard Zinn represents the difference and resistance, courage and cooperation of
unrepresented classes of Americans—the complexity of a living human being.
After I conducted all four interviews, I put them together into a scripted
performance that I designed to be performed in a particular classroom in the Winship
Building that houses UT’s Theatre and Dance Department, usually set aside for acting
and directing classes and as a rehearsal space for both departmental and other
productions. Because of time constraints, I conceived and wrote the performance and
rehearsed some of the interviews in preparation for the role, but wasn’t able to have a
public showing. I created a DVD with images and interviews to accompany my live
performance, which was divided into several chapters, each of which was titled after one
of Ava Coo’s lines from the play. The performance itself was shaped around drawing
parallels between drag performance and the way I, as an actor, went about building this
particular character. The room I chose has mirrored walls that are almost always covered
with curtains during the day. As the performance began, I intended to come out from
behind the curtains dressed in a bathrobe and wig cap and open the curtains slowly as the
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accompanying music began, with the stage set up so that the audience would be facing
the exposed mirrors and able to watch a reflection of what I was doing. There was to be a
video screen projecting the DVD upstage right. Upstage left was a stool and next to it a
table containing eyelashes, makeup, a wig and costume pieces, to be put on near the end
of the performance.
I divided the stage into sections, dedicating each location to one of the interviews:
center right was a bench, which is where the sections of interview with my colleague
Susanne Shawyer would be performed; the segments with drag performer Taylor Trinity
were to be performed slightly upstage and center; center left was a chair with a table and
telephone, where I would perform the interview excerpts with a friend who spoke with
me about femme drag and her extended road trip; and the interview with the drag
performer in Los Angeles, which was also done over the telephone, was to be performed
on the upstage left stool next to the table of makeup and other drag accoutrements. Each
chapter of the performance was to conclude with relevant sections spoken by Ava Coo in
The Strip, which I was to perform downstage center. The idea behind structuring the
performance this way was to emphasize that each of the encounters I had—with each
interviewee, with media images and music, with pieces of costume, with the text of the
play—was a separate but related cultural and social interaction that comprised the
identity of the character.
Because the performance was created to highlight issues of gender, drag and
sexuality, I titled the first chapter “I don’t really look like a girl,” and opened the
performance with the song “I Will Always Love You” by Dolly Parton. This song holds a
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place of great importance in the play: Tina Coo sings it, and calls it one of her favorites.
But also, Dolly Parton, with her connotations of excessive femininity and status as a drag
icon and, alternately, her deliberate association with “white trash” culture (she is often
quoted as saying “It takes a lot of money to look this cheap!”) brings up ideas about the
performativity of gender and class. In addition, I hoped to connect the lyrics at the
beginning of the song with what happens when an actor goes through the process of
piecing together a character through interactions with other people: “If I should stay/I
would only be in your way/So I’ll go. But I know/I’ll think of you each step of the way.”
I thought that it would be useful to make my presence as an actor evident, in the same
way that it is important to acknowledge an interviewer’s background, identity and biases
in ethnographic reporting or historical writing, so I added a still image of myself to the
very beginning of the DVD, as the voice of the anonymous drag performer explained that
he thinks a lot of drag performers are people who are “unhappy, but are famous and
beautiful on stage.” Ultimately, though, my goal was to put my presence on the back
burner and foreground the interviews and text from the play with which I hoped to bring
a new character to life. Like Ava Coo and other drag performers, who transform their
own identities by taking on characteristics of women (or men playing women) they have
known or admired, I wanted to change myself through re-membering a series of
interactions.
The DVD continued with a series of still images of drag icons mentioned in the
play (Shirley Bassey, Rosemary Clooney, Madonna), generally famous drag performers
on whom I did research (Charles Busch, Lipsynka, Divine), and other legendary
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examples of stars who were famous for certain kinds of femininity or gender
performance, who were either mentioned by interviewees or who seem to be mentioned
quite a bit in discussions of drag (Joan Crawford, Greta Garbo, the women from Dynasty,
Anna Nicole Smith, etc.) Behind the still images, I included a segment of the interview in
which the drag queen describes his character in a way that also described Ava Coo—a
performer who is potty mouthed, alcoholic and washed up, and who is living off the
memory of fame. This section ends with the phrase “I’m not impersonating anyone, she’s
just all of those women, all those performers in my head all ground up together.” The
images continue as my friend begins to describe what she thinks of as “femme,” a role
she eventually learned to play through her friendships with gay men and through her
work in the sex industry, but with which she had never previously felt comfortable as a
child. As the images, interviews, and song played through, I looked back and forth
between a mirror and the images on the screen, attempting to shape my body to match the
shapes these women’s bodies are making. My performance is not yet vocal: I’m merely
practicing the physical gestures of femininity in a mirror. Many of these gestures and
poses carried over into my performance in the play.
Queerness, Excess and Theatricality as Real Experience
Elin Diamond suggests that, for feminist actors, Brechtian theory provides a
technique for questioning the solid basis of identity on which actor training based in
realism relies: the actor must historicize herself, making evident the sometimes
conflicting cultural circumstances that condition her subjectivity. Through that
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historicization, the actor becomes equally as conflicted as the character and as mystified
as the spectators regarding her own identity:
The historical subject plays an actor presumed to have superior knowledge
in relation to an ignorant character from the past, but the subject herself
remains as divided and uncertain as the spectators to whom the play is
addressed. This performer-subject neither disappears into a representation
of the character nor into a representation of the actor; each remains
processual, historical, incomplete. (“Brechtian Theory” 1288).
Diamond sees Brecht’s verfremdungseffekt as being particularly effective in achieving a
gender critique in the theatre: “Verfremdungseffekt challenges the mimetic property of
acting that semioticians call iconicity, the fact that the performer’s body conventionally
resembles the object (or character) to which it refers” (“Brechtian Theory” 1286). In The
Strip, by pointing out that even though she is a girl she “doesn’t really look like one,”
Ava Coo reveals how borrowing the practice of dressing in feminine drag emphasizes
that simply living as a woman always involves a certain degree of verfremdungseffekt,
given the inability of most people to “conventionally resemble” the perfect picture of the
gender they are supposed to inhabit. As Diamond suggests, when gender is brought to the
fore in the theatre—in the same way that Ava Coo brings gender to light— one can
expose its individual components as a system of signifiers: “The appearance, words,
gestures, ideas, attitudes, etc. that comprise the gender lexicon become so many
illusionistic trappings to be put on or shed at will.” (1286). The result is debunking the
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hegemonic myth of “normalcy”: “to denaturalize and defamiliarize what ideology makes
seem normal, acceptable, inescapable.”
When the fabrication of identity is excessive and over-the-top, it appears to call
attention to its own deliberate construction; when the invention of identity is believable, it
hides the process of choice, repetition, and imitation that went into its creation. As
Stephen Bottoms notes, the former “theatricality” is historically considered queer: “To be
gay,” he summarizes, “is theatrical, and presumably vice-versa” (176). It is important that
the re-introduction of the biological body into gender comes out of queer sexuality
because of its historical “outsider” status in the United States. Here I quote Esther
Newton’s work from the late 1960s: “Homosexuals are not accepted as 100 percent
Americans, and they are certainly considered “perverse.” Homosexuality is a splotch on
the American moral order. It violates the rooted assumption that ‘masculinity,’ a complex
of desirable qualities, is ‘natural’ for (appropriate to) the male” (Mother Camp 2). I
would argue, however, that queerness and the practice of queering, while they undermine
the nationalist myth of “America,” are ultimately humanizing and universalizing
concepts: they acknowledge the biological and human desire for love, connection and
pleasure. In a sense, the historical “outsider” status of gay men, lesbians, bisexual and
transgendered persons has made it possible to make use of queer theory as a practice that
acknowledges similarity (we all have bodies that crave physical interaction with other
bodies and seek out love) while respecting difference (each person’s experience of desire
and consequent performance of identity—gendered and otherwise—is complex and
changing). Ultimately, not only is the queer admission of pleasure and desire human and
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“real,” so is its theatrical bent: everyone imagines and pretends when constructing an
identity. Conversely, what is typically understood as authentic, true and “serious
business” always relies, to some degree, on theatricality.
The fourth chapter of my solo performance (the two middle chapters I address
later, about geographic border crossing on road trips and visiting over-the-top replicas of
historic sites intended for tourists, came in between this and the first), in which I actually
intended to go through the process of putting on drag in front of the audience, was
entitled “I Know About Hair. I Got a Certificate from the Wilifred Academy of Beauty.”
While this chapter’s placement was intended juxtapose actual border crossing and
performances of culture at particular geographic locations with the experience of putting
on drag. Three of my interviewees described, in great detail and with great pleasure, the
process of putting on wigs and makeup, and I intended for pieces of those interviews to
play as I incorporated another important component of Ava Coo’s character: I planned to
put on eyelashes, wig and costume piece by piece, in the same way that I was putting on
bits and pieces of other people’s gestural and vocal habits.
One exciting element of doing this performance as a laboratory production was
that I was responsible for putting together my own costumes, and I was completely
inspired by the descriptions of drag outfits my interviewees gave, as well as by Esther
Newton’s beautifully detailed descriptions in Mother Camp:
His eyes, which are smallish, green and sad, are rimmed and smudged all
around with a thick line of eye liner, and he has gobs of mascara on the
lashes. He has carelessly drawn on eyebrows more or less over the place
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where his own are shaved off. All this is partially covered by large dark
glasses which he nervously whips on and off when confronting a
salesperson or a waitress, but they don’t hide the make-up which he has
splotched on his face and neck; it has been sweated off in places. His long
red hair is combed up all over in an upsweep of curls. When Tiger walks,
he sways (the walk referred to as ‘swishing’ by homosexuals). His arms
never hang “naturally” at his sides, but are held out from his body at rigid
angles, with long thin hands projecting like plumes. We walk into a cheap
department store; somebody whistles. Tiger turns, one hip hooked out, one
arm extended, palm turned up, head thrown back at an angle. He declaims,
in a loud stagey voice, “My the peasants are restless today.” Amoment
later he leans over toward me with an ironic smirk, pats his hair into place:
“Should I go home and put more make-up on, or do you think I look
fantastic enough already?” (9).
Newton goes on to describe an entirely different drag queen, one who is “apologetic” in
contrast with Tiger’s aggression. He wears ‘incredibly short, shorts, cut-off white levis,
very tight” (9). I was interested in Mother Camp as an ethnographic study of drag
performers, but also because it was first published in 1972, just a few years after the
Stonewall riots. It seems significant that these “street fairies” were marginalized in every
sense: she stresses that their appearances are likely to get them thrown out of some
establishments or stared at and harassed at the very least. As Judith Butler points out,
subversive performances of identity do carry consequences.
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I was interested in using Newton’s work as inspiration not just for performing
femininity, but also for the aspects of drag that seemed outrageous or excessive. One
costume I put together involved very tight shorts with studs, platform shoes and fishnet
stockings, a halter top that tied in the front and a long black “Betty Page” wig with bangs.
Another wig I chose was a shocking pink bob with glittered pink sunglasses to match,
and my final costume was a bright pink gogo dress with a gold-sequined high collar. I
picked a platinum blonde wig modeled after Jean Harlow for Ava Coo’s final
performance to make reference to Hollywood stars (and since the song Ava chooses to
perform is “Bette Davis Eyes,” the first line of which is “Her hair is Harlow gold …”). I
chose extreme and obviously unnatural colors and fabrics, excessively high heels or short
shorts, glittered eyeshadow and oversized sunglasses not only because wearing those
things was pleasurable and fun for me (and this was and clearly is an important element
of drag: it’s incredibly playful and fun) but also to make use of the elements of drag that
might mark Ava Coo as not only performing femininity, but also performing her role as a
“freak” and an outsider—a failure in the straight world, but fantastic in her own
imagination and those of other “drunken queens.”
The seemingly excessive “outsider” status of the characters’ identities in The Strip
coincides with the “over-the-top” femininity of drag performance, a kind of artifice that is
criticized in traditional actor training as “indicating” or pretending. Aston points out that
the acting in The Strip and the “unreal” nature of the characters were singled out by
mainstream critics:
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Significantly, the reviewing ‘body’ criticized Nagy’s characters as
‘freaks,’ and took against the over-the-top, cartoon-style register of
playing that the performers variously adopted for their roles. Yet, it is in
the exaggerated style of playing that Nagy locates a sense of the
performative, the freedom to play out roles that exist in tension with, but
are other than, the social identities assigned to them. (120)
Aston’s reading of the play and the performance style for which the characters seemed to
call could be understood as a kind of Brechtian technique that questions the “reality” of
more understated and apparently authentic approaches. I am interested in what happens
when one considers the excess of those characters as not necessarily “fake” or “outside”
of the norm, but as simply a more fantastic and fabulous and complex reality. My interest
was in seeing how interviewing people for whom drag was a significant part of their lives
might give a sense of drag as a real experience.
The DVD for my solo performance continues with an interview with drag
performer Taylor Trinity, which I conducted on a digital video camera at an event at an
art gallery during the South by Southwest music festival at which he was acting as emcee.
The sound on the interview is less than perfect, as people chat and move in and out of the
frame, drinking beer and looking at art. Taylor was in full regalia at this event, and I was
able to catch bits of an interview between changes of outfit (by happy accident, I chose a
location next to three sketches of different women): he went from a sexy but tasteful
jeans, heels and black top to what he called “full bitch mode” that involved a full length
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PVC dress and platinum blonde wig. The clip I chose for this section is one early in the
interview in which he makes a direct connection between drag queens and performers:
It’s probably no different than someone that is in the theatre or a film
career. You basically take on a mindset of this façade, character you’ve
created to where it’s public, and you have to, while you’re in form, live
out that façade, that character, ‘til you’re out of it … ‘til the duration of
it’s over. Me personally? I’m really introverted, somewhat more shy, kind
of a more quiet, book-reading stay-at-home and watch movies … But
when I’m in character, when I’m Taylor Trinity, it’s a whole other ball
game. I’m just the butterfly of the party, the life of the party, loud,
boisterous, crazy. You have to kinda get … it’s taking on a whole ‘nother
person. It’s actually quite therapeutic. Because if you have a side of you
that you don’t really get to express very often, doing this is like having
this whole other personality that you get to put away when you want. And
when you’re in the mood to let it loose and let it go crazy, you have that
other personality to lean on.
Because this was the first section of the performance in which I included an interview
that I had conducted in person, and to make reference to the drag practice of lip-synching,
my intention was to lip-synch this section to study Taylor Trinity’s gestural vocabulary
and copy his enactment of femininity with my own (female) body. His interview helped
me, again, to find the great pleasure in drag performance, but was also interesting in its
implication of choice: that acting as an “over-the-top” woman helped him to reveal (and
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revel in) a different and contradictory side of his personality than his typical quiet self. I
find it interesting that, while he acknowledges that his drag persona is a “character,” he
doesn’t remove her completely from himself: she is simply “another side” of him that he
doesn’t express in all circumstances.
Presenting the excessive theatricality of drag as authentic or real has a twofold
purpose: it gives a sense of the variety of possibility within actual life, and at the same
time it breaks down the boundaries that relegate straight experience to that which is
legitimate and queer experience to that which is less than true. So in a sense, the
performance of drag is a slightly different matter than what Elin Diamond is discussing
when she refers to using verfremdungseffekt.
The Brechtian ‘not/but’ is the theatrical and theoretical analog to
the subversiveness of sexual difference, because it allows us to
imagine the deconstruction of gender – and all other –
representations. Such deconstructions dramatize, at least at the
level of theory, the infinite play of difference that Derrida calls
écriture – the superfluity of signification that places meaning
beyond capture within the covers of the play or the hours of
performance. (“Brechtian Theory” 1287)
By “sexual difference,” Diamond refers to the Derridean concept that a signifier contains
within it the trace of that which it is not. Her suggestion is that the Brechtian actor,
imagining a character as whole but not attempting a total transformation into that
character, is able to imply that she is herself and the character. In other words, the
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character is one side in the discourse of the play, and the actor, commenting on that
character, represents the other. This is an extremely useful possibility for the feminist
actor, especially in its implication of the possibility that she can choose to stand outside
of the character and comment on it. In my master’s thesis, I theorized about the
Beckettian “not/not,” implying that in Beckett’s plays, identity (actor or character,
gendered or otherwise) is nothing at all until it is compelled by a particular situation; in
the theatre, the actor’s identity is compelled by a script, by a director or by an audience.
The beauty and usefulness of drag performance for the actor is that it is exceedingly
positive, active, imaginative and productive in its acknowledgment of possibility. Like
Anna Deavere Smith’s theory that the actor has the potential to be “all others,” the
difference of drag performers celebrates the extreme fullness and multiplicity of identity:
while the feminist actor practicing Brechtian technique might be understood to say, “I am
not this, but this,” the drag performer can say (like Madonna) “I am this, and sometimes I
am this, and I have been that person, and I would like to be this other person, as well.”
At the same time, Nagy seems to comment in The Strip about the excess and
performativity through which many people learn “mainstream” American history:
representations of national culture are commonly no less overblown than drag
performance, but for some reason are given more credence. This was an idea that led me
to title the third chapter of my performance “What Was That Looney Tunes Place We
Was At Yesterday?” This is a question Ava Coo asks Calvin, referring to one of the many
strange and artificial representations of American culture they have visited on their trip.
Two of my interviewees described their experiences with tourist sites intended to
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celebrate particular aspects of history and culture: my colleague spoke of the village
through which she traveled in Croatia that was Tito’s birthplace, while my other friend
described stopping on her road trip at Dollywood. Each told about her experience of how
the “essence” of these places was clearly manufactured for consumption by tourists—my
friend spoke of the “country feel” created in Dollywood. Ava and Calvin travel to many
of these sorts of places, and I completed this section of my performance with Ava’s
comment on how contrived they seem:
Yeah, like Disney World, except instead of Mickey Mouse you got
fucking Puritans or something and some half naked yo-yos painted red to
look like Indians, except it’s so hot the makeup blisters all over their
bodies and they end up looking like goddamn lepers, and wacko Kate tells
one of them he’s gonna end up in the slammer before Christmas on grand
theft auto charges, and I could’ve died, I coulda just died of
embarrassment right there in front of the imitation Ye Olde Worlde
Martha Washington. (245)
The work I did on this performance led me to realize that one important goal of this
multivocal training and rehearsal process is to flip the usual understanding of the
relationship between queer gender performance and realism: I wanted to present the
excess of drag as believable and authentic and ultimately a humanizing process, while
queering the performance of so-called mainstream American identity by pointing out its
excesses and artificiality.
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Choice, Chance and Creating Community
In the interviews I conducted, I also wanted to learn about the practice of going on
a journey without being entirely sure of the destination, both to replicate Ava’s own
experience and to draw correlations between her trip and the uncertainty of creating a
character through a series of unplanned interactions and border crossings. I titled the
second chapter of the performance “I Always Wanted a Passport Because They’re
Glamorous Things to Have …” My intention was to have this section shift from border
crossing in terms of gender to the more literal border crossing in terms of nations, states
and geography in general. The first section I included was an interview with my
colleague, Suzanne Shawyer, a Canadian citizen living in the United States, who had
lived in the former Yugoslavia for a year. She explains, “And then … we went across the
border. And Mischa had a map, and one of her concerns was that we go across an
international rather than an inter-country border because, you know, I had an
international passport. And she looked at the map, and it looked like an international
border. So we’re driving across, and we … um … we pulled out our passports, and the
Croatian guard says [makes a waving gesture with her hand] so … we go.” She goes on
to talk about how she felt like a passenger because she didn’t know where she was going,
didn’t know the language and “I’m just going to enjoy the ride and maybe something
interesting will happen. And I’ll take my camera, and maybe something will.” I then had
my other friend talk about how her fantasy road trip turned into a huge coming of age
experience and forced her to re-think her identity: “I felt really really lost and displaced.
Because, you know, sometimes when you go on a trip you take yourself out of your total
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comfort zone and everything that’s so familiar and so safe, and everything that you’re
used to somehow disappears.” I ended this section with Ava’s breakdown during the
telephone conversation with her mother, a point in the play where I chose to have her
remove her wig and put aside her ongoing allegiance to artifice:
God forgive me and I don’t know why, but I love you, Ma. I love you, and
I don’t know where I’m going next, and I don’t give a shit about some
drunk daddy I never met, and I sure as fuck don’t know how you know
where I am, but I wish you would just send me some cash and call it a day.
(219)
The sense from the interviews and from Ava’s scene with her mother was that travel like
this inevitably undoes one’s sense of security and identity, but through that undoing one
becomes a more complex person with greater depth of understanding.
I closed my performance with Ava Coo’s final monologue from the play,
connecting the culmination of my creation of her identity with her ultimate goal:
performing her act on stage in front of an audience (in performance, this speech is broken
up with dialogue between other characters). She speaks into a microphone:
Shit. Whoops, I mean, hey, it’s really great, really outstanding to be with
you all here tonight. It took me a while to get here, and let me tell you I
learned more than I ever wanted to know about the Revolutionary War,
the Amish, and other assorted religious types who don’t have sex. But I’m
with you now, and that’s the important thing. I’m gonna sing a special
tune for you tonight. It’s for this friend of mine, see, who kind of took off
274
all of a sudden, without advanced warning, you know? I hate it when that
happens, don’t you? I thought I hated her a lot, but then she scratched my
back and I felt, I don’t know, a comfort, a safety, and it was confusing to
me because I thought I hated her and ... well I mean it wasn’t sexual or
nothing ‘cause, shit, what do I know about sex anyway? I’m just some
chick who pretends to be a chick so people will look at me in a different
light so Christ, you know, what’s that about? (257)
Ava’s lip-synch performance of “Bette Davis Eyes” falls apart when her tape of pre-
recorded music fails, and she breaks down once again (smashing her guitar—which
because of budget constraints, in our performance appropriately ended up being a plastic
inflatable costume guitar—on the stage), wondering why nothing ever seems to go the
way she dreamed or planned.
I found that my process overlapped with Ava’s journey in a lot of ways. Two of
my interviews—with my colleague who had traveled abroad and with one of the drag
performers—were conducted in person with a mini digital video camera I had purchased
for the project with a tax return; the other two—with my friend who was beginning a
graduate program in another state and with the Los Angeles-based drag performer—were
conducted over the telephone. This was one parallel I found with the character’s
experience: there was a difference between in-person contact and contact over a distance,
but each interaction shaped my understanding of Ava Coo in important ways. While I
was clearly using these conversations for a specific end— I needed them for a project,
and the participants were doing me a great favor by giving me their time and their
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stories—I found that the nervous and sometimes awkward interactions added to the
character in ways I did not expect. The mere action of connecting with people added
depth and complexity to my understanding of myself, the process of acting, and the play,
but perhaps not in a way that I could visibly “use.” Surprisingly for me, the significant
difference this process made in my creation of a character was not specific gestures and
mannerisms (although there were a few of those), but the kind of empathy that comes
from listening to and trying to figure out how best to repeat people’s experiences. I took
great pleasure in the interviews themselves. I found all of these people and engaging and
fascinating, and I learned a great deal about the pleasure of simply listening and allowing
someone to elaborate on the details of his or her life.
As with Ava Coo’s travels, there were certainly problems and complications with
this process: the fact that I never found a time to publicly perform the character study
outside of the context of the play, for example. One of the things that I realized through
attempting this process was that forming an identity through a history of interactions is
often an unconscious process that happens unexpectedly and over a long period of time,
so doing it consciously and with limited time (at the same time as rehearsing a play), is
quite frustrating and complicated. The question of which gestures one chooses and why
one chooses them makes it essential to continue the conversation with a larger
community: doing this work without that ongoing interaction leaves out an important step
of the process. In addition, the arduous task of repeating gestures and words over and
over until they “settle” in one’s body takes more time than most people have, perhaps
especially in an academic context when there are other courses to consider, and other
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papers to write, etc. In this context, I had not thought out in advance how I would gather
members of the community of interviewees together to comment on my process, nor had
I engaged a director with whom to work. This left me with the problem of rehearsing
alone, being uncertain of whether or not I was accurate in my depictions or making the
most ethical or interesting choices for the character.
This made it even more clear how a collective effort in making certain character
choices is such an important part of this process, because as Chaikin says, “Until we can
hear the dominant voices of those ghosts whom we contain, we cannot control, to any
degree, whom we are to become.” I think this consciousness, combined with the
unpredictability and messiness of real interactions with and observations of people,
makes this process a particularly valuable tool for actors who want to both reflect the
world around them and choose to make changes in it. Like Ava Coo, whose identity is
transformed by the people with whom she comes in contact, I, as an actor, might be
changed unconsciously by the observations and interactions I have experienced. But I
might also, like her, be a “chick who pretends to be a chick so people will look at me in a
different light,” and make the choice to be aware of how I use the history of my
identifications and interactions in a way that might lead people to understand the world
differently and appreciate its “endless possibilities.”
I chose to title the last chapter of my performance “Me and Calvin are going
someplace. I got a job in a nightclub. I’m a nightclub entertainer in demand,” and
intended to combine the metaphor of a road trip or journey with the completion of Ava
Coo’s drag transformation. It was to highlight the combination of “going somewhere”
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and achieving progress through assertively believing in her status “a nightclub entertainer
in demand,” while at the same time showing the importance of “me AND Calvin” in the
development of that identity. I began the section with Taylor Trinity describing a road
trip to a gala in New Orleans where she was to receive an award, explaining how she and
her friends were pressed for time and had to put on drag on the road to suggest a
connection between her experience and adding pieces of people as “costume” on the path
to becoming a character. The last interview passage I chose was from the drag performer
living in L.A., who commented on how drag expands the possibilities for actors when it
comes to making use of the many rich observations of and engagement with the women
in their lives because it allows them to be what they wish rather than what they are
expected to be:
In general, I just think, I mean, it was very liberating when I first started
because as a gay man I spent a lot of my life studying women, because I,
you know, I think a lot of boys, when they’re young, they study the guys
they wish they were like, you know, the tough guys, and that whole tough
guy thing is learned, it’s not natural. It’s from children studying the
football players and the movie stars. So I, you know, most gay men will
spend just as much time studying their mothers and their mothers’ friends,
but we never as actors get to play that, get to use all that rich observation.
So when you play a woman you get to comment on all these women
you’ve seen your whole life, and you get to show people what you’ve seen
and noticed about them. … The novelty of getting to cross your legs and
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look beautiful on a chair, it’s a novelty for me, so when I get to do it, I’m
having fun doing it, I don’t take anything for granted ‘cause everything’s a
choice.
Not only does he say important things about choice and agency—performing gender
according to whom you “want to be like”— and community and experience—enjoying
the observation of mothers and mothers’ friends—concisely and beautifully in this quote,
he also emphasizes the importance of “fun” or pleasure. Queer performances of gender
also have the ability to emphasize how the body, while its adherence to normative rules is
undoubtedly required in certain ways for work, is often compelled to abandon those rules
and “choose” how it shapes itself according to what is pleasurable, comfortable and




“We Can’t Remember Ourselves”: Producing the Utopian Performative in Actor
Training and Rehearsal
I began this dissertation with the metaphor of falling in love, and explained how
my fraught and exhilarating relationship with acting and theatre has shaped my life. As I
hope I have illustrated through the last two chapters, a good deal of my thinking about the
contemporary possibilities of re-imagining the development of character identity in
actors’ training and rehearsal as an intellectually engaged and community-driven process
has been inspired by and developed through my own work with groups of people on
particular plays and characters. So I want to finish with acknowledging my indebtedness
to a particular play with which I am also deeply enamored, one whose story and
dramaturgy for me epitomize love and desire and set off a spark that carried through the
rest of my involvement with this topic. In the spring of 2003, several months before I
began work on the productions I have discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, I directed Naomi
Wallace’s The Trestle at Pope Lick Creek in UT’s Laboratory Theatre. Near the end of
that play, the character Dalton Chance reveals to the audience (who have become the
judge and jury in his murder trial) his story of Pace Creagan’s death as she—haunting
Dalton’s memories in a way that is halfway present and halfway not—fills his narrative
with explanations for why she behaved as she did. “I needed you to watch—,” she says,
“Because we can’t watch ourselves. We can’t remember ourselves. Not like we need to”
(337).
280
Pace’s words describe precisely why the relationship between actors and
audiences is an enduring and crucial one. Shannon Baley, my friend and colleague who
was the dramaturg for this production, has written specifically about Wallace’s
fascination with bodies and the transformative power of desire—a preoccupation that
becomes particularly evident in the way Pace’s relationship with Dalton undoes his ideas
about gender and sexuality (245). Wallace has said that that only through the pursuit of
desire (a project that sounds quite Stanislavskian) “loneliness is ended” and the
transformation of characters’ (and people’s) identities takes place (240). She has chosen
as an epigraph for her play a quote from Percy Bysshe Shelley: “Nothing in the world is
single.” Pace and Dalton need each other in order to piece together their own lives and
make them meaningful.
Dalton’s desire throughout the play is to kiss Pace on the mouth—an action that is
delicious and precious in his imagination, a traditional gesture of love that seems to
transcend time and place. But as Baley points out, Dalton and Pace live in a world where
a simple act of humanity, love and desire—a kiss on the mouth, for example—seems no
longer possible. The characters’ bodies have been so ravaged and shaped by the
depression that they have to take them apart again before they can be put back together
and made whole (a project that sounds both Brechtian and postmodern). Pace tries to
enlighten Dalton to this need through performances that both deconstruct and reinvent
both of their bodies. She kisses Dalton on the back of the knee, for example, and when he
says “I wanted you to kiss me on my mouth,” she replies, “Don’t you see? Where I was
kissing you … it was on your mouth” (313).
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In the final scene, she encourages him to imagine an erotic exchange of their
bodies, and together they engage in a fantasy in which he becomes her and she him.
Commanding him to touch himself but imagine that their two bodies are intertwined, she
says “That’s right. You’re touching me. I want you to touch me. It’s going to happen. To
both of us.” Because he is so entranced by her (as his mother says, “I think you loved that
girl”), Dalton plays along and does as Pace wishes; when she finally asks where he can
feel her, he has become transported. He replies, “Inside. Everywhere. Pace. (beat) You’re
inside me” (342). Pace shows how, through the combination of their bodies and
imaginations, the two have reclaimed power by deliberately taking hold of the language
and structures by which their bodies are supposedly imprisoned and changed their world:
she exclaims “See? We’re somewhere else now” (342). Baley writes of this final
exchange,
This final act of release, a feminist gestus and utopian performative rolled
into one, allows Dalton and Pace to dissolve and escape the hetero-
normative, capitalist system that attempts to yoke them irrevocably into
singular bodies and a closed, monologic history. In doing so, he finally
remembers (and re-members) her as much as she has re-membered him,
rearranging their bodies until they flow into each other, a dialectical and
potentially utopian exchange. (246)
Pace and Dalton are both actors in this interaction: he is driven by a need to have a
connection with her. She wants a connection, as well, but only in a world transformed by
her willfulness and imagination, partially achieved by compelling Dalton to recognize
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history and use it to transform himself, her, and their world. And Dalton is aware of how
his connection with Pace has changed him: in a scene in his jail cell he smashes a glass
and uses its pieces to illustrate to his mother how the girl made him aware that the
movement of history transforms the world, and that people change each other in a similar
way, with the ghost of Pace speaking behind him:
Dalton: Look. This was sand and heat. Not long ago. Other things, too.
Pieces and bits. And now. It’s something else. Glass. Blood. And it’s
broken. (Picks up a large piece. Nears Gin) I could cut you open with it.
(Gin slaps his face. He’s taken aback, put in his place).
Dalton: But that’s what she did to me. Cut me open and things weren’t just
things after that. I was just a kid—
Pace: — like any other. You didn’t care.
Dalton: I never even thought about it. But then one day I wasn’t sure. She
did that to me. She made me—hesitate. In everything I did. I was. Unsure.
Look. It’s not a cup anymore. It’s a knife. (308-09)
While our process with this production was relatively straightforward, it led me to
think about how the magnetic power of actors (like Pace or like Hollywood stars) and the
desire they engender might be demystified and used in a way that inspires an awareness
of history and community. Whether it is desire to think or behave like an actor and a
process of identification, a desire to be someone whom that actor might fall in love with
or admire and respect in return, or a more erotic and sensual attraction, it seems to me
that the charged energy of this relationship holds a great deal of potential for changing
283
people’s behavior and, consequently, their environments. Actors, as well, have a desire
for connection equal to those of their audiences, and suit their performances to best
communicate with them. Like Pace, who pleads with Dalton to “look at her” so she can
be sure of her own importance and existence and can believe that her actions are not
without meaning, actors’ very existence depends on their interaction with audiences, and
work is drawn out of them by this need. I began to wonder if and how demystifying and
opening up this relationship to develop consciousness of history and community might be
a means for social change. I thought it would probably involve actors reinventing their
own bodies by re-membering the bodies of other people through performance.
At the end of Utopia in Performance, Jill Dolan poses this same question: “How
can we take the space opened in performance and imagination and actively encourage
utopian performatives? Isn’t this what any group of actors and directors tries to do each
time they set out to create performance?” (169). As a person who has been involved in
acting and performance from a young age, I agree that many of the actors, playwrights,
designers, directors and others involved in creating theatre begin with intentions that
involve a desire to communicate and connect, and that the liveness and ephemerality of
their work is often utopian in impulse. Dolan suggests that the feelings aroused by these
efforts may be enough to provide the conditions and imagined possibility for a better
world:
The utopian performative, by its very nature, can’t translate into a program
for social action, because it’s most effective as a feeling. Perhaps that
feeling of hope, or that feeling of desire, embodied by that suddenly
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hollow space in the pit of my stomach that drops me into an erotics of
connection and commonality—perhaps such an intensity of feeling is
politics enough for utopian performatives. (19)
Here, she echoes Anne Bogart’s respect for emotion and response and the preciousness of
their unpredictability in her statement that “It is not the director’s responsibility to
produce results but, rather, to create the circumstances in which something might
happen” (124). As an actor, though, I wonder in what ways the conditions of my training
and preparation can be infused with the methodologies I have learned in courses on
ethnographic performance and community-based theatre, feminist and queer theory and
other identity-based solo performance and performance art. I wonder how the interest in
capturing the essence of “real” experience that fascinated Diderot and Stanislavski and
The Group and The Living Theatre and Anna Deavere Smith might be combined with the
consciousness and historicity of Marx and Brecht and the powerful imaginations of other
great actors, playwrights and scholars in ways that create circumstances more conducive
to social action in the current historical and cultural environment. Rather than making the
conditions for working on plays in more traditional “American” theatrical settings abide
by a particular set of rules determined by market standards, how might the actors and
audiences who are committed to re-staging old plays and creating new ones communicate
with each other and in that way develop changing circumstances for each production?
Taking one step further Dolan’s idea that feelings that instill in audiences a desire for
change are enough, what if the feelings and imagined possibilities that result from this
exchange are social action? What if the “something that happens” in the theatre, the
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feelings and desire and change that mark the bodies of a community of people through
their mutual interaction and communication with a group of artists is democracy and
change?
In contrast to the contemporary feeling common among actors that they have
minimal power to effect change, the initial drive behind the work of philosophers like
Diderot, Stanislavski and members of The Group Theatre was to expose acting as a
process of human labor rather than a mystical process of inspiration that was beyond the
performer’s control. The concept of actor training is humanist and, to a certain degree,
Marxian in impulse: it illuminates the ways in which the body of the actor is a tool and,
in the right circumstances, can be controlled and shaped by the actor to make meanings,
reflect existing behavior and imagine different ways of living. At the same time, actor
training devoted to reflecting “true” behavior has revolutionary potential because it
reveals the ways in which living is an interactive process—an actor must make an effort
to communicate with other actors and examine his or her relationship to a group in order
to believably represent the world. As I suggested in chapter one, the humanist impulse
behind actor training does not automatically make it exclusionary: on the contrary, it is
revolutionary in its suggestion that worlds are shaped by people moving their bodies and
interacting with each other.
The revolutionary impulse of acting as a humanist practice lies in its potential,
however, and not always in its practice. It is without a doubt limited by certain historical
and cultural circumstances. And like other products of the Enlightenment—the French
and American Revolutions, for example, and their devotion to democracy and
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“freedom”—it became exclusionary rather than truly being used for the good of all
humanity. Actor training may have resulted in a new awareness of people and their
ability to make change, but it was also mired in the economics of capitalism and came to
be associated with values that were geared towards maintaining a status-quo middle-class
morality that ensured that those who had acquired money and power might keep their
status at the great expense of other groups. Consequently, because it was associated with
the rise of capitalism and developed in conjunction with an increasing need for actors and
their training to become sellable products, attempts to objectify actors’ interactive and
detailed use of memory and imagination came to be understood as a static practice—“The
System”— that prioritized the believable reproduction of certain kinds of identities and
values. Like Dalton and Pace in The Trestle at Pope Lick Creek, actors had to find other
means to break out of what Baley calls “the hetero-normative, capitalist system that
attempts to yoke them irrevocably into singular bodies and a closed, monologic history.”
From the middle of the Twentieth Century through its end, then, actors who
entered professional training programs in the United States were rarely made fully aware
of the intellectual and revolutionary history of the work they were preparing to do. Rather
than engaging in an ongoing dialectical process, actors in BFA and MFA acting programs
were encouraged to imagine acting as a static and objective craft that, above all else,
involved “truthful playing in imaginary circumstances.” The ability to “just be” a
character convincingly becomes more important for a successful American actor in the
twentieth century than a consideration of ethical practices of representation, for example;
individual identity and desire, while they are most successful when clearly faithful to the
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wishes of a playwright or director and therefore determined from the outside, are
prioritized—an actor must learn to create the illusion of free will rather than questioning
what that concept really means. In addition, instead of being aware of his or her work as a
process that involves interaction and conversation, the actor must be sellable as an
individual personality. In this context, identities that uphold white, middle-class, straight
values continued to be perpetuated and celebrated through the work of “good” and
professional actors, who were being trained in programs increasingly geared toward
“legitimate” work to feed a commercial market.
As I pointed out in the second chapter, the professionalization and
commercialization of acting developed at a time when the spread of capitalism happened
through deliberate and obvious colonization and occupation of land and the control and
repression of the bodies of people deemed Others. The nationalist project of modernism
relied on drawing and maintaining boundaries, and resulted in/was the result of a binary
way of thinking: Us versus Them. While humanism held the seeds of being a populist,
democratizing and potentially radical development, in this context what was deemed
universal and human was, in fact, clearly white, male, Christian and heterosexual, and the
exclusionary practices associated with it were devastating for people not meeting those
qualifications. Consequently, particularly in the United States, the supposed objectivity,
truth and authenticity required of professional actors severely limited opportunities for
people who fell outside of dominant categories of identity, or who did not wish to
reproduce repressive notions of their own identity groups. Many non-whites, women,
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lesbians, gays and bisexuals, and working-class people found it difficult if not impossible
to maintain careers in the theatre or even in film.
After World War II, with the advent of the Cold War and the continued pressure
to accept capitalism and American nationalism as one and the same, Bruce McConachie
notes that the environment, dominated by metaphors of containment, promoted rigid
conceptions of inside and outside. Especially for artists, McCarthyism had the
consequence of excluding people who lived in this country legitimately (whether their
families were compelled to come here by the allure of prosperity and freedom or were
forcibly removed from their homes and brought here as slaves), simply by virtue of their
beliefs, ethnicity, gender, sexual practices or economic status: it became possible to be
“un-American” even if one was born and raised within the geographic boundaries of the
United States. Many artists—particularly actors and directors—who had initially been
interested in work that was revolutionary in both form and content were forced to choose
between maintaining careers in their chosen fields and continuing to be outwardly and
vocally dedicated to social change. This rift eventually became evident in training
programs for theatre: people who wished to pursue more traditional theatre forms (and
film or television) as a career were encouraged to enroll in BFA, MFA or other
professional training programs, and those more specifically interested in socially
engaged, experimental or “political” theatre were directed to the less lucrative but more
theoretically inclined field of performance studies.
The curricula of these two types of programs became equally divided.
Stanislavski-based training, with its focus on internal psychology, emotional truth,
289
external conflict and individual progress, dominated the realm of professional programs.
Performance studies became the purview of “Outsiders.” These academic programs were
where students engaged with experimental theatre and its interest in ensemble interaction,
non-realistic forms and feminist, queer and Marxist theory. Performance studies also
encompassed the interdisciplinary and postmodern practice of performance art.
Autobiographical performance by non-whites, women, people who claimed queer
sexuality and others who wished to resist the competitive and money-oriented values of
capitalism was a means of asserting subjectivity and drawing attention to the effects of
culture and language on the body. This kind of performance was often concerned with
questions of hybridity and straddling borders; it challenged notions of a stable and unified
America or a universal “human” by emphasizing difference, multiplicity and
internationalism. Performance Studies, in fact, valued its stance outside of mainstream
culture: its marginalized status made possible incredibly valuable collaborations with
other fields and art forms, exploring risky topics and experimenting with formal
strategies that resisted the market-driven values of mainstream cultures. Interestingly,
while professional programs were dominated by Stanislavski-based training, they often
introduced other, more “externally-based” practices. Performance Studies, on the other
hand, outside of critical analyses of traditional theatre, realism, and actor training, steered
clear of The Stanislavski System or The Method. Because of suspicion that any
methodology claiming objectivity and universal truth hid motives of colonialism and
repression, those tools were all but discarded instead of being taken apart with the
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intention of finding productive ways of transforming them for use in contemporary
contexts.
Solo performance art became fully established as a genre and Performance
Studies gained increasing credence as a field of scholarship around the same time as the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, a
fact which in many ways made the postmodern border-crossing tactics and focus on
hybridization less effective as resistant strategies. Capitalism itself, while it still relied on
American nationalism and violent occupation, also began to work increasingly on and
through individual bodies using a rhetoric of inclusion that gradually incorporated the
entire globe. Althusser termed this hegemonic process “interpellation” and Foucault
called it “biopower”: each individual body was implicated equally in the spread of
capitalist values, as the participation of each one was supposedly free and voluntary. At
the same time, advances in electronic technology made possible the ostensible erasure of
bodies, boundaries, time and space, eliminating geographical determinations of difference
with increasing speed. While this process makes the assertion of difference and the focus
on bodies embraced by performance art increasingly important, it also attests to the
metaphoric power of humanist rhetoric.
If, as Joseph Roach suggests, actor training throughout history has reflected
philosophical and scientific views of the body, I would suggest that, in turn, views of the
body follow general cultural metaphors that also inform geographic and ideological
concepts of national identity. While the strategic formation of Performance Studies as a
resistant discipline was incredibly useful in the postmodern economic and political
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environment, the increased spread of global corporate capitalism has combined similar
relativist, border-crossing strategies with a powerful rhetoric of universality, human need
(to have and produce more money, primarily) and concepts of “freedom” and
“democracy” to its advantage. Significantly, though, these corporate tactics also rely on
electronic technology and its ability to all but erase time, space and, significantly, the
suffering and change of actual human bodies—global capitalist values can easily
associate image with truth because they lack a basis in human, embodied experience.
Critical pedagogy has recognized this historical situation, and made attempts to re-
introduce bodies into the classroom in order to increase students’ awareness of how
history has shaped their bodies, but also what role students’ real bodies and their
experiences play in shaping the world. Essentially, I am searching for ways that teachers
and practitioners of acting can incorporate ideas from critical pedagogy to reflect
concepts of actual bodies that involve a physical negotiation of global, human, unified
ideals, new technologies and the generative power of desire; but in a way that also deals
with the daily facts, experiences and values of real human bodies.
In terms of acting, I have noted the ways in which Anna Deavere Smith’s work
models a dialectical philosophy of the body that reflects both a Marxian concept of
history as a moving totality that incorporates difference and what Lakoff and Johnson call
an “experientialist” view that negotiates between objectivity and subjectivity, the
intellect, emotion, imagination and the desire to, as Deavere Smith herself puts it, “cross
the bridge” between self and Other. Creating performances based on this model as one
step of training and rehearsal processes develops an understanding of body,
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consciousness and identity as being constantly transformed by interactions with other
people and other elements of history and culture; actors retain the useful elements of
Stanislavski-derived training (desire, empathy, and identification), while also being
conscious (in a Brechtian way) of the degree to which a character’s attributes (and an
actor’s choices regarding them) are learned and reproduced socially and culturally.
In some ways, Deavere Smith’s process is like the utopian re-imagining of their
bodies that Pace and Dalton go through in The Trestle at Pope Lick Creek. Rather than
engaging communities in a conversation only about an actual historical event or one issue
such as race, however, I am interested in borrowing the same “documentary” techniques
using plays, theatrical performances and characters as the imaginative and creative events
around which actors base their conversations with community members. Certainly, issues
of gender, ethnicity and class will be significant to these dialogues, as are actual historic
experiences—how those issues and events inform the choices made in developing a
unified identity to be performed by an actor in a play seems a possible way of
overcoming the Cartesian bias that has prevented actors from recognizing the extent of
their power, intellectual capacity, and civic responsibility. It also reaches for a
reconciliation of the distinction between the academic discipline of Performance Studies
and the more utilitarian practice of Theatre training.
This methodology is equally indebted, in many ways, both to Stanislavski and to
Anna Deavere Smith, whose work I see as extensions of each other rather than drastic
departures. Stanislavski’s work was undertaken in the legacy of Enlightenment efforts to
define tools that might be applied as standardized scientific disciplines, but in actual
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practice his techniques began in an attempt to solve the problems of a particular role in a
particular realistic play, with the goal of finding ways to make his performance of a role
more clearly reflective of life in the context of the play’s circumsances. While he may
have begun each process applying the standards and techniques he had previously
developed, his ideas and ways of working changed with each project on which he
worked: the characters and the scripts themselves informed shifts in his methodology. In
the same way, Deavere Smith goes about her work attempting to reproduce the words and
physical responses of her interlocutors as accurately as possible, resulting in changes to
her own body that vary with each event on which she works and each person with whom
she speaks. The process about which I have written was a direct descendent of this kind
of work: I looked to the form and content of the plays themselves, the characters and the
people working on them, and the context of the productions as blueprints for shaping the
training and rehearsal processes.
Instead of the commonly accepted notion that it is only the playwright who truly
imagines the world of a theatrical production and therefore can effect change, this
methodology takes its cue from Raymond Williams in considering that, rather than
determining the behavior of actors, it sets limits or “exerts pressure.” Including Anna
Deavere Smith’s process allows the play to become the basis for dialogue, so that the
participants in conversations surrounding it recycle, interpret and change the pieces of the
play or of history, imagining them into a new possible future event. Charles Mee’s work,
on which I based the third chapter, provided the inspiration for this format: his
intertextual, hypertext writing provides a form that calls for the participation of bodies as
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much as it provides the language and structure that shape the characters and production.
Like Mee’s plays, beyond giving a general theoretical framework, this methodology of
actor training can only be written about in the context of specific cases, since it relies on
the changing meanings produced with each new group of people, texts and historical
conditions. The work we did on our production of Mee’s The Trojan Women: A Love
Story applied to the work of the actor his description of artistic work of all kinds: “it’s
this kind of wonderfully paradoxical creation that’s both a product of the culture and of
some individual’s sensibility. But the tendency to choose that it’s either one or the other
is probably an oversimplification.”
Our project, then, developed as a “workshop production” for the Payne Theatre in
the University of Texas Department of Theatre and Dance in the post-September 11
context of the initial stages of the war in Iraq, was an amalgam of many different kinds of
texts. It began with the basics of Stanislavski and Viewpoints training, community-based
interviewing and solo performance, Euripedes and Berlioz and the various pieces of
script Mee chose to fill in those plays, and some songs collected from the public domain.
We began with a desire to find some kind of empathy with victims of war and raise
questions about its consequences, and, inspired by the play’s dialectical structure, also to
wonder about the possibilities for redemption through love and connection. Because this
was live theatre, our interest was also in, literally, “fleshing out” Mee’s body-focused
language: how could our physical interaction with all of these different texts make a
difference in a supposedly disembodied, technology-and-money driven world? The result
was a closely-knit and energetic ensemble of actors whose embodiments of conversations
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with victims of various kinds of trauma, people who were or had been in love, people
who were concerned with shaping their bodies in particular ways, a mercenary who made
money through violence, a sex worker who made money through pleasure, and others,
informed their understandings of mythic characters. Rather than only being individual
meditations on ideas about war and love, the actors’ interpretations of character in
performance were ghosted by traces of the experiences of embodying their research and
conversations, and had the potential to be more engaged and transformational processes.
My continued experimentation with this process allowed me to consider how
using such an intertextual methodology for acting might raise questions about how
gender is both culturally inherited and interpreted through individual embodied
experience. I was inspired by Ava Coo in Phyllis Nagy’s play The Strip, whose
performances of gender are intended to be subversive of dominant concepts of gender—
she is “a girl who pretends to be a girl so people will look at her in a different light”—but
by the play’s end also end up being inclusive and humanizing as her idea of success and
identity changes. She becomes aware of how significant the people with whom she
interacts have been to her success and to the development of her own gendered identity,
and acknowledges that—instead of an abstract idea of success and “being somebody”—it
could be her body’s need for affection, love, comfort and pleasure that compel her
particular performances of gender.
Like the drag performers I interviewed and like the character who led me to
conduct these interviews, I began to think of the ways that this process makes possible a
theory of identity that is multiple and positive and full of possibility rather than exclusive
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and singular. While identity and presence are most powerful when they make strong,
bold, active choices and statements, this power actually arises from a series of multiple
identifications that periodically (and temporarily) coalesce into the illusion of unity
through the body of an actor (like observations and interactions with many women come
together to form the identities of drag queens, or like stars gather strength from the
multiplicity of contradictory texts that make up their personae). Through taking the step
to make explicit the interactive journey and the need for border crossing, the variety and
contradiction, and the physical exchanges involved in the formation of a persona, it
becomes less necessary to subvert gender identity; acknowledging it as a complicated and
multiple process of choice might give an actor license to revel in the pleasure and power
of acting like a woman (or man). That is, through exposing everyone’s gender and
everyone’s desire as queer is an alternative model of global humanism that can be strong
in its actions while avoiding the exclusionary and rigid pressures of traditional white,
straight and male capitalist individualism.
Using these plays—Naomi Wallace’s The Trestle at Pope Lick Creek, Charles
Mee’s The Trojan Women: A Love Story and Phyllis Nagy’s The Strip—as the frames
through which I planned to re-imagine traditional models of actor training and hope to
overcome the rift between the scholarly projects of performance studies and the practice
of professional acting steered my thinking about an experiential and interactive practice
for actors in a particular direction. Clearly, this is simply the tip of the iceberg where this
process of training and rehearsal is concerned, and its application in other contexts
provides ample room for more research and development. For example, I would like to
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agree with those people who think of Stanislavski-based training as being applicable to
any kind of play, but not in a necessarily objective sense—it certainly can be applied in
any context, with the provision that the meanings resulting from its use will always be
different. In the same way, I would suggest that an interactive, community-and-interview-
based process might be applied in any theatrical context and used with any kind of script,
even though my thinking about it was born through work on contemporary and primarily
postmodern plays whose theoretical underpinnings are similar to those of the process
itself.
I have continued my own research on the process, for example, through teaching
an acting course on characterization at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas.
During the first semester I taught the course, Spring 2006, I gave students the option
choose a character and scene from one of four different plays that seemed to hold a lot of
potential for characterization: Chekhov’s The Three Sisters, Tony Kushner’s Angels in
America, Tennessee Williams’s A Streetcar Named Desire and Charles Mee’s Big Love.
There were only ten students in the class, and half of them chose Angels in America. All
but one of the students were women, and they varied slightly in ethnicity and national
identity: two students were from Africa, one was born and raised in Texas but identified
herself as half-Palestinian, and the rest were white and Texan. For the most part, these
students chose to focus on difference in their choice of characters. Two pairs of women
chose the scene from which the play’s title is taken—the conversation in a coffee shop
between Belize, an African-American former drag performer, and Louis, a Jewish gay
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man—they were performing, for the most part, across race, gender and sexuality
(although one of the African students chose Belize as her character).
Across the board, however, the interview process the students undertook didn’t
result in a focus on the cultural differences between them and their interviewees or their
characters. When I asked the students what they learned from the process of talking to
other people who had some point of intersection with their characters, they all stated that
they had more empathy for their characters’ plights. The weight of Belize and Louis’s
relationship with Prior, who is dying of AIDS, became more clear to all of them, and the
emotional values of the scene were richer than one might ever expect from nineteen or
twenty-year-old actors in a small college town in Texas. When cultural difference
between the actors and their characters was incredibly evident through the language of
the scene itself, their emotional sameness and identification was underlined through the
interview process.
This semester, Spring 2006, I decided to choose a different kind of play
altogether. All of the students in my characterization class read only one play: Thornton
Wilder’s Our Town. The class is larger this time—twenty students—and as a result has
even more demographic diversity. I was surprised that only two or three students were
already familiar with a play that I consider to be one of the most canonical plays for
junior high and high school acting students in the United States, but I chose it because I
suspected that it would be extremely familiar to them and to their interviewees. We are
very early in the process of the course, and students have read the play at this point and
done some dramaturgical research on the play itself, the historical context of its writing,
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and have also considered the differences in concepts of daily life, marriage and death—
the topics of each of the plays three acts—in various cultures. Our Town is understood by
some to be a universal picture of humanity, as Donald Margulies writes in his
introduction:
The perfection of the play starts with its title. Grovers Corners belongs to
all of us; it is indeed our town, a microcosm of the human family, genus
American. But in that specificity it becomes all towns. Everywhere.
Indeed, the play’s success across cultural borders around the world attests
to its being something much greater than an American play: it is a play
that captures the universal experience of being alive (xvii).
Already, however, through the research they have done, students have noticed the
specificity of the play to the historical circumstances it represents. As the stage manager
says in Act I,
So I’m going to have a copy of this play put in the cornerstone and the
people a thousand years from now’ll know a few simple facts about us …
So—people a thousand years from now—this is the way we were in the
provinces north of New York at the beginning of the twentieth century.—
This is the way we were: in our growing up and our marrying and our
living and in our dying. (33)
I also chose the play because of Wilder’s experimentation with form: the lack of
detailed, realistic sets, as one of the students pointed out in discussion, has the effect of
giving focus to the actor’s bodies: if someone has to pantomime cooking, for example, or
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serving dinner, or working, the audience pays attention to how each character performs
those actions. No interviews have been conducted yet, but I have encouraged students to
choose interviewees whose cultural backgrounds are different than their own or those of
the characters in the play to see how difference enlivens their understandings of
performing Our Town in a supposedly global cultural context: how might we turn Our
Town into Our Globe?
One of the most significant elements of this training and rehearsal process with
which I have unfortunately dealt very little is how it fares on the reception end. I am
interested, clearly, in producing conditions conducive to utopian performatives, but
documenting and analyzing the responses of interviewees and allowing those to inform
the choices of actors in performance is perhaps the most important area for further
research on this methodology. One of Jill Dolan’s primary questions in Utopia in
Performance surrounds the documentation of audience affect; if, as she suggests,
“Audiences form temporary communities, sites of public discourse that, along with the
intense experience of utopian performatives, can model new investments in and
interactions with variously constituted public spheres,” (10) then “How can we chronicle
an audience’s response, in the moment of performance” (169)?
It seems to me that if the relationship between these temporary communities
(which also include actors and other theatre practitioners) is set up as a conversation
rather than simply one of spectators witnessing a representation, the use of audience
responses in rehearsal and production concepts is even more significant because it
becomes an essential part of how decisions are made. Dwight Conquergood wrote about
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this kind of exchange in the changing methods of ethnographic reporting in the field of
anthropology: “The project of radical empiricism changes ethnography’s traditional
approach from Other-as-theme to Other-as-interlocutor, and represents a shift from
monologue to dialogue, from information to communication” (17). How might this
process, in which audiences become interlocutors, document interactions before, during
and after performances in ways that transform the resulting grounds for further
performance of plays, scripts and characters? What effect does it have on the experience
of actors’ virtuosity and presence to have been a part of their process from its initial
stages? Is it empowering for audiences to recognize the ways they have informed and
possibly changed the process of representation? Is there a feeling of pride having taken a
direct part in an actor’s transformation into a character? Can interviewees/audience
members recognize their contributions in the final performance, and how is that a
departure from their responses to previous plays in which they did not feel like a bigger
part of the conversation?
My interest in the importance of including the audience as part of the
conversations in rehearsal and performance and finding ways to document their
participation is also connected to another important area of research on this methodology:
the importance of new electronic technology for the work of actors in a global climate. In
the course on Our Town, I am requiring students to create Myspace profiles for their
characters. This assignment involves adding both interviewees and the other characters
from the class as friends, in order to turn the project into an online community. Not only
do I think it will be interesting and fun for students to use a format used to invent an
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online “virtual” identity in the process of creating a character, I also think the “Myspace”
phenomenon itself mirrors the kind of process the students are undertaking: these profiles
include subjective thoughts in the form of blog entries, for example, but also allow
students to post images and songs that influence their impressions of character identities
and to accept comments from classmates and interviewees that I hope will inform the
choices they make when they perform scenes. It also occurs to me that technology has
driven not only views of the body throughout history, but also has shaped concepts of
acting in important ways: Stanislavski’s attempts at reproducing life more “objectively”
came at a time when photographic imagery was increasing in clarity and specificity.
Actors had at their disposal the possibility of looking at photographs of people who
matched the types of characters they were to represent. Anna Deavere Smith began to
work at a time when video technology made it possible for her to view her interviewee’s
responses over and over again in the interest of attempting accuracy. As technology
continues to become more precise and user-friendly, how does it affect actors’
performances of others? At the same time, how can actors tap into the democratizing
potential of internet technology that makes possible online conversation with people
across the globe? How do these technologies that make both empirical accuracy and
interactive conversation more feasible inform actors’ live and local performances of plays
and characters? The use of technology in acting also runs the risk, however, of excluding
people who don’t have access to computers—in this case, how can actors trained in this
kind of environment recognize how technology and the use of it affects their work and
303
their perception of identity, while not making their processes contingent on the use of
electronic media?
All of my experimentation with this methodology, thus far, has been in academic
settings, and even if some of the work has been done with students who intend to go on to
professional careers, the division between theatre in academia and in the professional
realm still exists, maintaining the dilemma that Robert Brustein suggests actors face:
social activism or a comfortable career? Ultimately, I hope that this process might be
used successfully in professional settings, as well: it is my feeling that this would be the
most effective means of replacing or at least supplementing the financial goals of most
theatre with increasingly humanist ones. But again, resources inevitably exert pressure on
actors to work in a particular way: a professional actor would have to make the choice to
devote time outside of rehearsal and performances—of which there is precious little—to
interviewing community members and creating solo performances and maintaining
contact whether online or in person, most likely at the expense of relaxation or family
relationships or other important life pursuits. In essence, this process would require actors
to have two full time jobs. This is another area ripe for further investigation: how might
actors trained in academic settings using this process find ways to incorporate it into their
professional lives?
Ideally, I think, theatres would have to be willing to make allowances for this and,
possibly, incorporate “festival” settings in their seasons more frequently. I envision this
happening as a series of events: symposia on the play being produced, workshops, open
rehearsals, installations including pieces of videotaped interviews, interactive websites,
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evenings of solo performance by actors based on their interview processes, and, as the
culmination of this series, a production of the play itself. Would this kind of setting
actually invigorate people’s desire to attend theatre? If there was the possibility of
recognizing themselves or their neighbors in a staged production, would theatre seem
more relevant to some people who don’t usually attend? Might this even stimulate the
economy of regional theatres if more people took an interest in subscribing to a season in
which they actually had some participation and vested interest? How might
democratizing actors’ characterizations actually change the perception of acting as a
profession and live theatre as an institution?
These are statements of grand and hopeful possibilities, but I hope that the initial
work I have done on historicizing actors’ training and rehearsal processes in the United
States, theorizing changes that may make their work more relevant in a global context
and discovering how this theory applies in particular production contexts might generate
significant interest in further experimentation and investigation. My hope is that small
changes in the conditions of actors’ training and practice—in individual college courses,
for example—can help people recognize the power theatre has to imagine and transform
the grounds for future action. I believe that through opening up their work on plays and
characters to conversation with larger communities, actors can see the work they do as a
powerful arena for civic dialogue and activism, and will recognize both the significant
emotional, intellectual and physical power they can possess and the great social
responsibility that accompanies that power. By setting the conditions for these
conversations between actors and audiences in a way that encourages utopian physical
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exchanges of bodies, identities, and imaginations, maybe these temporary communities
can experience both difference and human empathy by engaging in an interactive process
of labor with a group of people, can understand how their work imagines and enacts new
possible conditions for living, and can say (with a confidence that was previously taken
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